Between Presidential Power and Legislative Veto
Andreas Hahn
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Andreas Hahn, Between Presidential Power and Legislative Veto (2010), Logos Verlag, Berlin, ISBN: 9783832597276
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Beschreibung / Abstract
Reform success and reform delay are subject to a variety of explanations. In general, high decisiveness leads to reform propensity, while its absence, or high resoluteness, to policy-gridlock.
The Brazilian reform experience is contradicting: both aspects are present -- factors leading to decisiveness as well as those inducing gridlock and reform delay. Leaving the static point of view and accounting for a dynamic development, this apparent contradiction gets resolved: in fact, the executive gained growing leeway during the 1990s, providing it with the means to achieve a higher degree of decisiveness of the political system by simultaneously guaranteeing resoluteness.
It is, however, greatly mistaken to consider this development as a blank cheque to universal, encompassing reforming in all areas. Despite growing executive dominance and growing policy consensus, some particular reforms were a success, while others did not surpass its initial stages. This is finally due to path-dependency and explicit policy-specificities, triggering different institutional constraints and veto-points, which even strong Presidents cannot override.
The Brazilian reform experience is contradicting: both aspects are present -- factors leading to decisiveness as well as those inducing gridlock and reform delay. Leaving the static point of view and accounting for a dynamic development, this apparent contradiction gets resolved: in fact, the executive gained growing leeway during the 1990s, providing it with the means to achieve a higher degree of decisiveness of the political system by simultaneously guaranteeing resoluteness.
It is, however, greatly mistaken to consider this development as a blank cheque to universal, encompassing reforming in all areas. Despite growing executive dominance and growing policy consensus, some particular reforms were a success, while others did not surpass its initial stages. This is finally due to path-dependency and explicit policy-specificities, triggering different institutional constraints and veto-points, which even strong Presidents cannot override.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
- BEGINN
- 1 Confronting the Challenges of the “Lost Decade† – Reform Dynamics in Brazil between Heterodoxy and Orthodoxy
- 1.1 Introduction – Structure of the Dissertation
- 1.2 The Relevance of the Brazilian Economic Reforms as Empirical Foundation
- 2 Crafting Market Reforms with Multiple Veto-Players – The Theoretical Conditions of Reform Capability
- 2.1 The Rational-Choice Perspective
- 2.2 Elaborating a Basic Institutional Perspective with Rational-Choice Elements
- 3 Endogeneous Institutions and the Political System: Increasing Decisiveness and Reform Capability
- 3.1 Blurring Policy and Polity – The Brazilian Constitution
- 3.2 Between Gridlock and Electoral Success – Brazilian Politics after the Enactment of the 1988s Constitution
- 3.3 The Growing Leeway of the Executive in the 1990s: Decisiveness and Indecisiveness in a Dynamic Perspective
- 3.4 Increasing Decisiveness and the Tightening of the Federal Budget by Reconstitutionalization
- 4 Gridlock, Delay and Success of Particular Reform Projects
- 4.1 Success of Privatization – Few Veto-Actors, Strong Consensus and Reconstitutionalization
- 4.2 Delay of Social Security Reform – Numerous Veto-Players, Weak Consensus and Constitutional Status-Quo-Orientation
- 4.3 Failure of Tax Reform – Few, yet Strong Veto-Players and Missing Political Will
- 4.4 Conclusion
- 5 Summary and Central Findings
- 6 Bibliography