Rationality in Social Interactions

Guido Olschewski

Cite this publication as

Guido Olschewski, Rationality in Social Interactions (2009), Logos Verlag, Berlin, ISBN: 9783832598709

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Descripción / Abstract

The analysis of human decision making in social sciences is often based on a conception of rationality. This dissertation contains three microeconomic models, which directly build on the rationality assumption in economic theory. We model agents endowed with rational preferences and analyze how such preferences translate into decisions in a given social interaction. In particular, we present three different models: (1) Arrovian social choice theory with delegation as a feasible policy alternative; (2) Game theory and the existence of mental equilibrium in 2x2 games; (3) Information economics and its application to analyzing stakeholder participation in electronic health record networks.

Índice

  • BEGINN
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Non-Dictatorial Social Choice through Delegation
  • 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 Setup
  • 2.3 Four Arrovian Conditions
  • 2.4 Result
  • 2.5 A Stronger Weak Extension
  • 2.6 Conclusions
  • 3 Existence of Mental Equilibrium in 2x2 Games
  • 3.1 Introduction
  • 3.2 Fundamentals of Mental Equilibrium
  • 3.3 Setup
  • 3.4 Nash Equilibrium and Mental Equilibrium
  • 3.5 Maxmin Strategies and Mental Equilibrium
  • 3.6 †™I don†™t care†™ Strategies
  • 3.7 Mental Equilibrium: Existence in 2x2 Games
  • 3.8 Introducing Emotions into Game Theoretic Models: Alternative Approaches
  • 3.9 Conclusions
  • 4 Electronic Health Record Networks: An Economics Perspective
  • 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 Electronic Health Record Networks
  • 4.3 Information Economics and the Particularities of Medical Data
  • 4.4 The Model†”Supply of HIV Test Data to an EHR Network
  • 4.5 Conclusions

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