Institutionendynamik. Zweck- System- und Wertrationalität sozialen Handelns
Mateusz Stachura
Cite this publication as
Mateusz Stachura, Institutionendynamik. Zweck- System- und Wertrationalität sozialen Handelns (26.04.2024), Beltz Juventa, 69469 Weinheim, ISSN: 2195-0695, 2013 #1, p.98
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Description / Abstract
Welche institutionelle Dynamik prägt die Entwicklung moderner Gesellschaften? Im ökonomischen Forschungsprogramm reagieren zweckrationale Akteure auf einen zunehmenden Umweltdruck mit dem Abbau institutioneller Normen. In der Systemtheorie reagieren soziale Systeme auf einen zunehmenden Umweltdruck mit dem Ausbau und der Verdichtung institutioneller Programme. Die Einseitigkeiten der jeweiligen Modellprognose (Institutionalisierung/Deinstitutionalisierung) legen es nahe, nach vermittelnden Alternativen Ausschau zu halten. Solch eine Alternative wird in einer Theorie sozialer "Spiele" identifiziert, die sich im Anschluss an Boltanski/Chiapello entwickeln lässt. Spiele sind Komplexe regelgeleiteten Handelns, das zugleich kompetitiv und normativ reguliert ist. Je nach der Spielkonstellation (Geschlossenheit oder Distinktionsschwäche) führt der zunehmende Konkurrenzdruck dabei entweder zu einer Verschärfung oder einer Entschärfung der institutionellen Spielregeln des Handelns.
Schlagwörter: Institution, Rationalität, soziale Spiele, Systemtheorie, ökonomisches Forschungsprogramm
Institutional Dynamics. Functional, System, and Value Rationality.
What institutional dynamics are shaping the development of modern societies? In the economic research program rational actors respond to a growing environmental pressure by dismantling institutional norms. In the systems theory, social systems respond to a growing environmental pressure with the expansion and consolidation of institutional programs. The one-sidedness of the model prediction (institutionalization/deinstitutionalization) suggests to seek mediating alternatives. Such an alternative could be identified in a theory of social "games" that can be developed following the theory of Boltanski/Chiapello. Games are complexes of a rule-governed behavior that is both competitive and normatively regulated. Depending on the game configuration (closeness or weakness of distinction) the increasing competitive pressures may either aggravate or defuse the institutional rules of action.
Keywords: institution, rationality, social games, systems theory, economic research program
Schlagwörter: Institution, Rationalität, soziale Spiele, Systemtheorie, ökonomisches Forschungsprogramm
Institutional Dynamics. Functional, System, and Value Rationality.
What institutional dynamics are shaping the development of modern societies? In the economic research program rational actors respond to a growing environmental pressure by dismantling institutional norms. In the systems theory, social systems respond to a growing environmental pressure with the expansion and consolidation of institutional programs. The one-sidedness of the model prediction (institutionalization/deinstitutionalization) suggests to seek mediating alternatives. Such an alternative could be identified in a theory of social "games" that can be developed following the theory of Boltanski/Chiapello. Games are complexes of a rule-governed behavior that is both competitive and normatively regulated. Depending on the game configuration (closeness or weakness of distinction) the increasing competitive pressures may either aggravate or defuse the institutional rules of action.
Keywords: institution, rationality, social games, systems theory, economic research program