


Stephan Kessler

Theories of
Metaphor
Revised



λογος

STEPHAN KESSLER
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Against a Cognitive Theory of Metaphor:
An Apology for Classical Metaphor

by
Stephan Kessler

Second edition
revised by Tim Ochser (†)

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de> .

Coverpicture: [iStock.com/MATJAZ SLANIC](https://www.istock.com/MATJAZ%20SLANIC)

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ISBN 978-3-8325-4701-1

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Comeniushof, Gubener Str. 47,
10243 Berlin
Tel.: +49 (0)30 42 85 10 90
Fax: +49 (0)30 42 85 10 92
INTERNET: <http://www.logos-verlag.de>

... it is, rather, of the essence of our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, I, § 89

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

This book deals with the theory of metaphors developed by Lakoff and Johnson, known as cognitive theory of metaphors or conceptualism. Their work follows in the footsteps of Max Black who, for his part, devised his theory from the work of Ivor Armstrong Richards. The ideas of Lakoff and Johnson are commonly alluded to in specialist literature on literary studies, presumably because of the perspectives they offer in criticizing current ideologies. However, Lakoff's and Johnson's notion of metaphor is not without problems when it comes to classical (rhetorical) metaphor.

In order to show how conceptualism insufficiently deals with rhetorical metaphors, it is first necessary to have a clearer idea of classical metaphor itself. My theoretical sketch, therefore, also includes a discursive criticism of the existing models of metaphor. By analysing the functioning of metaphor, we find evidence for metaphor as a pragmatic phenomenon of natural languages. This evidence forms the beginning of my critique (chapters 3 and 4) and is followed by a critique of conceptualism itself (chapter 5). For further support I am obliged to range further afield (chapters 1 and 2) since metaphor affects our fundamental beliefs about human imagery and referentiality in language.

I am extremely grateful to Angela Kessler who gave generously of her time to translate my initial manuscript into English. Her insights and suggestions saved me from copious blunders and inspired many improvements. For the second edition, I would like to thank all those who provided helpful corrections, especially Bettina Bergmann, Annica Tews, Elisabeth Schliericke, Headley Noel, Christopher Gray and Kay Nitsch. Tim Ochser was an incredible help with the final version — I would like to express my sincere gratitude for his input. Sadly, he is no longer around to appreciate the final result.

Greifswald, Spring 2018

Stephan Kessler

CHAPTER ONE

The General Principles of Iconicity in Language

Metaphor, Polysemy, Homonymy. Iconic and Symbolic Thought

This book deals with a theoretical problem called imagery in literature. The problem is probably as old as the hermeneutic preoccupation with texts, meaning it has existed since the advent of theology and the earliest studies of literature. Admittedly, this is a rather vague account of the history of scholarship on imagery, which encompasses the link between hermeneutics, language and art. The reader is therefore advised to read Gadamer's more detailed history of hermeneutics (1990: 177–222; 2006: 172–214). Images in literature are generally seen as a particular instance of language-based imagery. This is because they are recognised as part of a particular, aesthetically defined context (mostly within artistic texts, i.e. literature). On the other hand, the more general phenomenon of imagery in language is characteristic of all texts since it forms an integral part of speech. Numerous authors (e.g. Hönigspurger 1994) have attested to this fact. In this regard, everybody knows *a posteriori* about this topic. In the following passage:

- (1) In der Tat **umschwirren** Lobbyisten die Politiker wie die Motten das Licht. Die **Strippenzieher** aus Unternehmen, Verbänden, Gewerkschaften und PR-Agenturen haben die Bundeshauptstadt längst **umzingelt**. (Burmeister 2008)

Transl.: Indeed lobbyists **buzz around** politicians like moths around the light. **String-pullers** from business, associations, unions and PR-agencies already have **encircled** the federal capital.

The words in bold are not to be understood in their literal sense. They are, rather, an example of figurative language (a term which includes the metaphors we will be looking at). In such cases we often speak of a 'picturesque' style (Germ. *bildlicher Wortgebrauch*), which is a somewhat misleading expression. This linguistic phenomenon does not create a real picture (Germ. *bildlich*) but is merely evocative of a picture (Germ. *bildhaft*). In other words, such language represents figures of thought (cf. Abrams 1999: 64–66).

Although we are aware of the figurative meaning in example 1, it is commonly held that the literal, standard or original meaning of such statements is also pertinent: it has been activated, if only temporarily. Kurz (1988: 18) says, 'When understanding a metaphor — while striving to grasp its meaning — we temporarily activate all the possible meanings and connotations of all the participatory words, their various combinations and affective qualities.'¹ Hülzer (1991: 50) argues in a similar vein.

1 Our translation; orig. in German: 'Wir aktualisieren bei der Metapher – auf der Suche nach ihrem Sinn – wenig-

Salim-Mohammad (2007: 42–43) aptly calls this ambiguity ‘polysemification’ (Germ. *Polysemierung*). Schumacher (1997: 23–24) has likewise compared polysemy with metaphors (i.e. imagery in language). However, what exactly is polysemy? Polysemy is often described as a gradual form of homonymy (and vice-versa). For instance, Lyons (1994: II, 550–569) argues that polysemy is needed to explain ‘the native speaker’s feeling’ of what is called ‘relatedness of meaning’ and ‘unrelatedness of it’ respectively, i.e. the ‘feeling that certain meanings are connected and that others are not’ (loc. cit.: 551).² This is why polysemy and homonymy are often analysed in tandem (see Koskela and Murphy 2006), and are ultimately connected to metaphor (Lyons 1994: II, 566–567; cf. the ‘metaphorical’ examples the three latter authors provide concerning homonymy and polysemy).

What secrets, then, are concealed behind the terms ‘polysemy’ and ‘homonymy’? How do they contrast with imagery in language? On the one hand, we are talking about polysemy, for example, when we consider the meanings of the word ‘school’ pertaining to ‘institution’, ‘building’, or ‘lesson’. The meanings seem to be derived from one another (relatedness), and they denote different aspects of the same object (Gauger 1970: 81–82). But in a given context or situation, the meanings of a polysemous word are not activated at the same time, as is characteristic of metaphor. In addition, the polysemous word is ‘open’ to being understood in one sense or another, not depending on the context of the initial utterance. On the other hand, we are referring to homonymy when we consider the two meanings of the word ‘bow’: ‘a weapon’ (e.g. ‘bow and arrow’) and ‘the front of the ship’ (e.g. ‘bow and stern’), or the meanings of ‘fluke’: ‘a fish’, ‘the end of the arm of an anchor’ and ‘a stroke of luck’. The meanings seem to be independent of one another and to denote different objects. Lyons (1994: II, 551–552 and *passim*), however, argues that the criterion of (un)relatedness is of little value because it is too subjective and only relates to what readers/listeners ‘feel’ when faced with homonymy. However, we can distinctly recognise homonymy whenever we encounter it with no harm done to our linguistic faculties! For instance, if someone is asked about their health following an accident, they could reply (in German):

- (1a) Es geht schon wieder, danke! Nur mit dem Gehen geht’s noch nicht so richtig. — *Transl. by sense*: It’s getting better, thanks! But I still can’t really walk properly.

The two meanings of *gehen*, ‘to feel, to be’ and ‘to go’, are evidently unrelated, otherwise the word *gehen* could not be used twice within the same sentence, and the whole utterance would be sheer nonsense (for more on this, see chapter 4.2). In spite of the differences of polysemy regarding relatedness, the meanings of a homonymous word are not simultaneously activated by the act of reference (as happens with metaphor).³

For this reason, we do not have examples like ‘school’ or ‘bow’ in mind when talking about metaphor and juxtaposing its figurative and literal sense. Kurz (1988: 17) has already observed that ‘the reader / listener has to be able to recall a dominant meaning as the original

tens zeitweise alle möglichen Bedeutungen und Konnotationen der beteiligten Wörter und Wortverbindungen, ihre affektiven Besetzungen.’

2 Lyons (1994) offers an additional explication of the term ‘relatedness’ on page 22, volume I.

3 For an explanation of the term ‘act of reference’ see below.

Table 1: Comparison of metaphor, polysemy and homonymy

Metaphor	Polysemy	Homonymy
Both the literal and figurative meaning of the statement is resonant	Several meanings of a word seem to be derived from one another ('relatedness')	Two meanings seem to be independent of one another ('unrelatedness')
Both meanings are distinguishable; however, in the right context the meanings are activated together	In a given context the meanings of a polysemous word are not activated together, but the polysemous word is 'open' to being understood in one sense or another	Only one meaning is activated in relation to a given context; the context specifies the homonymous word from the outset
Both meanings, literal and figurative, denote different objects, thoughts or qualities	All meanings denote different aspects of the same object or thought	The two meanings denote different objects so that a change in understanding can occur
The reader / listener is able to recall a dominant meaning as the primary meaning	All meanings are of equal status to the reader / listener	There is no question of confusion for the reader / listener

meaning otherwise we are not dealing with a metaphor but a polysemous word which can at times mean one thing, at times another.⁴ This means that a polysemous word can have several meanings of equal status whereas a metaphor cannot. In a headline from a newspaper article, for example, we read the following: 'Strange goings-on in school.' We are not able to decide right away which of the three meanings of the polysemous word 'school' is intended. Only further reading will settle the question of whether a teacher did something extraordinary in class, or the school has to be renovated because its windows keep opening by themselves, or the Minister of Education is displeased with the shamefully low exam pass rates. Polysemy stays semantically unspecified up to a certain point in the wording. Interestingly, in many cases polysemy remains unspecified altogether. With regard to Two-Level-Semantics (see chapter 3.2), polysemy is possible due to the fact that all concepts (words, expressions) are un- or underspecified (Pinkal 1985, esp. pp. 50–57) and can be applied as 'empty forms' in a wide range of situations. The concept of 'school' in our elliptical headline is underspecified with regard to 'institution', 'building', or 'lesson' to such an extent that the term could still technically fit any context requiring one of the three meanings.

A homonymous word denotes two (or more) semantically specified things (matters), but, unlike metaphor, does not do so at the same time but only in different contexts. In the incomplete sentence 'the mate looked at the bow...', only one meaning immediately springs to mind: the mate looked at the front of the ship. This is because the sentence beginning with 'mate' strongly suggests a maritime meaning for 'bow'. However, if the sentence were finished in the following way (after a dramatic pause) '...the bow, which he drew skilfully', the ending would come as something of a surprise to us. Such surprises can be found neither in polysemy nor

4 Our translation; orig. in German: 'dem Hörer/Leser eine dominante Bedeutung als Ausgangsbedeutung gegenwärtig sein muß, sonst handelt es sich nicht um eine Metapher, sondern um eine Polysemie, bei der ein Wort einmal dies und einmal etwas anderes bedeutet.'

in metaphor because a polysemous word is indeterminate regarding the aspects of its meaning (its equal status), and a metaphorical word has two meanings that resonate at the same time, one of the two is the dominant or primary meaning (see e.g. Piirainen 2016: 173); cf. table 1. Although polysemous words are somewhat different to metaphors, there is nevertheless a great deal of similarity between them. The process of understanding a metaphor might follow the same rules of cognition as the individual decision about which meaning of a polysemous word is relevant in a particular context.

A passage from a text arranged like that in example 1 is entertaining and interesting to read because the author has deliberately produced a tensional relationship between the two possibilities of understanding the meaning of the text. For both the producer (author, speaker) and the recipient (reader, listener) of a particular statement, a metaphor is essentially a game of wordplay (cf. chapter 1.2). That is to say, the game may revolve solely around the use of playful expressions in a specific communicative situation. That said, we may also be dealing with an advanced form of wordplay that is neither humorous nor playful but represents an epistemologically complex level of being (see below). Yuri Lotman considers the tensional relationship between the two possible ways of understanding the meaning of a metaphor from a semiotic point of view. For him, they are two means of communication that are characteristically untranslatable, as is typical of the relationship between iconic signs (e.g. images and visions) and symbolic signs (e.g. sentences and 'texts'). Lotman uses the term 'text' instead of 'sign' (this is common in semiotics) in order to underline the character of the signs by interweaving them together, and in order to stress their readability: 'Iconic (non-discrete, spatial) and verbal (discrete, linear) texts are reciprocally untranslatable. They definitely cannot express one and the same thought' (Lotman 1996: 109).⁵ However, this is exactly the quality that images in language (and verbal arts in particular) can use productively. According to Lotman, the act of generating a text is connected to a multifaceted semiotic transformation; on the border of both activated semiotic systems, an act of translation⁶ is being performed and a transformation of meanings is taking place which is not entirely predictable (op. cit.: 108): 'Thus vagueness increases on the borderline between them and this constitutes an increase in the reservoir of information' (op. cit.: 109).⁷ This 'increase' in information does not mean anything more than an increase in understanding. That is, the producer of a text ('text' according to semiotics) mentally moves between the iconic sphere and the symbolic sphere; according to semiotics, he/she thinks in two different languages. The unity of these two languages, says Lotman, is finally achieved by means of metaphor (op. cit.: 167).⁸ The use of metaphor, according to Lotman's theory, is the (verbal) attempt to achieve a unity of both languages of thought.

5 Our translation; orig.: 'Иконические (недискретные, пространственные) и словесные (дискретные, линейные) тексты взаимно неперевоимы, выражать "одно и тоже" содержание они не могут в принципе.'

6 The untranslatability of one 'text' into another becomes clear in certain forms of aphasia; some aphasia experts run into trouble by carrying out so-called 'transcoding' (as both semioticians and psycholinguists call translations between semiotic spheres); see e.g. Koll-Stobbe 1985.

7 Our translation; orig. in Russian: 'Поэтому на смыках их соположения возрастает неопределенность, которая и есть резерв возрастания информации.'

8 Our translation; orig. in Russian: 'единство различных языков устанавливается с помощью метафор.'

In his article about the Russian poets Boris Pasternak (1890–1960) and Vladimir Mayakovsky (1893–1930), Roman Jakobson (1989; first published in 1935) uses ‘metaphor’ and ‘metonymy’ as heuristic terms (as does Lotman) for the first time. Jakobson (1989: 202) uses these concepts to describe the artistic style of both poets, and applies them at the same time to explain the characteristics of poetry and prose in general. In Jakobson’s eyes, poems consist of a metaphorical structure. Their rhythm and sense are determined by a ‘similarity association’ (*Ähnlichkeitsassoziation*). Prose is characterised by a metonymic structure: the narrator starts with one concept/idea and ‘adds’ or equates it with a second concept/idea. The story is told in observance of continuity of time, space, and causality. Jakobson calls this gradual progress ‘contact association’ (*Berührungsassoziation*). Like Lotman, Jakobson (loc. cit.) judges the principle of metaphor to be epistemologically important: ‘The essence of tropes in poetry not only lies in the booking of manifold relations between things, but also in the shifting of familiar relations. The more strained the role of a metaphor is in a given poetical structure, the more resolutely traditional assignments are torn down, things are arranged newly on the basis of newly introduced generic concepts.’⁹

The editors of the volume of Jakobson’s writings cited here believe (Jakobson 1989: 192) that the concepts of metaphor and metonymy occupied an important role in Jakobson’s thinking after the Second World War, just as it would come to feature prominently in French structuralism (Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, etc.). Jakobson, who emigrated to the USA and subsequently began researching aphasia, also spoke of ‘degrees of similarity’ and about a ‘state of contiguity’ (Jakobson and Halle 2002: 74). According to structuralism, both aspects are general principles of language that are based on two different linguistic operations: first, a selection between alternatives (that which ‘implies the possibility of substituting one for the other, equivalent to the former in one respect and different from it in another’; loc. cit.), and, second, a combination of signs (‘this means that any linguistic unit at one and the same time serves as a context for simpler units and / or finds its own context in a more complex linguistic unit’; loc. cit.). Jakobson elaborates, ‘The development of a discourse may take place along two different semantic lines: One topic may lead to another either through their similarity or through their contiguity. The METAPHORIC way would be the most appropriate term for the first case and the METONYMIC way for the second, since they find their most condensed expression in metaphor and metonymy respectively’ (Jakobson and Halle 2002: 90). This insight is followed by an explanation Jakobson had first given in 1935: the two basic linguistic operations determine most elements of our culture and art because they embody the conditions of our linguistic ability to express ourselves. This was why Jakobson investigated the mechanisms by which humans think (Lotman likewise), although this was not his original area of interest (he had previously been preoccupied with aphasia). However, as the Latin proverb says: *pathologia illustrat physiologiam*.

9 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘Das Wesen der dichterischen Tropen liegt nicht nur in Buchung der vielfachen Beziehungen zwischen den Dingen, sondern auch in der Verschiebung der geläufigen Beziehungen. Je gespannter die Rolle der Metapher in der gegebenen dichterischen Struktur ist, desto entschiedener werden die überlieferten Einteilungen eingestürzt, die Dinge werden neu angeordnet, auf Grund neu eingeführter Gattungszeichen.’

With respect to their investigation of human thought, Lotman's and Jakobson's approach is comparable to conceptualism (i.e. the cognitive theory of metaphor; see chapter 5). Conceptualism is probably more akin to Jakobson's approach because Roman Jakobson became a professor at Harvard University in 1949 and started teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1957. It was there that George P. Lakoff studied under Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, and under Noam Chomsky as part of MIT's Linguistics programme.¹⁰ Jakobson's notion that a metaphor is a device to tear down traditional relations between things and their generic terms is a central tenet of conceptualism (albeit 'generic terms' are to be understood as 'categories of thought'). Conceptualists are also influenced by Jakobson in the sense that they focus on the sentence-level and thus tackle metaphors partly as a 'rhetorical' problem of discrete words, and partly according to the tradition of philosophical logic.

The iconic sphere, as Lotman imagines it, (besides having many cultural aspects) also corresponds in many ways to the thoughts, ideas and memories around which conceptualists construct their theory. However, cognitive theorists of metaphor do not seem to recognise an original iconic sphere of thought, nor do they seem to have any problems with the symbolic sphere. The question is whether they see any spheres at all. According to their philosophy, language is a well-specified emanation of thought that is performed both mechanically and by way of representation, thereby allowing for conclusions to be drawn about categories of thinking. In contrast with the cognitivists, Lotman acknowledges two ways in which thinking is performed and he elucidates their complete dissimilarity. Lotman (1996: 169–170) says: 'The structure of the semiotic sphere is asymmetrical. This is expressed by the system of directed flows of interior translations which pervade all layers of the semiotic sphere. Translation is a basic mechanism of consciousness. Expressing a thought by means of another language is the fundamental requirement for the understanding of this thought. As in most cases the different languages of the semiotic sphere are asymmetrical in a semiotic sense (i.e. they do not possess definite equivalents in meaning), so the whole semiotic sphere can be regarded as a generator of information.'¹¹

Although Lotman's stance needs to be considered from different angles, we find in his model that thought equals speech, or, strictly speaking, that the mode of speaking equals the mode of thought: Lotman does not differentiate between expressing oneself (i.e. producing 'texts') as required by one of the two 'languages', or thinking in terms of the iconic or symbolic sphere. In doing so, Lotman equates the concrete metaphor with specific thought content. The iconic imagination helps form human reality, such as how we understand the position of the earth in the universe, or how we perceive distances between known and unknown countries. It is important to note that this reality-forming or 'cosmologic' iconicity is grounded in the desire to understand the world, and not in the intention to play with words: the thought

10 This information comes from Mr Lakoff's personal homepage.

11 Our translation; orig. in Russian: 'Структура семиосферы асимметрична. Это выражается в системе направленных токов внутренних переводов, которыми пронизана вся толща семиосферы. Перевод есть основной механизм сознания. Выражение некоторой сущности средствами другого языка — основа выявления природы этой сущности. А поскольку в большинстве случаев разные языки семиосферы семиотически асимметричны, т.е. не имеет взаимно однозначных смысловых соответствий, то вся семиосфера в целом может рассматриваться как генератор информации.'

Table 2: Lotman's and Jakobson's concepts from the viewpoint of semiotics

	Yuri Lotman	Roman Jakobson
Iconic signs (structures, codes)	• Iconic sphere • Non-discrete, spatial texts ('text' according to semiotics)	• Poetry is made of a metaphorical structure • Here 'metaphor' denotes a sign (structure, code) that is determined by a 'similarity association' (later: 'selection between alternatives')
Symbolic signs (structures, codes)	• Symbolic sphere • Discrete, linear texts	• Prose is characterised by a metonymic structure • Here 'metonymy' denotes a sign (structure, code) that is determined by a gradual progress of continuity ('contact association', later: 'combination of signs')
Cognitive relation between iconic and symbolic signs (structures, codes)	• They cannot express one and the same thought; they are two different ways of thinking • The act of generating a text is connected to a multifaceted semiotic transformation • The producer of a text thinks in two different languages ('language' according to semiotics)	• A metaphor is a rhetorical device (trope) for tearing down traditional relations between things ('things are rearranged on the basis of newly introduced generic concepts')
Position of the concept of metaphor in the models of Lotman and Jakobson	• The unity of the two languages (the iconic and the symbolic) is ultimately achieved by means of metaphor • An applied metaphor is a (verbal) attempt to achieve unity between both languages of thought	• The development of a discourse may take place along two different semantic lines: one topic may lead to another either through their similarity ('metaphoric way') or through their contiguity ('metonymic way')

lets us form (i.e. formulate) reality, and the iconic sphere is an internal medium that allows us to do so. After understanding reality iconically, we can express our insights in several ways, including through translation into the symbolic sphere, i.e. into written texts or natural speech (the result of which means that metaphor acquires an 'epistemological function' — see next chapter). Insofar as the 'cosmologic' sign of the iconic sphere does not permit arbitrariness based upon a separation of the signifier (vehicle) from the signified (tenor), and thus represents (means) what it is (shows) (see Hickethier, 2003: 81–93),¹² it does matter what a specific cosmologic image is composed of or what it signifies. Expressing such an image entails thinking the world in a specific way; by using it subtly, moving within a specific 'world

12 In humanities such a sign is sometimes called 'literary image.' For instance, Gröbel (1987: 49) describes the literary image as the 'prototype of the original mythic sign' (*Prototyp des ursprünglichen mythischen Zeichens*): 'It was marked by the amalgamation of the perceived appearance and the perceiving observer. The mythic image always means what it conveys, and it merely signifies what it means. From the mythic image emanates everything it refers to' (*Es war durch die Verschmelzung von wahrgenommener Erscheinung und wahrnehmendem Betrachter gekennzeichnet. Das mythische Bild bedeutet stets das, was es mitteilt, und es bezeichnet nur das, was es bedeutet. In ihm kommt ganz zur Erscheinung, worauf es verweist*). Cf. also Kessler 1996: 282–284.

of images' and articulating an 'image of the world' (this does not exclude the particular, context-related meanings of the images used). Scholars have repeatedly emphasised this (e.g. Zybatow 2006) in their work on literary and 'cosmologic' images and with regard to the 'world(s) of images' used in texts by individuals and groups.¹³

The conceptualists pursue a line of argument that is critical of both images and linguistics yet deduce from single sentences and tropes 'equal' thought contents (cf. chapter 5 for a more detailed analysis). In other words, they proceed from the micro-level of the phenomenon of images (like Jakobson before them). The ideas outlined in the previous passage, in contrast, usually proceed from a semiotic ('cosmologic') or social macro-level and use any sources and speech forms in order to conclude what distinctive and widespread images depict and signify. At this point it is worth mentioning, drawing on the abundant body of writing that deals with this subject, Klaus Theweleit's (1980) seminal study of fascistic thought among certain sections of retired WWI veterans, in which he conducts a thorough analysis of their images of the world through the use of autobiographical texts, contemporary propaganda posters and other iconic source material.

Functionality. Two Meanings. Visualizing

The idea of imagery in language has yet another, less cognitive-semiotic dimension. This does not emphasise the aspects of words and thoughts, but the above-mentioned aspect of a 'game' we play when using language between ourselves. Gadamer (1990: 107–139; 2006: 102–130), Beckmann (2001: 109–124) *et al.*, and authors whose work can be found in the anthology edited by Bosse and Renner (1999), posited a 'ritual-full' way of being. This is a notion of behaviour with a Wittgensteinian dimension: 'game' is here meant to refer to the role character which constitutes every linguistic act and is used to emphasise that human behaviour, social roles and speech acts are bound by rules. These rules have to be accepted not as the 'natural' laws of nature but as 'debatable' social contracts. The nature of metaphorical statements is therefore bound to the rules of linguistic performance. Shibbes (1971b: 13, No. 13) argues that 'In ordinary language philosophy the meaning of a word is its use in a language-game so that to determine what the word means one needs only to look at the use of the language in its situation, e.g. 'How do you do' in the language-game of greeting someone. The expression has no separate meaning. Metaphor could be developed in terms of this meaning-is-its-use theory.' Shibbes' emphasis on word meaning is supported by Pinkal (1985: 29), who summarises the idea of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) by generalizing, 'Language is an open system of rules which governs the use of different expressions in differ-

13 In German, both concepts, 'world of images' and 'image of the world', can be expressed by punning: *Bildwelten* vs *Weltbilder*. Here, *Weltbild* is an established (as well as philosophical) term in German. Both concepts, either individually or together, have been used as an approach to analysing notions of reality, generating a copious amount of scholarly literature (at least in German) on worlds of images and images of the world. This research can easily be found using the appropriate key terms in German so further references will not be necessary.

ent communicative situations (partial). The significance of an expression can be described as being a mere collection of rules of applications.¹

Numerous scholars have acknowledged the dependence of meaning on context. The question is how can the language-game be identified (both in general and in particular) where metaphor is concerned? One answer is: by the communicative function metaphor fulfils. The 'functionality' (Salim-Mohammad) of figures of thought has been repeatedly emphasised by theorists of all stripes. Kurz (1988: 24) states, 'Metaphors, because of their expressive importance, do possess an important constitutional and structural function for the text.'² Literary science is acutely aware of the functionality of images in language. According to Salim-Mohammad (2007: 90), for instance, metaphors and other linguistic imagery can be used either as models for the gain of knowledge (i.e. an increase in understanding, as Lotman predicted) or as rhetorical ornamentation (i.e. as a phenomenon inherent to speech). In Salim-Mohammad's view, it all depends on the kind of text in which they appear. He mentions only two general functions for the use of figurative language: the epistemological function and the aesthetic function (cf. also Schumacher 1997: 77–84). Salim-Mohammad suggests that the latter frequently appears in scientific discourse whereas the former is characteristic of literature. It is used in literature because poets and authors are striving to understand the world they live in; it is used in science because metaphors are needed for ornamentation. This probably strikes you as strange: surely it should be vice versa! Why on earth don't scientists stick to the epistemological function of metaphors in their investigations of reality? Because metaphor is regarded by scientists as subjective and irrational. The language of science must be objective and unambiguous; this is why scientists believe that metaphors should only be used for aesthetic purposes. However, it is often the other way around. Various new research shows that all scientists employ linguistic imagery performing an epistemological function in their articles (cf. Hänseler 2009, Beyer and Lohoff 2005, Drewer 2003, Draaisma 1999, White 1994; cf. also Hülzer 1987: 281–285). It is certainly true that popular science made rich use of imagery in language in the 19th and 20th centuries, a fact that would make a worthy subject in itself for future research into metaphor; cf. the analyses of Schumacher (1997: 91–98).

Considering that science cannot do without metaphor and other figures of thought, it seems high time to rehabilitate both functions and their specific modes of reasoning (cf. chapter 1.1). The linguistic imagery once common to humanism (or, at least, iconicity in general) used to be regarded as the root of the discovery of *similitudines* of being, generally understood to be the purpose of the *scientia* at that time (Grassi 1992: 30). Blumenberg (1998) demonstrates in his insightful analysis of the 'powerful truth' (Germ. *die mächtige Wahrheit*) how the linguistic imagery we inherited from earlier times influences contemporary concepts and expressions. Tokarzewska (2013) offers a philosophical sketch in which she outlines the historical context of a few interesting literary images that expressed the *ignorabimus* (i.e. the

1 Our translation; orig. in German: 'Sprache ist ein offenes Regelsystem, das die Verwendungsmöglichkeiten verschiedener Ausdrücke in verschiedenen Situationen (partiell) festlegt; die Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks ist allenfalls als eine Ansammlung von Verwendungsregeln beschreibbar (vgl. Wittgenstein 1953).'

2 Our translation; orig. in German: 'Metaphern haben gerade wegen ihrer expressiven Bedeutung eine wichtige textkonstitutive und textstrukturierende Funktion.'

principle boundary of human knowledge) experienced by 18th-century philosophers and pre-romanticists. Lotman accords a systematic place to the importance of iconicity, i.e. images within us and our language. A modern methodology for the purposeful increase of knowledge by means of imagery, however, has still to be written, although the idea of it was conceived some time ago (Jäkel 2003: 35–36). Such a methodology would be greatly facilitated by the fact that we all are masters of the use of imagery in language. Although we usually do not know how we do it, we use images because we can through our communicative competence. We are able to conjoin the iconicity of metaphors and the imagery of language in a broader discursive context or to employ it for a suggestive transmission of what we ‘have in mind’.

It is therefore all the more astonishing that nobody — to the best of my knowledge — has yet proposed a terminological distinction: between rhetorical metaphors on the one hand, and ‘cosmological’ images on the other. It is surely self-evident that these form two separate categories. The confusion is compounded by the fact that academics interchangeably use the terms ‘metaphor’, ‘image’ and ‘icon’ as *termini technici* in order to refer both to the micro-level and the macro-level of our imaginary competence. For now, at least, we shall define the generic term as well as the respective *termini technici* as proposed in table 3 (a certain degree of inconsistency cannot be avoided at this stage). In doing so, it becomes evident that a linguistic code and single metaphors, respectively, and the literary image and the social image of the world, respectively, are intertwined. But where does one start and the other end? And in what way do the two levels relate to each other? These questions have hitherto remained unaddressed by experts.

It is unsurprising that metaphor itself has only recently been discovered as an essential noetic category. As Shibles (1971b: 19, No. 89) euphorically puts it, ‘Metaphor creates a new world, a world we would not have without it.’ It is quoted *inter alia* that metaphor is a way of applying our categories of thought. Although the connection between the utterance of a metaphor, its reception and the simultaneous reception of the background intention of explaining the world through it has so far remained vague, the discovery of this connection has excited scholars and inspired new research into the subject. As far as the idea of metaphor as a game of ‘figurative words’ is concerned, it can generally be stated that a speaker who has a particular situation in mind must have deliberately intended the semantic ambiguity of his utterance (Salim-Mohammad 2007: 91) or at least he must have approved of it because the primary pragmatic (perlocutive) effect of a metaphor comprises ambiguity (Kubczak 1986: 90–91). Continuing this train of thought and reformulating it in the terms of Grice (1991: 117–137) and Searle (1994: 77) means that the interpretation of figures of thought is not, at root, propositional; their interpretation does not correspond to the logical meaning of the sentence structure which is represented by the literal meaning of a figure.³ Grice and Searle emphasise the point that sentence meaning (‘that which is said’) is not utterance meaning (‘that which is expressed’) when dealing with imagery in language (as per example 1). How-

3 Specialists in other disciplines have also come to this realisation, e.g. Sperber and Wilson (1996: 231–237). However, because Sperber and Wilson support a conceptualist approach their examples are of little value (for the question of the examples cf. chap. 5.1).

Table 3: Terminological approaches

Visualizing (<i>ability to produce icons</i>) → images in general (<i>icon, hypoicon</i>)	
Microlevel	Macrolevel
Level of language code	Level of social knowledge
Metaphors (<i>and other tropes, figures</i>)	Literary , cosmologic images
Rhetoric; linguistic	Categories of thought
Double-sense structure: signifier vs signified	Represents (means) what it is (shows)
Iconicity of metaphors in language	Imagery of language, of groups
'Language game', symbolic sphere	'World of images', iconic sphere

ever, in contrast to both polysemy and homonymy the two meanings of a metaphor are clearly distinguishable in a given context (i.e. when questioned the reader/listener would be able to distinguish between them) and they are activated (understood, realised) simultaneously (together).

When iconicity is involved, there is a double sense structure (Levinson 1995:150–151): the image 'in the text' constitutes a unit of sense in itself. This is the sentence meaning. At the same time the image reveals in 'the eyes of the reader' a secondary meaning; the utterance meaning. Here, the division of 'text' versus 'reader' is only a figure of thought itself for the two levels of understanding (Kurz 1988: 7). In order to describe the two levels, we have already introduced the terms of Grice and Searle. But literary science frequently uses other, more traditional pairs of linguistic terms, such as the following:

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--------------------------|
| ● image in the text | — | meaning of the image, |
| ● image level | — | meaning level, |
| ● vehicle | — | tenor, |
| ● hypoicon | — | icon, |
| ● literal, original meaning | — | figurative meaning, etc. |

Literary science has long confounded theories regarding textual iconicity with the proper meaning of that which is expressed with such ambiguity. One difficulty for theorists is the fact that linguistic images can be embedded very differently in the structures of utterances and passages of text. In example 1, for instance, the question is whether the comparison 'like moths around the light' should be added to define the trope of the first sentence 'buzz around' or not. In the second sentence it is questionable whether the word 'encircle' causes the image, or rather a broader (general) statement that has to be reconstructed from the context. This broader statement could be expressed by 'certain persons encircle the federal capital', for instance. And yet example 1 is still simple! The matter is further complicated if one agrees with Janelsiņa-Priedīte (1987: 26–27) that literary images can be specifically formed out of smaller image units (e.g. metaphors) by means of a compositional hierarchy (cf. also Kessler 1995: 108–111). But how can the two dissimilar metaphors given in example 1 lead us towards a more comprehensive image relationship? As far as literary and linguistic research on images is concerned, two points are striking.

Firstly, the production of tropes, as well as iconicity in literature or language, is usually not understood as a special case of the general ability of humans to picture something vividly in their mind, an ability we like to call visualising. We do not understand this ability to be a technical, physical or neuro-biological process but rather regard it as an intellectual process. In this respect, visualising is a variety of imagination, an ability to create a phantastic as well as an ideal or typical model of the world and of the objects in question; visualising is bound to experience and language. Aldrich (1968), in my opinion, was the first to grasp this broader view and not make the mistake of *a priori* separating speaking and seeing. This position is also shared by Hülzer (1987; 1991) who, when putting metaphor down to ideas, regards them as being present as pictures (optical, visual images) that are anyway inherent to us.

Secondly, the vast array of literary and linguistic possibilities with which we can create iconicity is rarely taken into account but, instead, metaphor is deemed to be the only underlying issue; cf. for instance in the narrow viewpoint of Hülzer (1987: 12). This is certainly understandable. In classical metaphor, all elements are concisely implied and contribute to the understanding of the perception of other kinds of iconicity and images. In any case, there is a time-honoured tradition of studying metaphor that stretches back to antiquity. It makes little sense to start out with metaphor *per se*.

The Metaphor in Visual Media and Texts. Arbitrariness. Crossovers

The intellectual process of visualising has reached a new dimension with the rise of visual media. However, new and old visual media usually deal with optical images as does the research concerning them; cf. the articles in the anthology edited by Weidenmann (1994a). According to Weidenmann (1994b: 9), optical images can inform, entertain, or fulfil an artistic function. This is hardly surprising since this can be said for language and speech, indeed, for human communication as a whole! Horaz (1994: 24–25) has already written about *aut prod-esse, aut delectare*.

Optical (visual) images, however, are not a counterpart to linguistic images. They are the counterpart to speech in general. The use of optical metaphors constitutes a counterpart to linguistic images. In this regard, Issing (1994) talks of ‘metaphorical analogies’ (Germ. *bildliche Analogien*) and Aldrich (1968) uses the expression ‘visible metaphors’ (Germ. *sichtbare Metaphern*). Both are dealing with films, photos, paintings, graphic arts and illustrations that possess a ‘deeper’ symbolic meaning ‘behind’ them. Eco (1991: 242–245) distinguishes between three levels of understanding a visual (optical) image:


- first, the ‘perceiving code’ which pieces together the technical formation of a visual image (e.g. the pencil lines that become an eye);
- second, the ‘iconic code’ which focuses on recognizing objects or figures by identifying a situation (e.g. the above-mentioned eye and other parts of a body that, for example, become a horse in a fight);

- third, the ‘iconographic code’ which leads to an understanding of the situation depicted through its recognisable elements (e.g. a horse in a fight that is part of a depiction of the battle of Raclawice in 1794).

According to Eco, the detection of optical metaphors is naturally situated at the third level of decoding a visual image. We will touch on this iconographic level when we come to look at the similarities between optical and verbal metaphors.

All authors dealing with visual images have illustrations in mind which, for instance, are meant not to imitate, but to explain something graphically. A graphic of the sun may depict the sun (level of iconic code), and this depiction may be part of a romantic (in the style, say, of impressionism) sunrise (level of iconographic code). However, in a different context the depiction of a sunrise may symbolise the rosy future supposedly built by communism (communist propaganda actually used the sunrise motif; see Kummer 2006: 45). In this and similar illustrations, an optical metaphor has been used which is to be understood in a figurative sense. Through the use of optical metaphor, the recipient is not only given a picture in addition to the verbal explanations that are normally part of every communicative situation, but they are also given a picture of something that transmits a particular content (which is also important for the verbal explanation). On the other hand, as many theorists have already pointed out, the understanding of the iconographic code depends on knowledge which is only attainable through verbal and not pictorial communication. Indeed, a figurative understanding of the iconographic code is especially dependent on this additional knowledge. Interestingly, in order to describe the understanding of optical metaphors, Issing (1994), for example, makes use of the same theoretical models we use for linguistic images and classical metaphors. This is because there are surprising parallels between optical metaphors and linguistic images (see diagram 1 on the next page).

Unlike the perception of optical metaphors, iconicity in language seems to require an additional imaginative ability: an optical metaphor is a visualisation performed, but a verbal metaphor is an ‘undetermined’ visualisation and still has to be transcoded (transformed, translated) into a particular image. Optical metaphors already exist in their components insofar as they are limited in scope and quality for the recipient. Linguistic images are formed in the mind only. In the process of formation they are completed by the individual reader in different ways. This is an effect usually intended by the author. Of course, optical metaphors also demand a certain amount of brainwork; they are not simply a given, and they produce manifold associations. The recipient has to imitate the visualisation in his/her mind to comprehend it. However, optical metaphors are given as ‘a picture of something,’ the optical metaphor itself must be totally complete in its component parts or else it will not work. The metaphor is part of a picture in which you can see what is mapped out (or not); this means that you expect all the necessary components to be mapped out in the picture, which includes the optical metaphor. Blank areas would be a sign of incompleteness rather than a sign to complete the metaphor. But ‘blank’ areas are also inherent to linguistic images. This is abundantly clear to lecturers when they discuss a text in class with their students! Iconicity is completed in the mind in response to minimal linguistic stimulation according to certain ‘knitting pat-

Diagram 1: Optical metaphors and linguistic images

terns’ and without any damage to the image. The question of how far you can go with your imagination and where the border lies between the meaning created by the text and what the recipients might make of it is another matter.¹ It goes without saying, however, that only linguistic images work in this way.

A further distinction between optical and linguistic metaphors is clarified in diagram 2 (on page 26). Before we go any further, however, I would like to offer some general advice. It is becoming increasingly common to hear it said that ‘all language is metaphorical.’ It is important to understand that the true meaning of this is frequently misunderstood. The phrasing ‘all language is metaphorical’ does not mean that language consists solely of (classical) metaphors, i.e. of iconicity, or that language participates in the spheres of thought suggested by Lotman (cf. chapter 1.1). Rather, the phrase ‘all language is metaphorical’ simply provides an insight into the fact that the relationship between the signifier and that which is signified


1 The individuality of the reader will be a decisive factor. The reader is influenced by iconographies of culture, sub-groups and the pragmatics of language. The reader’s completion of an image can go in different directions because each reader selects from numerous possible ways to complete the image.

in all languages is arbitrary. This does not mean anything other than the fact that, according to the semiotic categories of distinction between the three types of signs (icon, index, symbol), natural languages are predominantly symbolic. Kant (2006: 296–297; cf. Gadamer 1990: 81; 2006: 65) realised the arbitrary relationship of words (terms) and their meaning; de Saussure (1994: 76–81) developed on this by establishing a new terminology for modern linguistics. This central characteristic of natural languages constitutes the basis of our ability to ‘play with words;’ in other words, it is the basis for metaphor. Because of its importance, we will return to this subject more than once.

The complex relationship connecting visual images and language, iconic and symbolic signs, and the possibilities for metaphors in both forms of communication can only be touched upon in this book; for a more elaborate explanation, see Kummer (2006: 33–67) and Eschbach (1996: 45–48), who lists seven points of comparison between visual images and text. For our purposes, the key difference lies in the following: representation (depiction) by means of visual images can do without metaphor; a text cannot. The mode of representation in drawing, graphics, websites, films and comics (etc.) can be totally non-figurative. The images can be used exclusively for denotation, i.e. for the demonstration of facts as they are understood by the producer of the images. Of course, visual demonstration does not mean that every visual sign which represents a thing must be completely similar to the thing it represents, ‘An object resembles itself to the maximum degree but rarely represents itself; resemblance, unlike representation, is reflexive. Again, unlike representation, resemblance is symmetrical: B is as much like A as A is like B, but while a painting may represent the duke of Wellington, the duke doesn’t represent the painting’ (Goodman 2008: 4). In contrast to language, however, we perceive a visual image as being, to some degree, similar to the thing represented. The same does not hold true for a natural language, for a *système primaire* (de Saussure): words or concepts are not similar to the things they represent; language is only symbolic (‘symbolic’ means one of the semiotic types of signs). Its ‘symbolisms’, i.e. arbitrariness, include the fact that words can (and must) be used metaphorically. There are many things to denote in this world, but only a few words with which to do so. Here the arbitrariness bears fruit because a word (concept) is like a label — a label concerning objects and facts. Figurative speech seems to cause these labels (concepts) to ‘change their places’ (Goodman 2008: 74–84). However, in this context ‘metaphor’ can mean a re-categorising of objects and facts, i.e. a form of predication that is possible due to the vacant form inherent to the place-changing concept, and to the arbitrariness of concepts in general. In contrast, it is not possible to make a visual sign place-change in a similar way — for it will represent the object it demonstrates anyway.

In a comparison of optical and verbal metaphors (see diagram 2 on the next page), the place of the metaphor can vary considerably. There are ① visual images which include some optical metaphors. Such metaphors may follow a familiar iconography or they may, as indicated below ⑤, have a linguistic metaphor as their basis. Nevertheless, it is also possible for a visual image to be entirely made from an optical metaphor. On the other hand, ④ texts necessarily include metaphors. Such texts may follow a familiar iconography but how often do textual metaphors have ⑥ a visual image as their basis? Additionally, is it possible that a text

Diagram 2: The places of metaphor



can be made solely from metaphor? An optical metaphor can obviously be a complete visual image, but a linguistic image cannot be a complete text.

Furthermore, our distinction between ① visual images on the one hand and ④ texts on the other is an oversimplification. Images and text can be combined, and generally are juxtaposed in our increasingly image-mediated world. In some cases ③ the text is the general medium (e.g. in newsletters), in other cases ② the visual image is dominant (e.g. in comic strips). Metaphors appear in both spheres, iconic and symbolic, and can be ‘completed’ (interpreted) by what is said / shown in another sphere (in such cases, they use ‘everything’ as a context). Cases ② in which a visual image has an additional linguistic metaphor are banal because a text can always imbue visual images with additional information. Certain media consciously exploit this possibility (paintings, advertisements etc.). The reverse case ③, whereby a text receives help not only from a visual image but also from an optical metaphor, is perhaps rare, but has become common in contemporary literature. For instance, two optical metaphors appear in the novel *Eve Thumb* (*Īkstīte*) by the Latvian writer Gundega Repše. The first of these is where the novel incorporates the score of a piano piece composed by Franz Schubert (Repše 2001: 87–98); the score serves as an optical metaphor for the feelings the

reader should have at that point in the story. The second is a photo of the author on the front cover framed within the shape of a bird that stands as an optical metaphor for the fact the novel is autobiographical. The shape of the bird connects the author with the content of the novel.

There are other interesting examples of crossovers, such as when ⑤ well-known linguistic images become part of visual imagery. Nöth (2000: 492) draws a sharp distinction between ‘visible metaphors’ (*visuelle Metaphern* — metaphors that are optical by origin) and ‘visualised metaphors’ (*visualisierte Metaphern* — linguistic metaphors transcoded into the iconic sphere). Kroeber-Riel and Esch (2004: 216) provide a good example of visualised metaphors: they show a poster for a special car service whose premium treatment of a customer is expressed by a man rolling out a red carpet (as in the German proverb *einen roten Teppich ausrollen*). However, although language allows for crossovers, it is not always possible to create visualised metaphors. To visualise the sentence ‘there was a table’, the scene needs only a table (for instance on a set). But how is one to visualise ‘that was a tongue twister’ so that the reader / listener instantaneously understands the figurative notion of ‘tongue twister’?

Another interesting crossover ⑥ is that of the optical metaphor translated (transcoded) into a linguistic one. The process of transcoding as such is not surprising: well-known visual images, for the most part works of fine art (paintings, graphics, sculptures, wall friezes, escutcheons / shields, etc.) are often described both in belles-lettres (cf. Drügh and Moog-Grünewald 2001) and poems (cf. Kranz 1986). The outcome of such transcodings is called ekphrasis. For instance, in his novel *Lithuanian Pianos* (*Litauische Claviere*, 1965), Johannes Bobrowski (1917–1965) describes a famous photograph of the Lithuanian author Julija ‘Žemaitė’ Beniuševičiūtė-Žymantienė (1845–1921) (Bobrowski 2002: 38–39). Goethe’s ekphrases are fictional descriptions of lost paintings from antiquity. More recently, contemporary artists painted pictures by basing them on Goethe’s descriptions (Osterkamp 1991). However, are Bobrowski’s and Goethe’s ekphrases examples of transcoding metaphors? This is difficult to say and depends on the interpretation we accord both acts of transcoding. We do not want to pass judgement in Goethe’s case, but Bobrowski’s narrator tells us (loc. cit.) that he resorted to ekphrasis because the picture of the Lithuanian female author is a vague historical document calling out for illumination. The narrator uses ekphrasis to go beyond what he thinks he knows; he does so because the picture itself is figurative and an optical metaphor for him.

A third and more revealing example may be the kind of images created by the authors belonging to the literary school of Imaginism. Their imagery is closed to the process of ekphrasis because it is a textual ‘description’ of a visual image (Iser 1966), mostly describing a scene they have ‘seen’ only in their mind. Like Bobrowski, the Imaginists transcode such scenes (i.e. visual images) into text because the scenes hold a figurative meaning for them; the descriptions of the scenes then become optical metaphors.

Identification and Interpretation of Metaphor. Traditions in Research

Ever since academic research focused its attention on the idea of metaphor, classical metaphor has become a victim of misconception. Only in a few cases is the term correctly used with regard to true metaphors. The terms 'image' and 'metaphor' are generally and freely used to pertain to the phenomena they are meant to describe. *Nolens volens*, they have to be used in general for a whole array of hermeneutic-aesthetic-semantic problems. Yet both terms are often indiscriminately used to describe various figures of thought (i.e. tropes; cf. Abrams 1999: 64–66; Lausberg 1990: §§ 168–236) and all kinds of images. Literary researchers frequently make the hermeneutical leap from a literal to a figurative reading of a text,¹ maintaining that the text in question or any kind of element embedded in the text as an whole is an 'image for something.' This parable-esque way of interpreting the text is also called allegory (Germ. *Allegorese*) and can be regarded as a hermeneutical method (Kurz 1988: 45–47, 60–65; Gadamer 1990: 178–179; 2006: 176–177). Epistemologically, there is probably no significant difference between the process of understanding a word in a figurative sense in its given context and the process of interpreting a text or part of a text in the manner of a parable. However, the former process is considered passive — it lies inert within the text or speech — whereas the latter process is an active seeking-out of the meaning of a text. We shall confine ourselves to the textual analysis below, leaving allegory (*Allegorese*) and interpretation aside.

It is common to differentiate between the identification and interpretation of a metaphor, as suggested by Salim-Mohammad (2007: 26). However, it should be acknowledged that 'No connection can be detected between intelligibility and the degree of metaphorical intensity. Simple statements do not have to be less metaphorical and the reason for a lack of intelligibility does not lie in the fact that statements are metaphorical but in the kind of metaphors applied' (Jäkel 2003: 83).² In addition to this valuable insight, it should be noted that metaphor is a semantic phenomenon; the identification of a metaphor only takes place when its interpretation has been successful even if this interpretation only gradually dawns upon us. Gadamer (2006: 390, 399) states, 'All understanding is interpreting,' and 'interpretation is not something pedagogical for us either; it is the act of understanding itself.'³ Thus, interpreting a metaphor means nothing more than having understood it. The identification of a metaphor, on the other hand, can only occur once its intelligibility has been fully achieved, as it implies (see above) finding something more in the utterance than its ostensible meaning. The 'identification of a metaphor' is therefore synonymous with the 'appearance' of a secondary mean-

1 In the terminology of Kahrmann, Reiß and Schluchter (1991) this is the textual level of the 'narrative conception' (Germ. *Erzählkonzept*).

2 Our translation of: 'Zwischen Verständnisschwierigkeit und Metaphorizitätsgrad ist kein Zusammenhang feststellbar: Gut verständliche Aussagen müssen nicht weniger metaphorisch sein, und mangelnde Verständlichkeit hat ihren Grund nicht darin, daß Aussagen metaphorisch sind, sondern in der Art der verwendeten Metaphern.'

3 Orig. in German — Gadamer 1990: 392, 401.

ing in the sentence. If we seem preoccupied with the identification of metaphor, it is solely for epistemological reasons. In our analysis of the phenomenon of metaphor, we are primarily concerned with the mechanisms of metaphor identification without regard to meaning or interpretation in particular. This is because we do not want to examine a particular metaphor but metaphor *eo ipso*.

It is well known that Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) examined metaphor in his ‘Poetics.’⁴ In the Early Modern Age, metaphor was rediscovered through the revival of ancient rhetoric (Kubczak 1986: 83–85). Metaphor has since been swirling around in a constant wave of attention although it only became the subject of specialized disciplines much later (op. cit.: 85–86). Voluminous bibliographies on metaphor (cf. the index at the end of this book) bear witness to the considerable attention the subject has received, particularly during the 20th century. The newest bibliography on metaphor (an online journal) contains more than 11,500 entries for the years up to 1990.

New research not only recognises the pivotal role of metaphor in language, but also asks probing questions about the functioning of metaphor. Four essential models have taken shape:

- the substitution model (inclusive of the analogy theory and theory of the elliptical simile);
- the model of non-literal or transferred meaning;
- the so-called theory of interaction; and
- the model of Lakoff and Johnson (also known as conceptualism or Cognitive Metaphor Theory).

Depending on one’s methodological approach, some other models of metaphor (but by no means all) are arguably worthy of mention.⁵ These models differ slightly but more or less overlap with the four essential theories of metaphor.

We will not offer a systematic criticism of the existing models of metaphor but provide a critical review of conceptualism. This is presented at the end of the book. The better-known models of metaphor may help us shed more light on classical metaphor — these are mentioned where useful for our discussion. In chapter 2 we look at the model of substitution and shortened simile. Chapter 3, among other things, explores the model of non-literal or transferred meaning. Chapters 5.1 and 5.2 are about the theory of interaction (keeping Richardson, Black and Weinrich firmly in mind), while chapter 5.3 focuses on the model of Lakoff and Johnson. Finally, in chapter 5.4 we look at a new development in cognitive research on metaphors (so-called blending theory) although this is merely a continuation of Black’s and Lakoff’s conceptualism.

4 Chapter 21 and 22 (1457b–c); also in chapter 25 (1461a, lines 15 ff.) where Aristotle gives some examples. There are also passages in his ‘Rhetoric’ dealing with metaphor: Book III, chapter 2, lines 2–5 and 10–11.

5 For instance, the highly recommend book about metaphor by Beckmann (2001) criticises (pp. 36–65) the following four theories: the theory of deviation (Germ. *Abweichungstheorem*), the theory of unsuitability (*Uneigentlichkeitstheorem*), the theory of misrepresentation (*Falschheitstheorem*), and the theory of figurative meaning (*Theorem der übertragenen Bedeutung*).

CHAPTER TWO

Presuppositions of Metaphor

The Model of Substitution. Predication vs Attribution. Position of Metaphor. Sem-Analysis

The model of substitution, in particular, is the offspring of ancient rhetoric. Aristotle argued that words substitute each other if there is a relation of analogy between them (Aristoteles 1996: 69). The analogy argument and the model of substitution all but belong together; for a more detailed description and criticism of both, see Kügler (1984), Hülzer (1991: 37–48) and Beckmann (2001: 50–54). I want to emphasise once again what has often been said, namely, that metaphor itself only creates the analogy or, so to speak, maintains it. Metaphor does not express any existing similarities between objects or situations (Black 1981: 37; Kurz 1988: 20). Levinson (1995: 153–156) has criticised in detail the concept of similarity held to be the basis for analogy.

Those who support the model of substitution tend to use examples like the following:


- (2) Achill war ein **Löwe** in der Schlacht (Lausberg 1990: 78) — *Transl.*: Achilles was a **lion** in battle;
- (3) **Abend** des Lebens (Aristoteles 1996: 69) — *Transl.*: **evening** of life.

‘Lion’ and ‘evening’ are here regarded as replacements for the proper or standard expressions (the *verbum proprium et univocum*); they use the more figurative and poetic words¹ ‘lion’ and ‘evening’ instead of ‘strong warrior’ and ‘old age’ (cf. diagram 3 on the following page). Supporters of the model of substitution think that this kind of replacement is possible because the term that is replaced and the term which is used to replace it have an analogous feature in common, the so-called *tertium comparationis* (e.g. Hönigsperger, 1994: 78–79, uses this term in accordance with the tradition of ancient rhetoric). With respect to examples 2 and 3, ‘strong warrior’ and ‘lion’ share bravery as a common characteristic (i.e. *tertium comparationis*); ‘evening’ and ‘old age’ each stand for the end of a natural cycle. So the concept of metaphor can be formulated as an analogy-relationship:² ‘As a lion acts towards X so Achilles acts towards Y because both are brave.’ Or as Shibbes (1971b: 13, No. 16) rightly remarked, ‘It is often said that metaphor is based on analogy but seldom stated acceptably what analogy is based on.’

1 ‘figurative and more poetic’: Lausberg (1990: 78) uses the first adjective while Aristotle has the second one in mind — σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι ‘clear but not banal at the same time’ (Aristoteles 1996: 71). However, example 2 is particularly academic; see Black 1981: 33 (especially note 9).

2 Lausberg (1990: 78) calls it a ‘likeness relation’ (Germ. *Abbild-Verhältnis*).

Diagram 3: Pattern of the substitution model



Salim-Mohammad (2007: 26) sees these analogy- or likeness-relations as part of the need to interpret metaphor: the metaphor has to be understood first. Only then is it possible to formulate the right analogy-relation. Others, such as Hülzer (1987: 268–277), assert that the *tertium comparationis* appears at the very end of the interpretative process. Formulating an analogy at this stage, according to Kurz (1988: 21), is not the same as identifying the metaphor but merely explains what has been understood by the reader. Through analysis of conversations Hülzer (1991: 380) discovered that

the reconstruction of the analogical construction of a metaphor is always aimed at when there are problems of understanding, (...) i.e. if possible, the communicating parties strive for exposure of the *tertium comparationis*, (...), which considerably facilitates the retranslation of the metaphor into a conventional meaning.³

Thus, the advantage of the analogy-theory is that it helps to make metaphors intelligible; interpreting and explaining them according to the rules of the analogy-theory produces objective results. We might here refer to Coenen (2002) and Hönigspurger (1994) for having both successfully applied the analogy-theory.

It is correct to say that the metaphor in example 2 exemplifies the character of Achilles. Because the sentence structure of example 2 is akin to the structure of the sentence 'Socrates is wise', which serves as a classic instance of predication (cf. Searle 1999: 124), the syntactic function of the metaphor in example 2 can be regarded as a predication for the personage of Achilles. Of course, predication is unavoidable in such syntactic cases (e.g. 'X is A', or 'A is B') but, by its very logic, this can easily result in tautology. Moreover, metaphors may syntactically 'stand alone', as shown in example 3, making it impossible to predicate whatever attributes can be derived from the metaphor to anyone or thing. On the other hand, these attributes occur in our understanding of the metaphor, and we 'reflexively' identify them with

3 Our translation; orig. in German: 'daß die Rekonstruktion der analogischen Konstruktion (...) einer Metapher bei Verstehensbeeinträchtigungen durchgängig anvisiert wird, (...) d.h. die Kommunizierenden bemühen sich nach Möglichkeit um die Freilegung des *tertium comparationis*, (...) das eine Rückübersetzung der Metapher in eine konventionalisierte Bedeutung erheblich erleichtert.'

the object denoted (e.g. the attributes of 'evening' to the end of life). Therefore, we would like to make a useful distinction between predication and attribution. As we shall see in chapter 5.1, attribution is a conceptual problem whereas predication is a matter of sentence meaning. In example 3 we call the function of the metaphor an attribution (cf. also Schumacher 1997: 35), insofar as 'evening' constitutes a further qualitative and quantitative specification: it is not the entirety of life that the attention is focused on but only life's last stages (quantity); furthermore, the word 'evening' possesses certain positive connotations which are then attributed to the period of life in question (quality). The use of the metaphor in example 3 is reflexive to the stage of life. It should thus become clear that metaphors may be used for predicating but are also a linguistic feature of ascribing importance. In other words, metaphor is more a problem of reference, or what Searle (1999: *passim*) defines as the question of identifying an object. With regard to 'Socrates is wise' or 'Achilles is a lion', one could easily cast doubt on whether they correctly identify the person in question by contradicting them with 'This is not Socrates the philosopher!' and 'This is not Achilles the brave warrior!' As long as the reference is correct, metaphor can be used for predicating. However, reference again plays an important role here: the problem lies in identifying the object which is 'hidden' by the metaphor, i.e. to understand the reference of the metaphorised word(s). Previous research on metaphor that used the model of substitution or analogy, and whose focus was on detecting the *tertium comparationis*, failed to take into account that metaphorised concepts underlie the act of reference. If this were not the case, phrases such as example 3 could not be understood as metaphor, and there would be no 'attribution' at all. Of course, the role of attribution in metaphor, beyond that of correctly identifying its object, is to impart an 'extraordinary' quality to its reference object.

Most theorists, however, concentrate solely on predication, such as Kurz (1988: 22) and Coenen (2002: *passim*). Maintaining that predication is the overall general function of metaphor is not only consistent with the sentence structure often assumed to be typical for metaphor, but, above all, it is consistent with the terminology of philosophical logic, which has long explored the idea of predication (cf. HWP 1989). Predication is here a basic requirement of speech, but according to Searle (op. cit.) predication can further be defined as a judgement on something: we can negate the veracity of 'Socrates is wise' simply by saying 'Socrates isn't wise!' Let us now apply this insight to example 2. If we articulate the predication 'Achilles is a lion', the contradiction of this predication will be 'Achilles is not a lion.' However, the metaphor in example 2 states that 'Achilles is a lion in battle.' Would we be contradicting this if we say 'Achilles isn't a lion!' or, respectively, 'Achilles isn't a lion in battle!?' No, we would not. It is more probable that we would argue, 'Achilles is not brave, he is a coward!' This example shows that predication has occurred but it is different to 'simple' predications such as 'Socrates is wise'.

Advocates of the interaction theory likewise refer to 'attributing' now and then, but they really mean predication. Black (1993: 28), however, calls the process in question the 'projection of associated implications.' In the cognitive theory of metaphor (see chapter 5), this projection (in fact, predication) is called 'mapping.' The idea of mapping is based on a theory that, broadly speaking, claims metaphor helps categorise unknown or new objects through

the use of familiar concepts (cf. chapter 2.3). Regarding the variables in diagram 3 on page 32, the term ‘mapping’ denotes the relation between ‘A’ and ‘B’, i.e. in our example between both nominal parts of the sentence, ‘Achilles’ and ‘a lion in battle’. Of course, the unknown or new object in this sentence is not Achilles, but Achilles’ ability to fight. According to the cognitive theory of metaphor, the concept of the fighting lion categorises Achilles’ ability to fight fiercely in battle. The concept itself is considered self-evident. It should be clear that this is of no concern to classical metaphor. Classical metaphor is interested in the relation between ‘B’ and ‘x’ (cf. variables in diagram 3), e.g. between the figure (‘a lion in battle’) and its so-called *verbum proprium* (e.g. ‘a brave warrior’). The question concerning classical metaphor is not how Achilles is attributed with this or that characteristic but why we understand at all that there is talk of the ability to fight. In other words, how can we explain that in the example given above the idea of a ‘lion’ evokes the readily comprehensible concept of a brave and fierce warrior?

The somewhat questionable idea of mapping was developed by Jäkel (2003: 41, 55–62) into the thesis of unidirection. He believes, along with other supporters of the cognitive theory of metaphor, that there is only one direction of transmission possible — ‘known content → unknown object’. But for most people the concept of lion is as readily familiar as that of the brave warrior. In addition, Jäkel (loc.cit.) argues that the known content is usually a term from the spheres ‘physical/concrete’ or ‘ego/man’. His empirical study (op.cit.: 63–84) verified that utterances using a metaphor from these concrete and close-to-ego spheres are much better understood than utterances using metaphors with other transmissional directions. Thus, in some respects the transmissional direction advocated by Jäkel’s notion of unidirection is legitimate.

If the conversational purpose for the use of metaphor is to make an ‘extraordinary’ reference (i.e. attribution), it is clear that metaphor can occur in any kind of term and word category. It is therefore questionable why in descriptions of the model of substitution it is often presumed that a noun would replace a *proprie-noun* and that the predicate of a sentence containing a metaphor would consist of the copula. The history of the model of substitution seems to have restricted the occurrence of metaphor solely to this sentence pattern, at least in the field of analysis and didactics, i.e. Kubczak (1978: 55–58). As Schumacher (1997: 26) pointed out, ‘The selection and consequently the freshness of the examples possess the greatest effect upon the descriptions of the workings of “metaphor”’.⁴ He goes on to say (op.cit.: 29) that scientific analysis looks for examples ‘which it is able to understand and “explain” so there is no need (...) to give up its method.’⁵ There are several other structures for metaphors. In example 1 (page 11) there are two verbal metaphors: *umschwirren* (constantly move around sb/sth (excitedly), come closer continually) and *umzingelt* (encircle threateningly in order to conquer and separate from the rest of the world). Both metaphors are attributions to

4 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘Größte Auswirkungen auf die Beschreibungen der Mechanik von “Metapher” haben die Auswahl bzw. die Frische der Beispiele.’

5 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘Beispiele, die sie verstehen und “erklären” kann, so dass sie ihr (...) Vorgehen nicht aufzugeben braucht.’

the behaviour of the lobbyists being described. An example of an adjectival metaphor can be seen in this German verse:

- (4) Wie gierige Augen funkeln an den schlanken / **verwelkten** Dirnenhänden breite Steine. (Eisenlohr 1992: 31) — *Transl.*: Like greedy eyes, big precious stones sparkle on the slender **wilted** hands of a slut.

The attribution of the compound *Dirnenhänden* ‘hands of a slut’ by the marked adjective *verwelkten* ‘wilted’, meaning ‘visibly and considerably grown old, not looking young and pretty anymore’, is evident. Further syntactical positions of the metaphor are possible. Theoretical descriptions such as those of, among others, Salim-Mohammad (2007: 16–26) and Hönigsperger (1994: 93–96), which take the syntactical position of metaphor in a sentence as the category for classification, hinder the further development of a theory of metaphor by restricting metaphor to this rigidly formal category.

When looked at in the context of rhetoric, the model of substitution suggests the separation of a given text into two texts: into the existing embellished text (Latin *ornatus*), and into a pre- or proto-text (Latin *proprium*) that is equal in content and function and optimally formulated (Latin *univocum*). In rhetoric, the latter is regarded as a text which can and must be reconstructed by the reader or listener. The linguistic creativity of metaphor is not the problem here since the aesthetic function of metaphor is indisputable. It is the assumption of the proto-text which is problematic, although once again a distinction has to be made here. For the act of construing the meaning of a metaphor from the vast corpus of linguistic norms is no mean feat. The frame of reference supposedly provided by ‘linguistic normality’ may only exist in the imagination of the recipient. Nevertheless, this example is helpful for the identification of metaphor, as we will see. Problems arise when there is an assumption of an actual proto-text, formed by *verba propria et univoca* or ‘the original wording and with regard to its true idea/truly named’. Taken at face value, most people would probably scoff at such a suggestion. However, there remains an implicit belief (particularly in literary theory) that this assumption exists and that a text as a work of art somehow stands in contrast with a purer pre- or proto-text; this can make a work of art seem even more poetic. As an axiom of textual analysis or for the purposes of didactics this may be acceptable but any reflections upon imagery should not be governed by this idea. There is no such text, neither at the moment of the production of a text nor as a linguistic creation in general. Every natural language relies upon metaphors, as will be explained in chapter 3; tropes and figures of speech constitute the everyday life of language, particularly in the mass media (cf. Hoßmann 1994; or Lau 1994). During the production of a text it may seem, while poring over the page, as though one is ‘searching for the right word’, whereby an available non-figurative expression can be substituted by a figurative one. However, this will never affect the text as a whole; the starting point of a text is always a text that is already worked out and iconically. It is not a collection of utterances of *verba propria et univoca*. As I stated earlier, it is instead a reflection of the structure of the human mind.

The model of substitution considers the identification of a metaphor to be possible because the linguistic knowledge of what shall be uttered next is disregarded by the use of a metaphorical word. This is an ancient conviction that dates all the way back to Aristotle’s *Po-*

etics, where metaphor is described as a term used in the wrong (improper, inappropriate) context (Aristoteles 1996: 67–69). Semantics reformed this idea by stating, more precisely, that metaphor constitutes an offence against semantic congruity, namely, against the expectation of this congruity.⁶ According to semantics, this can be shown through sem-analysis. Lüdi (1985) uses this method to demonstrate the fundamentals of semantics. Hönigsperger (1994: 84–87) has shown that two kinds of sem-features occur with the interpretation of metaphor. The first fulfill the expected congruity and are accordingly predicated / attributed to the intended object.⁷ The second are those features which do not fulfill the expected congruity (these are then left aside, unused, so to speak). As Hönigsperger explains, the recipient accepts the incompatible features as soon as he or she has realised that he or she is dealing with a metaphor. The syntactical basis requirement to connect the articulated concepts with each other ‘dominates’ at this point, as it were, the fact that the speaker has worked a semantic inconsistency into the sentence. In this way the existence of the features that are incompatible with the aim of attribution seems to be constitutive for the detection of metaphor. In other words, it is precisely because there is a semantic problem with congruity that the metaphor is intelligible to the recipient. A metaphor, then, would be an act of linguistic reflexion that helps the recipient reconcile the contradictions they detect.

By means of sem-analysis it can now be shown that the aforementioned offence of congruity consists of the semantic components of the metaphorical term, meaning those features which are incongruous with the rest of the sentence, such as, for instance, the semantic implications of the verb. Salim-Mohammad (2007: 26–28) gives an interesting example from the German novel *The Tin Drum* (*Die Blechtrommel*, first published in 1959) by Günter Grass. However, Salim-Mohammad makes a remarkable mistake which shows that the metaphor cannot be clearly identified by the offence of semantic congruity but that the congruity in question only ‘roughly’ signals there is something amiss with the sentence. As Kurz (1988: 16; with secondary literature) points out,

It can be proved that such analyses are not acts of discovery but, at best, acts of justification of an already presupposed understanding of the metaphor. (...) The semantic features of a word are not static entities. Speakers and listeners determine which features become relevant in an utterance and in their understanding of it.⁸

Levinson (1995: 148–152) criticised sem-analysis of metaphors for its formation of features. The formation of features in sem-analysis, according to Levinson, is too limited to capture the metaphorical power of language. We might add that sem-analysis is too rigidly logical in

6 ‘Expectation of congruity’ — Germ. *Kongruenzerwartung*. There are several other terms in use: for instance, Coseriu (1967: 302) talks about ‘solidarities’ (Germ. *Solidaritäten*) and Weinrich (1976: 319–320) about ‘expectation of determination’ (*Determinationserwartung*). It is right to emphasise the point of expectation inasmuch as one can argue that a metaphor may evade current linguistic congruence but it then creates new ones so that the congruence necessary to understand a sentence is also present when using a metaphor.

7 Hönigsperger speaks of a ‘transfer of features’ — Germ. *Transfer von Merkmalen*.

8 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘Solchen Analysen kann man nachweisen, daß sie keine Entdeckungsprozeduren sind, sondern bestenfalls Rechtfertigungsprozeduren für ein schon vorausgesetztes Verständnis der Metapher (...) Denn die semantischen Merkmale eines Wortes sind keine statischen Größen. Vielmehr legen Sprecher und Hörer erst fest, welche Merkmale in der Äußerung und im Verstehen überhaupt wirksam werden sollen.’

its understanding of how metaphor operates, a process which cannot be wholly understood by 'traditional' logic alone (see further chapters).

Salim-Mohammad's explanation is drawn from the following extract from *The Tin Drum*. The protagonist Oscar is meeting Roswitha for the first time, the Italian companion of his acquaintance Bebra:

Roswitha Raguna (...) stroked Mr Bebra's fashionable English tailor-made suit, projected her cherry-black Mediterranean eyes in my direction, and spoke with a dark voice, bearing promise of fruit, a voice that moved me and turned me to ice: 'Carissimo, Oskarnello! How well I understand your grief,⁹ *Andiamo*, come with us: Milano, Parigi, Toledo, Guatemala!¹⁰ My head reeled. I grasped la Raguna's girlish age-old hand. The Mediterranean beat against my coast, olive trees whispered in my ear: 'Roswitha will be your mama,¹¹ Roswitha will understand (...)'' (Grass 1986: 166; my emphasis),¹²

Salim-Mohammad (2007: 27) argues that in the underlined sentence

(5) **olive trees whispered** in my ear

the 'semantic incongruity between the two metaphorical objects', the object 'olive trees' and the image 'whispered', is 'clear and easy to recognise'.¹³ He wrote (op. cit.: 26),

the verbal metaphor *olive trees whispered in my ear* contains, on close reading, a semantic incongruity between the object *olive trees* and the image *whispered*. In accordance with the denotative meaning of the single components of metaphor, the verb *whisper* is defined in the Duden Universal Dictionary as follows: 'hiss softly, speak with a toneless (...) voice (...)'. (...) Here it is marked with the semantic feature [+ living] whereas the object *olive trees* is marked [- living].¹⁴

The semantic incongruity is revealed, according to Salim-Mohammad, and the reader is invited to discard the literal meaning of the sentence. That, apparently, is that. The fact that there is a semantic incongruity, however, clearly does not explain which of the two relevant words in example 5 constitutes the metaphor. It is, in fact, the 'olive trees' that stands figuratively¹⁵ for Southern Europe (as well as the Mediterranean Sea, mentioned in the previous sentence) and thus refers to Roswitha (who has been introduced as Italian). In contrast, the 'whispered' in question is not meant to be metaphorical; Roswitha is indeed speaking, a fact that can be recognised in the direct speech following the passage and describing the content

9 The context is that Oscar has just been talking about his mother's death.

10 Bebra and Roswitha are itinerant dwarves who are part of an acting troupe.

11 Oscar is 14 years old and Roswitha is said to be older (between 18 and 80).

12 Orig. in German — Grass 1999: 220. In the German edition the underlined phrase is 'Olivenbäume flüsterten mir ins Ohr'.

13 Our translation; orig. in German: 'die semantische Nichtübereinstimmung zwischen den beiden Metapherngegenständen [ist] deutlich und leicht feststellbar'.

14 Our translation; orig. in German: 'Betrachtet man (...) die Verbmeterapher *Olivenbäume flüsterten mir ins Ohr*, so erkennt man den semantischen Widerspruch zwischen dem Objekt *Olivenbäume* und dem Bild *flüsterten*. Entsprechend der denotativen Bedeutung der Einzelkomponenten der Metapher wird *flüstern* in dem Universalwörterbuch Duden folgendermaßen erklärt: "leise zischen, mit tonloser (...) Stimme sprechen (...)" (...) Dort wird es mit dem semantischen Merkmal [+ belebt] gekennzeichnet, während das Objekt *Olivenbäume* als Objekt durch [- belebt] markiert wird.' — This approach to sem-analysis is what Lüdi (1985: 72 ff.) calls 'paradigmatic' (Germ. *paradigmatische Analyse*).

15 To be precise, in terms of rhetoric we are dealing with metonymy and not with metaphor. However, that can be put aside here: metonymy also belongs to tropes and needs to be identified and interpreted.

of Roswitha's whisper.¹⁶ If 'whispered' were the metaphor, it could only be understood figuratively in connection with the ensuing direct speech. But then why would the olive trees, not being the metaphor, perform such an action? Where do they suddenly materialise from in the reality being narrated? And what would this image want to say (the olive trees knowing that Roswitha will be like Oscar's mum and doing something with Oscar's ear akin to whispering)?

If metaphor is an incongruity on the level of semes, then one sem of the sentence in question should be the unit constituting the features of congruity, and another sem the unit disturbing that congruity with its incongruous features. Then it should be possible to identify the role of the semes accurately. Salim-Mohammad's mistake merely goes to show that sem-analysis does not allow for clear and precise identification. It is also clear that the offence of semantic congruity can only be elucidated with the help of a good dictionary! The expectation of semantic congruity only ever exists against a background of semantic norms; every metaphor we encounter is checked against either a physical dictionary or, even more likely, against our 'inner' dictionary (Salim-Mohammad 2007: 26). Although it is certainly possible to comprehend metaphor in other ways, the fact remains that lurking behind the theory of the offence of semantic congruity is the problem of essentiality (the 'inner' norm is the 'essential' case, the metaphor a use deviating from it), a problem we have yet to tackle.

Metaphor as Shortened Simile. The Context Marker

Metaphor has also been defined as shortened simile by the likes of, for example, Lausberg (1990: 78) and Kubczak (1986: 91 ff.). A detailed criticism of the theory of shortened simile can be found in Beckmann (2001: 95–104); Levinson (1995: 151–153) also provides a comprehensive critique.¹ According to the theory of shortened simile, the following simile is said to correspond to the metaphorical utterance of example 2 (page 31):

(6) Achill kämpfte wie ein Löwe (Lausberg 1990) — *Transl.*: Achilles fought like a lion.

This might certainly give the impression that a metaphor is a shortened simile because a metaphor's communicative function is frequently that of predication. Predication is also the function of the simile in example 6. For every metaphor it is possible to find a corresponding simile with a similar function to that of the metaphor because the communicative function of any statement (i.e. the speech act) can be transformed into various sentences or utterances. Both examples 2 and 6 are nevertheless interesting. Let us modify them and juxtapose them with further variants:

16 It makes no difference whether the words of the direct speech are only in Oscar's imagination or whether they are actually physically articulated.

1 His examples, however, are inappropriate because they do not contain metaphors but 'competitive' equations in the manner of 'time is money'. Incidentally, these examples are in the spirit of conceptualism. From the viewpoint of philosophical logic, such equations are structured like predications, but it is obvious that 'time is money' conveys a different kind of informational content to, say, 'a horse is an animal'; see my criticism in chapter 5.1.

- (7) Achilles is a lion in battle.
- (8) Achilles is like a lion.
- (9) Achilles is a lion.

In example 7 and 8 we are clearly dealing with the famed Achilles and his legendary courage and hot temper. However, in example 9 the situation is different: it refers to a lion with the name of Achilles (i.e. the creature named Achilles is classified under the taxonomic category of lion). When we compare example 8 with example 9 it is evident that the difference in meaning is produced by the word 'like'. The word 'like' is a conventional implicature signalling that a predication is made to Achilles (i.e. a response to the question of Achilles' character). Now Achilles is no longer an animal but a brave and fierce warrior.

In order to indicate that Achilles is not an animal (example 9) but that a predication to Achilles is being made, the use of the conventional implicature 'like' is used in utterance 8. In example 7 we come to the same understanding, only this time it is not evoked by the help of conventional implicature. Since the difference between example 9 and 7 lies solely in the phrase 'in battle', we have to conclude that this phrase fulfills exactly the same function as the word 'like' does in example 8. Ergo, it is this phrase which indicates that a metaphorical predication to Achilles must be made. 'In battle' supplies a context in which the warrior Achilles is 'like a lion' and in which the lion is fierce. The understanding that 'lion' is contingent on context leads us to the conclusion that 'Achilles is a lion' has to be a metaphorical predication for Achilles and must not be taken as a classification. For this reason I deem the phrase 'in battle', as well as all the elements of a text fulfilling a similar function, a context marker. The availability of a context marker is a basic requirement for metaphor (see also Weinrich 1976: 318–319; Hülzer 1991: 49; or Schumacher 1997: 33; their work recognised the importance of context markers but neglected to provide proof of their existence). Beckmann (2001: 88–93) shows that further indicators are often added by the speaker in conversation so that a metaphor can be 'safely' recognised and no misunderstandings occur.²

The logical sentence structure for metaphor would therefore be:

Target object + word *x*, {*x* | *x* semantically implies qualities $\wedge$ a context marker_{*x*} exists}

However, with this we reach the end of what can usefully be expressed via formulae. To recap, the function of the metaphorised word 'x' is to denote an 'uncertainty factor'; it is a predication if a target object is used, but it is an attribution if the target is a case of reference. It is also worth noting that the context marker is particularly polymorphic. Its structure in example 7 is not especially unusual but it is nonetheless revealing. Another frequent but notable case is that found in example 3, in which the context marker is part of a genitive construction.³ A

2 Communication conflicts arising from metaphors have been empirically examined in detail by Hülzer (1991). Unfortunately, her idea of metaphor is influenced by conceptualism so that her study only partially addresses the question of the type and manner of communication conflicts arising from classical metaphor.

3 This was observed by Weinrich (1976: 319) and Ortner et al. (1991: 116). About genitive metaphors in Russian cf. Scholz (2007).

multitude of metaphors similar to genitive constructions can be found in German in particular because of its characteristic use of derivation:⁴

- (10) Lebens**abend**, Kindergarten, Oster**glocke**, Affent**anz**, Gefühls**welt**, Gefühl**tiefe**, Karteil**eiche**, Informations**portal**, Karriere**leiter**, Tochterunternehmen, Entwicklungs**stufe**.

Transl.: The **eve** of life, kindergarten, daffodil, hullabaloo, **world** of emotions, **depth** of emotions, card file **corpses** (i.e. non-active, nominal members), **portal** of information (i.e. an internet page), career **ladder**, subsidiary company, stage of development.

Or similar to the above examples in German, the following compounds in English:

- (11) Mother **tongue**, mouth-**organ**, gut reaction, egghead, computer **keyboard**.

Or with a genitive context marker:

- (12) Cursive writing is going **the way** of the dinosaur as computer keyboards and smartphones increasingly engage young fingers. (Patil 2011)

In example 12 the phrase ‘to go the way of the dinosaur’ means ‘to perish, to die out’; the word ‘dinosaur’ is the context marker for what is befalling cursive writing.

The context marker does not have to be a full sentence, even if an interpretation of the metaphor demands this. The metaphor ‘string-pullers’ in example 1 (page 11) is an interesting case. It provides a cohesive link for the idea of ‘lobbyists’ from the previous sentence, in which the context is named or formed and which leads to the metaphorical understanding of the term ‘string-pullers’. Searle (1994: 108, No. 43) gives an interesting example, in which the context marker and the target of predication coincide. However, a target object does not necessarily need to be named; it can remain imprecise or even appear as a random subject of the sentence. The metaphors in examples 10 and 12 are clearly comprehensible in and of themselves. If we were to modify example 7 so that it reads:

- (13) What’s-his-name is a **lion** in battle,

the exact target of the predication is missing (because the reference of ‘what’s-his-name’ is unclear),⁵ although the metaphor remains intact. Or if a colleague were to ask out of the blue:

- (14) ‘How much **working storage** do you have?’

we would not be completely clueless as far as the metaphor is concerned (‘Working storage? Can work be stored?’) but we would most likely still have to grope about to find the exact meaning in the given context. However, the metaphor in example 14 does not have a target

4 In using the term ‘derivation’ I want to take into account that the following German examples, morphologically speaking, are not always genitive constructions (cf. Ortner et al. 1991). Furthermore, in the corresponding examples taken from other languages, the term ‘genitive’ is not always correctly identified (morphologically) with regards to the newly added word element of the compound. Modern linguistics calls it a modifier but it is often a genitive metaphor when analysed under the theory of metaphor. It should also be noted that metaphors and context markers can occur in every part of the newly formed compound, and not only in the part added to the basic word of the compound and suspected to be the genitive.

5 ‘What’s-his-name’, of course, refers to a person. However, since the speaker is unable (or unwilling) to provide an actual name, we cannot identify a particular person.

of predication; it ‘works’ for the purpose of reference only, i.e. in its ‘classical’ or academic form. The metaphor may or may not be part of a predication in everyday German or English.

To sum up, predication provides an additional function of metaphor depending on the position of the metaphor in a sentence. But further research is needed to explore what I have preliminarily treated as attribution, that is, the problem of the ‘special’ case of reference. It is also worth remembering that the context marker can assume paralinguistic forms such as illustrations:

(15) *The bolded headline: Der Schatten der Lobbyisten* (Burmeister 2008)

Transl.: The shadow of the lobbyists — beneath the caption we see a large photomontage showing the conference hall of the German Bundestag being subsumed by the shadow of an unknown person speaking on a mobile phone.

The context marker consists of the information supplied by the photomontage; the image makes the ‘shadow’ alluded to in the headline seem particularly alarming. It is also worth considering the combination of the singular noun ‘shadow’ with the plural ‘lobbyists’ in the headline. However, even if the headline had more accurately read ‘the shadows of the lobbyists’, the metaphor would still have worked because of the supplementary information provided by the photo. The context marker can also be provided by the situation. When two people are facing off, and one yells angrily at the other, ‘You are an ass!’ (*Du bist ein Esel!*), the metaphor is immediately clear (Lieb 1996: 355); see below.

However, the problem of referentiality inherent to metaphor can also be discerned in examples 7 to 9. The word ‘like’ or the context marker signals that ‘a lion’ is referring to Achilles but in order to understand the simile or the metaphor correctly, it is necessary to understand the word ‘lion’ in a particular way, namely, to think of a lion as a brave and ferocious beast. This is why we do not take examples 7 and 8 to mean that Achilles moves on all fours and has a mane.⁶

Metaphor as Idea, Intercultural Tool and in Translations

Intercultural comparisons show that different languages use different linguistic constructions or forms when expressing a metaphor.¹ That said, the same metaphor can translate comfortably between languages (cf. the examples in Wandruszka 1981: 267–294). Let us compare, for instance, the metaphor ‘kindergarten’ in several different languages:²

6 Levinson (1995: 150–151) emphasised the fact that associations relate to the reference object and occur when a metaphor is understood. He wrongly describes them as ‘contingent attributes of the referents’ of the attributed term. However, these do not happen by accident but are culturally determined; Lakoff certainly thought as much (1972: 183–185).

1 Scholz (2005) provides two examples of different forms in Russian but they fall beyond the scope of this book.

2 The example is problematic because it is possible, depending on your viewpoint, to see the German term *Kindergarten* (‘a garden for children’) as an instance of metonymy, in which case the vessel (the garden) stands for the content (the children who go there). Nevertheless, we consider the German term a metaphor because in a kindergarten children are cared for and ‘cultivated’ in an analogous way to flowers, fruits and vegetables in a regular garden.

- (16) *Germ.* Kindergarten, *Latv.* bērnu **dārzs**, *Lith.* vaikų **darželis**, *Russ.* детский сад.

All the above examples are comparable in structure; the main difference lies in their respective modifiers. The bolded part of the words consistently means 'garden,' and serves as a metaphor in all the languages listed in example 16. More formal variation can be seen in the following examples:

- (17) *Germ.* Arbeitss**peicher**, *Engl.* working **storage**;
 (18) *American Engl.* main **memory**, *Lith.* standartinė **atmintis**, *Latv.* zibat**miņa**, *Russ.* оперативная **память**,
Polish **pamięć** operacyjna.

The parts printed in bold are the metaphorised parts of the word although they still correspond to each other: they all mean 'storage' (example 17) or 'memory' (example 18). In each of the three examples (16–18) above, the added parts are context signs, and are morphologically different from each other in terms of their modifier, which can only be added in accordance with the structural pattern of each language.

It should be pointed out that examples 16, 17 and 18 are all subject to borrowing processes. However, this fact is irrelevant when it comes to the use of iconicity. The metaphors have to work independently in each language. They have to be understood as soon as the figurative structure of the application has been imitated in the borrowing process for each language with whatever formal tools it has at its disposal. This is what Weinrich (1976: 283) had in mind: creating a metaphor involves a certain idea that visualizes something. This idea has to be understood and has to occupy or find a place in the semantic system of its respective language so that a metaphor can succeed. In the case of example 16, for example, the metaphorical idea pertains to the accommodation of pre-school children, and how best to find a suitable expression for this notion.³

The metaphorical idea is not the same as the meaning of the metaphor. For instance, the meaning of 'storage' in the context of computer memory (example 17) is a (term for a) special technical function. But the idea of the metaphor 'working storage' is what one expresses through the analogy between the concept 'storage' and the function in question. There is a special function and we would like to label it, and so to that end our labelling is a kind of appraisal. In terms of semantics, I believe, an attribution is therefore in progress.⁴ This is, for the most part, a day-to-day process. Labelling or attribution by metaphor is 'special' insofar as the word used for the label is already being used in other categorisations (see chapter 3.3).

3 Examples 16–18 only concern genitive metaphors. They were carefully chosen to elucidate the common confusion of attribution with predication, a problem I discussed in the previous chapter. However, the idea of metaphor must be taken into account, too, as a criterion concerning sentences where metaphor is used for predication. In philosophy this criterion is well recognised; cf. HWP (1989: 1194): a thought is expressed through the use of predication, a phenomenon known as the 'epistemological dimension' (*erkenntnistheoretische Hinsicht*) of predication. Expressing thought through metaphor encompasses the idea of the metaphor.

4 Logic labelling is described as 'elementary predication' (*elementare Prädikation*) by Kamlah and Lorenzen (1985: 23–34); see chapter 5.1 for further criticism. They identify a special case of predication in labelling and elementary predication because labelling is necessarily based on the 'speech act of indication' (*sprachliche Handlung des Hinweisens, deiktische Handlung*). Therefore, by 'speech act of indication', Kamlah & Lorenzen mean the act of reference. Thus, labelling is ultimately the cause of attribution.

Hence we draw analogies between the contexts, we check the categorisation (does it match?), and we identify the object, meaning that we understand what has been attributed to the object (for instance, to computer memory). Incidentally, to visualise the metaphor 'working storage' means to 'see' the idea of the metaphor, i.e. to create a mental picture of storage and the technical processes or -concepts connected with that storage. Thus the attributed 'content' reveals itself when visualising the metaphor.

As we have seen, an idea is converted into a language according to the unique structure and characteristics of the language. Many studies regard metaphor from this somewhat innovative idea. Hülzer (1987: 249–258), for instance, views metaphor as a hypothesis, the persuasiveness of which the speaker is testing on the listener:

The actual act of understanding a metaphor has to be understood as a kind of control of the metaphor. For the speaker, a moment of feedback or 'looking-glass speech'-effect is included in the reconstruction of the image⁵ evoked by the metaphor — this happens even when the metaphor has not been fully understood. (Hülzer 1987: 255)⁶

Chesterman (1997) has looked closely at this idea. Drawing on Richard Dawkins' 'The Selfish Gene',⁷ he expounds on the word 'meme' and its close connections with the word 'gene'. A meme (according to Chesterman 1997: 5–6) should be called a 'unit of cultural transmission', meaning ideas that do not necessarily exist in an identical form in different human brains, but which possess enough similarity between them to have a common denominator; that common denominator is the meme.

Meme transmission within a culture takes place through imitation and of course also through language. But for a meme to be transmitted verbally across culture, it needs a translation. Indeed, the need for translation is a neat criterion for the existence of a cultural boundary (...) ⁸ This gives us a fundamental definition of a translation: translations are survival machines for memes. (Chesterman 1997: 7)

Without wishing to extol a Neo-Platonic world of ideas, we have to admit that Chesterman's point clearly shows the problems of translation in their true light. Thanks to their linguistic competence, speakers and translators know which conceptions (thoughts, ideas) are behind the terms of the source language or are connected with them. This helps them realise that certain translations into the target language are problematic (without this competence, they would have no translating problems at all). One such problem is metaphor because, as we saw in chapter 1.2, metaphor operates on two semantic levels that have to be reconciled between the source language and the target language: not only the metaphorised term (corresponding to the level of sentence meaning) but also the 'idea of the metaphor' (i.e. the idea with which to express the utterance meaning through a metaphorised term). To translate a term as metaphor becomes impossible, then, if the target language does not know or allow the corre-

⁵ In her use of 'image' Hülzer has metaphor in mind.

⁶ Our translation; orig. in German: 'Die konkret erbrachte Verstehensleistung muß als eine Form der Überprüfung der Metapher verstanden werden. Im Aufarbeiten des durch die Metapher gesetzten Bildes ist aber in jedem Fall, d.h. auch wenn ein Verstehen derselben nicht zustande gekommen ist, ein Rückkopplungsmoment oder "Looking-glass Speech"-Effekt für den Sprecher enthalten.'

⁷ New York–Oxford 1976, ²1989. — Germ. *Das egoistische Gen*, Berlin et al. 1978.

⁸ Chesterman refers to Pym (1992: 26).

sponding metaphorical idea. In other words, it becomes impossible if the words expressed in the source language are not visualisable in a similar way in the target language.

We have seen two general structural patterns that underlie the metaphor, including the pattern of the 'genitive' metaphor. But in morphology, to link two terms metaphorically can only work when the presupposition being made is generally valid: the idea of the link has to be understood before the link is understandable (cf. the examples given by Motsch 1995: 513–518, 524–528).⁹ That is why the metaphor cannot be 'formally' defined by word formation or by a definition like 'metaphorical link'. For instance, in the arbitrary compounds

(19) knife-tree or street-scale

the idea needs to be understood first of all. A natural reaction towards these incongruous compounds would be to ask: 'What do they mean?' An immediate understanding of the metaphorical meaning of the compounds does not come to mind: neither through *a priori* knowledge of them nor by logically 'adding' the component parts together. Nevertheless, some theorists support the idea of metaphorical linking (see chapter 5) inasmuch as they believe that the compound metaphor applies known notions like 'tree' or 'scale' to other objects (contexts) which in turn have something to do with 'knives' and 'streets' (or vice versa). The technical term 'mapping' is used to describe this kind of application. The results of such mapping are, among other things, metaphor compounds such as those described in example 19. New concepts like 'knife-tree' or 'street-scale' should, by this account, be intelligible by the sum of their individual components. One should, in theory, be able to identify the part of the compound which represents the metaphor and thereby explain the meaning of the object / term that was previously unclear.

Another possible interpretation of the theory is that only the linking itself is metaphorical (i.e. the metaphor itself) whereas the singular compounds are not. If that were true, the following non-notional compound should be perfectly straightforward:

(20) *Germ. Bio-Bauer — Transl. by sense: person who practises ecological farming.*

Perhaps we know the universal prefix *Bio* (ecological) and the German *Bauer* (farmer). If the theory of metaphorical linking were correct, we should be able to explain the meaning of *Bio-Bauer* from the meaning of its components by metaphorically mapping the category *Bio* onto the context *Bauer*. In theory this might work but realistically it would only work if you already know the logical connection between the word components. However, you can only know this if you are already familiar with the meaning of example 20. It is not possible to know it *a priori* or by adding together the component parts because there is also, for example, the term *Bio-Gemüse*, meaning 'ecologically cultivated vegetables'. Precisely because the two terms share the same metaphorical structure, one might reasonably infer that a German *Bio-Bauer* is an ecologically produced farmer, made in the same way as all those eco-friendly German vegetables!

9 Compounds, or the juxtapositional linking of two terms, are a general semantic problem. A nice illustration of the 'problem of rightly understanding the idea' can be found in the German verses: 'Die Erde birgt viel Tonnen Öl. / Die Sonne nicht so Sonnenöl!' (Gernhardt 2014: 1004)

We can further demonstrate that the meaning of a compound metaphor is not elucidated by metaphorical linking (i.e. by mapping) through the well known example:

(21) *Engl. kindergarten.*

In German, *der Kindergarten* has the structure 'context marker *Kinder* + metaphor *Garten*'. In English it is an appellative (a name) for a nursery school that came into being as a loan word. If the meaning of this compound were the result of metaphorical linking, it would have to be a metaphor in English in order to have the same meaning. Conversely,

(22) *Engl. Pizza Hut*

has the metaphorical structure 'context marker *pizza* + metaphor *hut*.' However, in German it is simply a proper noun denoting a shop, much like *Auto Meier* or *Der Rügenbäcker*. Or else the 'hut' can be mistaken for the German *ein Hut* (hat) just as the English 'brand new' has been misinterpreted as *brandneu* (newly made of fire) when borrowed into German (Wandruszka 1981: 172). The fact that examples 21 and 22 are loan words often means that the foreign parts of the compounds cannot be immediately identified. By borrowing from a foreign language, the metaphorical structure becomes eliminated. The meaning of the compounds in such (increasingly common) cases does not emerge from linking concepts metaphorically. But such a 'linked' meaning should emerge, if the theory of mapping was consistent with reality.

It should be noted that examples 21 and 22 are loan words (only the term — not the idea of the metaphor — has crossed linguistic boundaries), whereas the metaphors in 16, 17 and 18 that have crossed linguistic boundaries are parts of loan translations (terminology of Betz 1949: 27–28). As we have seen with the 'lion' examples (7 to 9), when we talk about the idea of the metaphor we talk about culturally formed attitudes towards the comparability of image and meaning: we are referring to the notion of a lion from a cultural perspective; we are not talking about the identification of an object (terminology of Searle 1999: 81 ff.) but about the cultural status of this animal (Kubczak 1978: 106). This cultural status is often and confusingly described by the term 'concept' (Germ. *Begriff*). Metaphor is about ideas and their visualisation, which is why, as we have seen, there are metaphors which are impossible to translate into a foreign language. The semantic order of the foreign target language cannot always accommodate the metaphorical concepts of the source language in a way which makes the idea of the metaphor intelligible. Contrastive analysis in translation theory has repeatedly proven this point. Cultural distance is invariably held to be the reason for untranslatable metaphors, a problem that Salim-Mohammad (2007: 1–2, 47–58, and 75–97) has comprehensively explained. For our purposes three short examples should suffice:

(23) *Germ. Phrasen dreschen, Lith. has no equivalent* — *Fig. transl.:* to talk a lot of hot air;

(24) *Latv. ne mana cūka, ne mana druva* (MEH 1923/1946: I, 398) — *Literal transl.:* not my pig, not my field;

(25) *Latv. nav jau pirmo reizi ar pīpi uz jumta* (Rūķe-Draviņa 1974: 219) — *Literal transl.:* it is not his first time on the roof with a pipe.

In Lithuanian there is no equivalent for the German metaphor in example 23 but that does not mean it is impossible to translate what the metaphor is intended to express. It simply means that in Lithuanian it is not possible to use a corresponding image. Instead the verb *tuščiažodžiauti*, which, roughly translated, means ‘to utter empty words’,¹⁰ is used for this expression. Conversely, it is almost certain that both German speakers and anglophones would fail to understand a literal translation of the two Latvian examples (24 and 25), even if one were to replace the original nouns with ones closer to home. Compare the literal translations of 24 and 25 to:

(24') not my car, not my home;

(25') It is not his first time using a mobile phone in the rain.

If it were true that the meaning of a metaphor or figurative phrase is the result of a cognitive process that consists of mapping known concepts (expressed by a metaphor) onto unknown objects (expressed by other parts of the utterance), then we should be readily able to understand the phrases in examples 24 and 25 by literally translating them, or else we should be able to understand them simply by updating the terminology as in examples 24' and 25'. But the theory of metaphorical mapping is not sustainable; meaning is not a concrete slab that can be universally used for constructing ideas in all languages (cf. Chesterman 1997: 13, 21). It is of crucial importance which parallels or analogies are attributed to which object or state of affairs in each language and culture. The original structure of the metaphor has to be carefully considered if one intends to alter it (as we did with the well known localized metaphors in examples 24 and 25). Furthermore, in order to undergo a successful translation the original structure has to exist both linguistically and conceptually to the speaker, i.e. it has to be available as the idea of the metaphor. Incidentally, the respective meanings of the colourful idioms above (24/24' and 25/25') are: ‘That's none of my business’ and ‘Don't be naive.’ Idioms are truly a lovely and fascinating way of communicating ideas!

10 This *tuščiažodžiauti* is also a metaphor. However, its structure is inverted compared to the German metaphor: the Lithuanian metaphor ‘empty words’ corresponds to the part (Germ.) *Phrase* (phrase), not to the part *dreschen* (to thresh), which constitutes the metaphor in German. However, the Lithuanian *tuščiažodžiauti* is more complex in structure, too, because the context marker, i.e. the act of uttering empty words, is expressed by the verbal ending *-auti* only. In fact, a more literal translation of *tuščiažodžiauti* would be ‘to word emptily’.

CHAPTER THREE

The Evidence for Classical Metaphor

Double Sense Structure. Reference. Metaphor as an Exceptional Device

The grammatical particularities of a language are largely inconsequential where metaphor is concerned, as we saw in chapters 2.2 and 2.3. What is important is how its meaning is structured, which includes the question of reference, and the cultural/historical manifestations it draws from. Metaphor is affected by meaning on two levels:

- on the metaphorical level, that is to say: the actual idea of a metaphor, its image or iconicity respectively, the visualisation of it as a semantic entity *eo ipso*; and, of course,
- on the level of understanding, that is: the meaning of the image, the actual communication of the word in relation to the actual environment of signified objects.

Metaphor, or the image at the heart of it, is not simply a word (term) or a concept (de Saussure's 'concept'). In its figurativeness metaphor preexists itself as a trans-conceptual semantic entity, or, if you like, a thought. Just as metaphor (and not only that which is meant by a metaphor) constitutes an independent semantic entity at the sentence-level, so it is inherently possible to distinguish a specific 'literal' meaning from a 'figurative' meaning. It is interesting that we consider the aspect of a semantic entity which induces us to visualise an ephemeral image to be 'literal' and 'original' but we consider the aspect of the semantic entity which is the substantial thought of the utterance expressed (with reference to a factual context or situation) to be 'figurative', 'transferred' and so on. (To be fair, not all theorists do not conceptualise these things in this manner.)

If semantics worked along the lines of diagram 4 (on the following page), metaphor would make no sense as it operates through a model of substitution like that shown in diagram 5 (also see chapter 2.1). Instead, metaphor functions according to the equation shown in diagram 6. In order to understand the meaning of the phrase

(26) *Germ.* einen **süßen Zahn** haben — *Transl.:* to have a **sweet tooth**

the listener must not only understand that two ordinary words ('sweet' and 'tooth') are here juxtaposed in a literally incongruous and nonsensical combination but must also accept that the speaker believes that the meaning 'to love eating sweet things' can be adequately paraphrased by the expression 'sweet tooth'; that is to say, the idea can be conveyed by the metaphor. However, the point we wish to make is not that there is a single idea which can be expressed in two ways. What is important is the absent reference of the concept used in the metaphor (concept B in diagram 5). This reference must be *in esse* (see the revised scheme in

Diagram 4: Scheme for the semantics of word ‘A’ (taken from Nöth 1995: 92–93)

meaning A (understanding; semantics)	concept A (the word and its meaning — understood as independent and free of reference; mental dictionary)
	reference A (the actual reference to the signified object; the act of contextualisation)

Diagram 5: Position of metaphor ‘B’ according to the model of substitution

meaning A	metaphor: concept B instead of concept A (given by word B, instead of A)
	reference A

diagram 6) or else concept B would be either an ‘empty’ word or an ‘ordinary’ concept; it would not constitute an entity in its own right (an image).

If you say ‘You’re an ass’ to a donkey which is standing right in front of you,¹ it is not, needless to say, a metaphorical utterance. It is a simple case of referring to objects, facts and situations according to the model shown in diagram 7.² When the same term (‘ass’) is used to refer to a person, however, it becomes a ‘figurative’ reference. This dynamic is explained in diagram 8 (on page 50). In both cases (I and II) the reference in question is factual and objective. This is a relatively straightforward example but it is nonetheless worth considering: the situation which ‘You are an ass’ refers to (reference situation) is identical with the situation in which the sentence is uttered (utterance situation); see Hülzer (1987: 93–100) for more concerning this ‘deictic’ distinction.³

The famous example used in examples 7 and 9 (page 39) is more intricate. What does the statement refer to? It allows us to infer or make up a situation (and from it also a context), however, the example alone does not provide any reference to a more specific meaning (situation). A ‘closer’ determination follows: either (case α) in the further course of the commu-

1 This example is more compelling in German because there is only one word (*Esel*) for this creature.

2 Regarding my use of the term ‘reference’, cf. Searle (1999: 91–94). There are, of course, several approaches to the question of reference. See Salmon (1996) for an illuminating perspective.

3 Hülzer cites a 19th century-study by Philipp Wegener in support of her argument.

Diagram 6: Double sense structure of metaphor ‘B’





Diagram 7: ‘You’re a silly ass’ — situation I



nication, by making the unclear reference the central theme of the dialogue, or (case β) certain basic assumptions of a more general kind are made by the recipient of the cryptic statement. In case α the following dialogue could take place:

- (27) A TEACHER asks her pupils at the start of the new term: ‘What did you do during the holidays? What was the most interesting thing you saw?’
BRUNO: ‘Achilles was amazing! Achilles is a lion.’
TEACHER: ‘Where did you see him?’
BRUNO: ‘In Wrocław Zoo.’

4 The word ‘donkey’ is more commonly used in a neutral context; ‘ass’ is a little archaic (i.e. ‘beast of burden’) and is generally only used pejoratively (i.e. figuratively). This distinction is not a problem in German and other languages.

Diagram 8: 'You're a silly ass' — situation II

meaning A: 'a stupid person' (maybe a true statement, but certainly offensive; etc.)	concept A (utterance): concept of the ass — 'quadruped of the horse kind ...', regarded as stubborn and stupid ...
	reference A (reference to objects, facts and situations): <i>'Till Eulenspiegel'</i> <i>from the edition Strasbourg 1515</i>

The child is referring to a real lion. This reflects the case illustrated in diagram 7, except the lion is not part of the utterance situation. The reference situation is constituted by the child's visit to the zoo (see diagram 9): the child mentions Wrocław Zoo (which is locally well known) as evidence of his/her statement, thus answering a critical question; the child might just as well show a photo of the lion prowling around its enclosure, etc.

If there is no such clarification, the conversation does not necessarily come to an end. Case β remains open: any lingering uncertainty is usually tolerated as long as most general basic assumptions are communicatively upheld.⁵ It is important to remember that when we communicate with others, as in case β , we actively (re)construct context in order to make otherwise obscure references comprehensible. Without receiving specific information from the speaker, we naturally think to ourselves: 'The child went to the zoo' or 'There was a programme about lions on TV'; the result is what we see in diagram 9. So in case β we understand the utterance from the supplementary assumption of certain conditions which constitute the situation; from this we infer context and determine the truth, probability and intelligibility of the utterance (Searle 1994: 117–136). The act of reference, as we can see, is in large part produced and enriched by our imagination.

Linguists have called this process of using the imagination to generate additional information and enrich understanding 'contextualisation' (cf. Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz 1976, Gumperz 1982, Auer 1986). Contexts are not explicitly provided but are surmised over the course of a conversation; manifold 'contextualisation cues' are given by the speaker that depend on a background knowledge which is determined according to socio-culturally deter-

5 We can believe whoever we are speaking to as long as they do not become excessively entangled in contradictions.

Diagram 9: ‘Achilles is a lion in a zoo’ — situation III (cf. example 27)

meaning A: ‘Achilles = lion’ (true statement under the actual conditions of the reference situation)	concept A (utterance): concept of the lion — ‘dangerous large quadruped wild animal, carnivorous ...’, regarded as brave, aggressive and ...
	reference A (reference to objects, facts and situations), here: the reference situation <u>is not</u> the utterance situation. ⇒ Reconstruction of the conditions under which the utterance of the child becomes a plausible answer to the questions of the teacher. ● The further course of the dialogue can shed light on the actual conditions (case α): ‘It happened during our visit to the zoo’, ‘There was a film at the cinema’, etc. ● Otherwise (case β) an uncertainty remains, taken into account by the speaker and the listener: ‘Achilles is a lion’ >> There is a lion known by the child >> How could this happen?

mined frames. The listener, in turn, must react to these subtle prompts in order to form the right context for an utterance. That is, they must pick up on the given cues in order to contextualise ‘correctly’. In other words, they (the listener) automatically follow case β if the conversation as such does not deal with the assignment of utterances, or cues, to a frame, i.e. the relevant and necessary background knowledge (case α). However, in either case (α or β) the listener’s reconstruction of the reference situation follows certain rules of plausibility (of probability, of the usual), which can be pragmalinguistically reformulated by means of Grice’s maxims and principles (Grice 1991: 26–31). Broadly speaking, plausibility is derived from our knowledge of the world and people, and from interpretative frames such as causality. Habermas (2006: I, 56–58, 107–108, 149–150, 190–191, 400–414, 448–452, and II, 185–205, 223–224) explains this notion of ‘background’ through the concepts of situation and ‘life world’ (Germ. *Lebenswelt*). For Habermas, ‘life world’ represents the culture, language, personal beliefs and social practices that are the accumulated sum of one’s communicative behaviour. Pragmalinguists refer to this as ‘presuppositions’ (cf. Meibauer 2001: 44ff.). Unlike Habermas, however, they do not draw any philosophical conclusions from this process. For them, presuppositions are basically distinguished either by use-related (including extralinguistic) ‘contents’, such as know-how and experiences, or by sign-related ‘contents’, such as connotations, social imagery, and the knowledge of how to refer and contextualize correctly.

In example 27 the interlocutors presuppose that the term ‘lion’, as it is used by young Bruno, accurately describes the object he has in mind. Both speakers automatically presuppose that each knows what a lion is (whether as an empirical object or as a symbol). And both speakers mutually presuppose that the child’s answer conveys certain behavioural norms

when it comes to school kids and how they spend their summer holidays. The act of reconstructive understanding, or contextualisation, complies with Grice's rules of communication and does not need an extraordinary linguistic marker (although it does require certain cues as identified by Gumperz). In any case, metaphor, as an exceptional form of communication, includes this extraordinary linguistic marker, i.e. the context marker described in chapter 2.2.

If we concur with Kubczak (1986: 87) that metaphor circumvents the rules of communication and speech, this does not mean that the application of metaphors does not work according to certain rules; rather, metaphor creates an 'established' exception towards those rules. Beckmann (2001: 83 *et passim*) was (to the best of my knowledge) the first to rightly define this as a legitimate linguistic device. Black (1993: 22–23), as early as 1954 (then again in 1977), wrote about the restricted creativity of metaphor: metaphor violates the very rules that allow creativity to take its own course. Black (1993: 23) posits that this is not arbitrary but, rather, revolves around a 'logical grammar'. In a similar vein, Schumacher (1997: 32–36) reverts to a study by Werner Ingendahl and regards metaphor as a deliberate, semantic 'reaching out to grasp' (German *Ausgriff*), meaning that one can wring new meanings and aspects out of words because they are innately malleable on a semantic level.

The exception created by metaphor lies in the fact that when someone speaks of a lion they are not really referring to a lion either as an empirical object or as a cultural symbol. They are drawing on notions of normality that are linked to the semantics of words (thereby affecting reference) and which govern our imagination. The word 'lion' denotes not only 'a large predatory cat with a mane ...' or 'a wild and fierce animal that ...'; we also know that lions are only found in zoos, films, and certain parts of Africa and South Asia. If this were not the case, our judgement of the utterance in example 27 would be different: we would not interpret the dialogue as the integrated whole that we do. Any further communication between the teacher and child would not be regarded by us as a specification of the child's answer, that is, a clarification of ambiguity and evidence to support the child's response; any further communication would be regarded by us as new answers within a further sequence of dialogue (cf. chapter 4.3). When a person wants to use a metaphor, they must make it contextually clear that, firstly, the reference situation does not require plausibility to grant it validity, and, secondly, whatever degree of plausibility is required can be perceived by the listener so long as the speaker does not talk nonsense. This is often achieved by briefly outlining the reference situation in advance so the listener can adjust themselves mentally and the metaphor will hit home, as it were. The speaker inserts an extraordinary context marker into their speech; they insert a cue that tells the listener how to contextualise the word that needs to be metaphorised.

Visualisation as Ideal Reference and Substitute for Experience

In the case of

(28) Bundesrechnungshof — *Transl.*: Federal Audit Office (*in English the German metaphor is not translated*),

(29) Supreme Court of Judicature,


only ‘court’ (German *Hof* — ‘court’) is considered a metaphor. However, as I explained in the previous chapter, ‘court as metaphor’ is imaginable only in a definite ‘life world’, context and specific utterance structure. This makes it vexingly difficult to translate. Concepts, connotations and presuppositions for ‘court in that specific context’ have to be valid in the target language, too. On the other hand, if one usually locates the metaphor in a single word, this is because the word is in the semantic focal point of the metaphorical meaning (the rhema of the statement). Kubczak (1978: 91–93) calls this the ‘orientation’ of the metaphor. Thielemann (2014: 86–87) makes a useful distinction between the ‘keyword’ (*Schlüsselwort*) and the ‘catchword’ (*Schlagwort*). From a single metaphorical construction we have to derive those characteristics we want to predicate to the target of the statement when trying to explain the meaning of a metaphor within a given context. I would like to emphasise here that the analogy-theory (cf. chapter 2.1) is correct in its assertion that, from the point of view of meaning, the only important characteristics of the utterance are those that pertain to the target of the predication (attribution).

Let us consider two further and specific connections between meaning and reference. When making a reference, we describe something by a particular term or an utterance; the thing described is the reference object. The totality of all reference objects shall be described by the term reference potential.¹ Similarly, we shall use the term utterance potential to refer to the totality of available terms (statements, signs) that refer to a particular reference situation (namely, the object of a situation) so long as the meaning (illocution) of what is uttered is equivalent. Keeping this terminology in mind, along with the basic structure of metaphor (as illustrated in diagram 6), we are now in a position to analyse the semantics of metaphor (outlined in diagram 10 on the next page).

With the occurrence of a ‘second’ meaning (utterance B), the possibility of distinguishing between a reference situation and utterance situation likewise occurs a second time. From the point of view of utterance B, ‘situation’ A seems to be ‘factual’ while ‘situation’ B only seems relevant on a linguistic level; that is, utterance B refers to a ‘fiction’ because its context marker ‘in battle’ is the cue that reveals its difference to ‘situation’ A. Moreover, in the example shown in diagram 10, reference A (to ‘Achilles’) is clearly more important than reference B (to ‘a lion’) so one would expect an appropriate reference-A-object such as ‘brave warrior’ to be uttered in the context. This important act of ‘crossing-out’ occurs because language makes it possible to talk about matters beyond the utterance situation. Language would not be able to

¹ In language philosophy this phenomenon is also called extension; Lyons (1996: 50 ff., 174 ff.) uses the term ‘denotation’.

Diagram 10: 'Achilles is a lion in battle' — situation IV (the semantics of metaphor)



fulfil this important communicative function, however, if reference situation A was not intuitively understood to be more significant despite being literally historical, fictional and even phantastical in meaning. In the final analysis, only reference A (to 'Achilles') relates to a 'real' concrete situation and hence contains the act of reference itself. It is, frankly, inconceivable to imagine it any other way.

² Detail. Source: Louvre, from Wikipedia.

Reference B is purely ideal and exists for the purpose of visualisation, although we retain the ‘free’ use of contextualisation. This ‘free’ ideality, otherwise better known as the imagination, is commonly expressed by markers along the lines of ‘literally, a lion is ...’, or, ‘a lion makes you think of ...’, etc. This means that reference B occurs if the speaker omits the utterance context (see Levin 1993: 121). This is what we shall call the ideal reference, the result of which is the ideal referent. The idea of the ideal referent has much in common with the theory of ‘idealised cognitive models’ postulated by Lakoff and Lakoff and Johnson (see chapter 5.3). Whereas idealised cognitive models are meant to represent actual facts, the ideal reference is imaginary; it is produced by the imagination of the speaker or listener. In order to make an ideal reference, one needs to be able to visualise the reference in question, which is essentially a by-product of fantasy.

It is only because metaphor constitutes a separate semantic unit that it is possible to visualise its content. But what happens then? Of course, everybody is able to form a mental picture of concepts like ‘evening’, ‘garden’, ‘court’ and so on, but this is in no way the same as visualizing examples 28 or 29. A concept in itself does not suffice to make a metaphor. Visualisation cannot simply be equated with ‘having an idea or notion of something’. This has already been pointed out by Aldrich (1968: 76–78, 82–84)³ who argues (op. cit.: 83): ‘Concept’ by itself will not do, since nobody sees anything as a concept.’ A concept is the product of single reference situations and of an abstraction of these experiences, the latter of which is made possible by the entity of the used sign. ‘Reference potential’ does not mean anything more than a concept; as a product of abstraction, it is applicable to various actual, possible, and hypothetical cases. A concept, then, is not a ‘content’ but rather something akin to a rule of application (Germ. *Gebrauchsregel*, cf. Beckmann 2001: 27–32);⁴ a concept may facilitate the imaginative faculty, but, in contrast with metaphor, a concept is independent of context. That which we refer to as ‘concept’ has been usefully defined as ‘semantic form’ within so-called two-level-semantics (Bierwisch 1983, 1989, 1997; Lang 1985, 1994; for what constitutes the nature of lexical content in general, see Motsch 1995: 518–524). We will use this term (abbreviation s-form) when we discuss the ‘emptiness’ of semantic forms. In chapter 5.1 we will clarify what we mean by the ‘contents’ of concepts. For now we will simply say that a ‘concept’ becomes a superordinate, of which the ‘s-form’ is but one part (equal to the view of two-level-semantics). Thus we will continue to use the traditional expression ‘concept’ only when a more precise distinction is unnecessary.

Visualising a metaphor (as in diagram 10) means the creation of a model which is dependent on context. Visualising a metaphor means forming a picture (idea, notion) in which the metaphor finds an ideal form that corresponds to the given reference situation. In terms of the example given in diagram 10, the corresponding form is an ideal reference for the s-form B (‘lion’) in such a way that the meaning of B — ‘a fighting lion’ (derived from the ‘complete’

3 Instead of visualisation, Aldrich (1968: 77–78, 83) uses the terms ‘image’ (Germ. *Vorstellungsbild*) and ‘illustrated concept’ (Germ. *veranschaulichter Begriff*).

4 ‘rule of application’ (Germ. *Gebrauchsregel*) — this definition goes back to Wittgenstein who observed that the meaning of a concept is based on its application. A given concept can therefore also be altered by its applications (cf. Lyons 1994: I, 607 ff.; Motsch 1995: 522) because the contents of concepts are part of our experience.

utterance B, 'a lion in battle' — remains plausible in connection with reference A ('Achilles'). An ideal referent for *Bundesrechnungshof* (example 28) or 'Supreme Court of Judicature' (example 29), in addition to the idea, for instance, of a stately building similar to a grand court with many servants, lackeys and officials scurrying discreetly between rooms, would also include the fact that auditing (example 28) or legal deliberations (example 29) are going on and that this work is being done by or for the Federal Republic of Germany or the United States of America. The visualisation might also contain ideas affecting the illocutionary aim of the utterance such as, for instance, by asking a graphic artist to draw his or her ideal referent for the word *Bundesrechnungshof* (e.g. for a satirical political cartoon). This visualisation would then be markedly different from others. In any case, the important thing is that metaphor not only possesses an epistemological function that enables us to incorporate certain norms into a vision, including a key concept and a certain world context, but it also allows us to communicate all of this visually and without the often cumbersome support of words.

The matter of ideal reference is complicated because of the fact that it is also possible to form an ideal referent consisting of non-metaphorical semantic forms. A 'tree' is a mental category which is simple and easy to grasp, and which implies a number of experiences and qualities. In an abstract form this category finds its counterpart in the semantic form possessing the corresponding criteria. These criteria may only allow for certain logical (syntactic or pragmatic) links. That is why the s-form (the meaning of a concept) can be regarded as embodying the rules of application of itself. Compared to the s-form, the visualisation of 'tree' is a process out of which the imagined tree springs from a romantic painting, for instance, or arises from pure fancy or perhaps from the memory of a particularly beautiful example of a tree. The 'tree' is contextualised, one might even say simplified; but this contextualisation happens in a free, imaginative way. As a result, the context is highly elaborate and with no consideration of the utterance situation. This brings us back to de Saussure's model of the linguistic sign (published posthumously in 1916), which he defined as a psychological entity through which 'thought-image' (French *concept*) and 'sound-image' (*image acoustique*) are connected (cf. Nöth 1995: 59–60).

It is irrefutable that concepts can be visualised.⁵ However, we want to emphasize the fact that ideal referents can arise only through a hidden reference situation generated inwardly by association. Searle (1994: 128) demonstrated this when discussing so-called literal meaning: 'Consider the imperative sentence "Shut the door". As soon as we hear this sentence we are likely to picture a standard scene in which it would have a clear literal application.' By inventing a standard situation, Searle forms an example of ideal reference. However, he also shows (loc. cit.) how the accepted 'normal meaning' of the sentence 'Shut the door' disappears if one changes the standard situation into a non-standard one. In Searle's example meaning, or more specifically understanding and the formation of an ideal reference are interdepen-

5 In his early work Lakoff (1972: 183–185) shows the role ideal reference plays for categories like 'bird' or 'fruit' and for the assignment of members to these categories. The over-individual, culturally dependent prototypes developed inter alia by Lakoff originate from experience-based but individually formed ideal references, that is to say, from the visualisations of semantic forms.

dent. Here Searle is clearly influenced by Wittgenstein who wrote the following about the interdependence between meaning and the use of concepts (1953: 21e):

43. For a large class of cases — though not for all — in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.⁹

Because of this interdependence it is important to know the reference so one can gauge whether it is real or ideal. Wittgenstein elaborates (op.cit.: 19e):

(39. ...) The sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular way. If they are combined differently Excalibur does not exist. But it is clear that the sentence ‘Excalibur has a sharp blade’ makes sense whether Excalibur is still whole or is broken up. But if ‘Excalibur’ is the name of an object, this object no longer exists when Excalibur is broken in pieces; and as no object would then correspond to the name it would have no meaning. But then the sentence ‘Excalibur has a sharp blade’ would contain a word that had no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But it does make sense; so there must always be something corresponding to the words of which it consists.¹⁰

Let us turn to diagram 10 on page 54 again: regarding visualisation, metaphor is not like an indistinct s-form in its often unclear context (at least whenever the reference situation is not the utterance situation) but it is a verbally evident process with an ‘outward situation’ *expressis verbis* — ‘a lion in battle’. Hence, reference A is not the feature that is visualised. In contrast, the use of concept B, such as the German word *Hof* (cf. example 29), generates meaning B in its specific reference situation B (*Bundesrechnungs-*). Now meaning B has opened up for us our possible experiences regarding both concept B and situation B. Thus, when introducing a metaphor we are able to subtly control its visualisation by modifying situation B. Concept A is a matter of truth, whereas concept B is a matter of imagination; the reference of A can be false or inadequately fulfilled by the metaphor-B-situation, but the metaphor itself can not be false in any way. If it transpires that the ‘lion in battle’ is, in fact, a ‘frog in battle’, the metaphorical idea of being an animal in battle still remains, only the evaluation that utterance B expresses will have changed. Furthermore, modifying the context marker can be more impressive: ‘to be a lion in the battle of Verdun’ changes our visualisation of the metaphor drastically. For understatement we might add ‘sluggish’ to the lion, or ‘fierce’ to the battle, and our visualisation of metaphor B will be further enhanced.

It should once again be reiterated that the visualisation of a metaphor involves the level of sentence meaning. The sentence meaning in diagram 10 includes concept B (the meaning of B). The visualisation of B is bound to the context, i.e. it does not solely consist of a model based on the s-form B but also consists of co-modelling (‘seeing’) both the context marker and the target of predication (attribution). However, meaning A is not part of the visualisation of metaphor B. In examples 28 and 29, for instance, what could be the visualisation of meaning A is invisible (in the examples where the Germ. *Hof* or Engl. ‘court’ stands metaphorically). This is seemingly a paradox because the metaphor has been created especially for the sake of the utterance meaning! One could argue that it is not necessary to visualise meaning

⁹ Orig. in German — Wittgenstein 1953: 20.

¹⁰ Orig. in German — Wittgenstein 1953: 18.

A because the object being referred to is the visual proof of what matters. Yet this can only be the case if the utterance situation is identical with the reference situation as shown in diagrams 7 and 8. If it is not (as in diagrams 9 and 10), there is ‘nothing to see’, i.e. the reference-A-object remains technically unclear. In any case, the object for which the *Hof* in *Bundesrechnungshof* or ‘court’ in ‘Supreme Court of Judicature’ stands metaphorically is not only invisible in the actual utterance situation but it may be impossible for us to have any ‘empirical’ insights into the object at all.

Here another important function of metaphor reveals itself, namely, the ‘filling’ of meaning B in cases where it is not possible, for various reasons, to draw on (linguistic) experiences, or when one does not want or cannot contrive any (seemingly) better linguistic categories comprising ideas formed from personal values and socially recurrent views of the world. In this regard we can meaningfully and fittingly speak of the ‘unspeakable’ signified. We have already called this semantic ‘filling’ process an attribution (cf. chapter 2.1). In other words, the metaphor (see concept B in diagram 10) simulates a linguistic experience of reference when an actual one is (maybe) lacking. Or, as conceptualism sees the matter (cf. chapter 5), concept B transmits an actual experience (specifically, an ideal referent) to the understanding of meaning A, thus camouflaging other — possibly better — categories (notions, concepts) for the reference object. In this way metaphor truly ‘constructs sense’ where there is none. However, categorising by means of metaphor (in the final analysis: to conceptualise) is not a compensatory mechanism but a basic requirement of human communication and of thought itself. Conceptualism more or less comes to the same conclusion although it improperly generalises the effect of attribution. The fact is that metaphorical expressions are already the best available terms (at least, they are no worse than any other). As a rule, there is often no alternative to them.

Consequences. The Critical Merit of Intention.

The Model of Non-Literal or Transferred Meaning

The aforementioned function of metaphor (the construction of sense) has received a great deal of critical attention, particularly as part of a wider, more general, philosophical criticism of language (see below). The following three aspects should be kept in mind:

- The process described is inevitable as long as ‘new words’ are constructed from old ones by using the old ones in a new context and thus linguistically conquering the world anew. The process can only be sidestepped if completely new words are invented for new contexts. But would communication be at all possible then?
- The process described is a necessary one because it alone allows for change in the meaning of words and in their scope of meaning. If one word were exclusively restricted to one particular reference (as was the belief in antiquity in the form of *verba univoca* or ‘true expressions’), concepts would never be able to change and would remain fixed. Human speech would consequently know fewer misunderstandings and ideologies would strug-

gle to cope. Human language would be on the same level as the language of bees or communication by flag signals.¹

- In any given communicative situation, the utterance meaning is of far greater importance than the sentence meaning. Gadamer expressed it in the following way:

The verbal explicitness that understanding achieves through interpretation does not create a second sense apart from that which is understood and interpreted. The interpretive concepts are not, as such, thematic in understanding. Rather, it is their nature to disappear behind what they bring to speech in interpretation. Paradoxically, an interpretation is right when it is capable of disappearing in this way. And yet at the same time it must be expressed as something that is supposed to disappear. The possibility of understanding is dependent on the possibility of this kind of mediating interpretation. This is also true in those cases when there is immediate understanding and no explicit interpretation is undertaken. For in these cases too interpretation must be possible. But this means that interpretation is contained potentially within the understanding process. It simply makes the understanding explicit. Thus interpretation is not a means through which understanding is achieved; rather, it enters into the content of what is understood. (Gadamer 2006: 399)²

This is illustrated by diagram 10 on page 54 in the following way: what is understood by metaphors such as examples 1, 3, 7, 17, and 28 is the meaning of A (the utterance meaning). The understanding of meaning A requires an explanation of the meaning of concept B in the particular context, for instance, with the comment that ‘in this passage’ we are dealing with a metaphor signifying this or that. In this way the understanding of meaning A is elucidated and a particular interpretation of the metaphor is achieved. The explanation of meaning B in a given context, however, is not the same as an interpretation of the metaphor itself. The interpretation of metaphor B is its visualisation which (as we hope we have made clear) is something quite different from the understanding of the metaphor; the understanding of metaphor is the intellectual transition from sentence to utterance meaning.

Linguistics and philosophy have so far overlooked this subtle but significant difference. This does not mean that the use of images cannot be criticised (on the contrary). However, it is not the image itself, nor the use of the image as such, which can be criticised. The fact that metaphor is able to simulate a non-existing experience of reference is also not the crucial point here. What can be criticised are the values, morals and ethos of the individual experiences being conveyed by metaphor. We again refer to Gadamer (2006: 402):

Faced with the socially motivated tendency towards uniformity with which language forces understanding into particular schematic forms which hem us in, our desire for knowledge tries to escape from schematizations and predecisions. However, the critical superiority which we claim over language pertains not to the conventions of verbal expression but to the conventions of meaning that have become sedimented in language.³

Thus, when a particular metaphor is criticised, the criticism is essentially of the reasonableness of the values, morals and ethos propagated by the metaphor. In other words, the real problem is that the metaphor is communicating values which, for whatever reasons, appear

1 Cf. language and the determination of humanity, a connection that has been established since antiquity, Gadamer (1990: 447 ff., and 2006: 440 ff.).

2 Orig. in German — Gadamer 1990: 402.

3 Orig. in German — Gadamer 1990: 405.

to be wrong or insupportable in the mind of the listener or reader (likewise Hülzer 1987: 257–258). In short, metaphor is open to criticism when its utterance meaning is open to criticism.

Even the visualisation of a metaphor is prone to criticism by this logic. The visualisation process is a form of interpretation by the recipient, who will either approve or disapprove of the imagery or symbolism of the s-forms being metaphorised. The speaker, as with the person who provided them with the metaphor beforehand, must choose whether to use the same visualisation or select another one when using an s-form (word) as metaphor. This results in a ‘hermeneutic’ gap between the visualisation intended by the speaker and that perceived by the recipient. The only worthwhile criticism, in consequence, is that which can distinguish between the visualisations a speaker has ‘seen’ behind his or her metaphors and which pre-existing imagery or symbolism the speaker has in mind (this is no mean feat!).

Metaphor as such, that is to say, as a linguistic device, is morally indeterminate; only in connection with the utterance situation can it be determined if a metaphor supports ideas that might be deemed unacceptable. Let us take a popular German expression about work, for instance:

- (30) Schuften bis zum Umfallen — *explanation*: ‘to work so hard that one is ready to drop (collapse)’ — *Engl. equivalents*: work like a dog, *or*: have your nose to the grindstone (*the English metaphors are less drastic than the German*).

The recipient must overcome the ambiguity contained in the metaphor as it does not precisely state the quality of the German phrase *bis zum Umfallen*. Is it ‘drop dead’, ‘collapse’, or merely ‘faint’? How the metaphor is filled depends on the visualisation of the individual recipient. Let us imagine three different conversations in which this phrase is used:

- (31) EIN FREUND: ‘Wie lief’s heute bei dir auf der Arbeit?’
 GEFRAGTER: ‘Mann, wir haben wieder geschuftet **bis zum Umfallen**.’
Transl.: A FRIEND: ‘How was work today?’
 PERSON ASKED: ‘We worked so hard that I’m ready **to drop dead**.’
- (32) ARZT ZUM PATIENTEN: ‘Wenn Sie weiterhin jeden Tag **bis zum Umfallen** schuften, werden Ihre Rückenprobleme nur noch schlimmer werden!’
Transl.: DOCTOR TO PATIENT: ‘If you work every day until you’re about **to drop**, your backache will only get worse and worse!’
- (33) CHEF ZUM ARBEITNEHMER: ‘Sie wollen schon nach Hause? Nichts da! Sie schuften gefälligst **bis zum Umfallen**!’
Transl.: EMPLOYER TO EMPLOYEE: ‘You want to leave already? Not a chance! You’re supposed to work until you’re ready **to drop**!’

The last example (33) certainly seems a bit exaggerated and unlikely. No employer would dare say such a thing (and would probably not dare think it either) for obvious reasons: the very idea is the epitome of cruelty. Depending on how we visualise the metaphor, the employer is either a slave-driver, psychopath or murderer. However, it is not the metaphor per se but the belief of the employer that employees should work until they are physically spent that is to be criticised. The metaphor itself does not merit any criticism despite ambiguously conveying the morally repugnant values of the employer. The same metaphorical phrase is used in ex-

amples 31 and 32 but in example 31 it is used to express a somewhat hyperbolic self-importance and in example 32 it is used to offer well-meaning advice. These opinions leave little room for criticism.

As we see, metaphor itself is neither inherently good nor bad; it is simply a case of figurative speech structured around certain imagery. It should be emphasised that we do not intend to neglect the moral problems which can arise from the use of metaphors; it would be impossible and inexcusable to do so. However, metaphor is 'only' a device by which one expresses one's intended meaning. Unfortunately, this distinction is not always observed when discussing metaphor. Kurz (1988: 25–27), for instance, believes that metaphors possess political content solely by the fact that they belong to a particular metaphorical field. According to Kurz, metaphors that describe the state (community) are automatically political statements when they originate from the mechanical rather than the organic realm. Nevertheless, the description of the state in either mechanical or organic terms would be rejected by some and welcomed by others. There is no decisive or conclusive reaction regardless of which metaphorical category is used. Many people do not like being compared to a machine as they feel it 'dehumanizes' them. Others could find positive connotations in the comparison inasmuch as it expresses the idea of being highly organized and efficient (cf. 'working like clockwork'). In this respect, Kurz is right in his general criticism of metaphor when he says that linguistic images are subtle rhetorical instruments whose effects run deep. We would add that this is true precisely because we are able to visualise metaphors and to understand such visualising as representing its meaning. It is exceptionally hard not to experience visualisations when decoding metaphorical language, which means that certain emotional effects set in automatically.

This does not mean that the use of iconicity is completely individual and arbitrary (that is, dependent on the situation). As is the case with many other aspects of language and speech, so iconicity also contains an abundant reservoir of signs, images, key concepts and symbols etc. (cf. chapter 4.1) that are socially and culturally bound in such a way that their actual use is prestructured *a priori*. These rules and restrictions occur for various moral, religious or ideological reasons, or even for purely historical reasons: a certain use of language is always functionalised by the cultural, social and political 'memory' (Assmann; cf. *inter alia* Welzer 2001). A particular instance of iconicity may be prohibited, for instance, because cultural or linguistic usage 'remembers' its abuse and consequences. From this point of view, there is no 'metaphor as such' at all! Iconicity is simply 'content'; it is intention, meaning, evaluation, categorisation, and can thus impart the same controversial things that can be conveyed by way of speech or intercommunication.

For this reason it is important to be aware that the iconicity underlying many metaphors is suffused with cultural and historical baggage. In general, a surprising amount of what passes for idiomatic language is, at root, an expression of hatefulness. One should be cognizant of the fact that the metaphors and figures used in an utterance situation can reinforce prejudices and result in hurtful visualisations (even though this was unintended). Metaphors do not materialise out of nothing yet they often elude close scrutiny; culture gives them a free

pass, so to speak. But we are responsible for the images we evoke in the name of language and what is expressed by them.

Metaphors are possible because semantic forms and their reference objects do not bear a fixed relation to each other as a rule; metaphors do not refer to objects and facts according to a fixed rule, a fixed context or a fixed situation. If there is a determining rule, context or situation, then it is not down to 'nature' but social convention. We use the term 'arbitrariness' (chapter 1.3) to explain this aspect of language in general. Without the arbitrariness or contextual flexibility of metaphors and figurative phrases (or of language as a whole), irony would not be possible. If you were unlucky or incompetent enough to have sunk a rented boat to the bottom of a lake, and the owner of the boat said to you:


(34) Das haben Sie ja toll hingekriegt! — *Transl.*: Wow, great job!

we would all know what the owner really meant by that. There is, however, no categorical difference between example 34 and examples 31 to 33, as Searle (1994: 112–116) and Grice (1991: 34) clearly explained.

Ironically, perhaps this arbitrariness is the reason why so many theorists persistently find in metaphor a 'non-literal' or 'improper' meaning (see diagram 11). The term 'transferred meaning' (Germ. *übertragene Bedeutung*) is also often used to describe the effects of iconicity we have in mind. Or, as Goodman (2008: 74–84) reformulated it in contemporary jargon (he is not talking about metaphors in particular), a label changes its denotation. What is the point here? Several theorists of metaphor are of the opinion that there is a so-called transference from 'y' to 'B(x)' (for the abbreviations cf. diagram 11). What they mean is that a kind of semantic charging of 'B' (in diagram 11 symbolised by the formula 'x + y') takes place when a metaphor is used. This semantic charging occurs because that which is embodied or expressed by 'y' does not belong to the meaning of 'B' according to the usual lexical rules. This is formulated by the equation 'B' is symbolised by 'x' and is considered not to be completely 'superseded' (as the model of substitution suggests; cf. chap. 2.1) when concept B is used in a new context with 'A.'

One advantage of the model of non-literal meaning undoubtedly lies in the fact that it has no need for *verba propria*; it can be interpreted more loosely and by adapting to the speech act in question. According to the model of non-literal meaning, 'lion' in the context of 'Achilles' (for instance, as in example 7) is a new application. One can argue that this new context leads to a semantic reduction of 'lion' and to qualities which are then attributed to 'Achilles'. However, neither the actual utterance nor the reference situation (and with it the actual contextualisation of the 'troublesome' word) are identified in the model of non-literal meaning as the heuristic frame but in the active vocabulary of the recipient: that is, his or her knowledge of the standard 'literal' meaning, or 'B(x)', as he or she understands it. When dealing with the model of substitution, we have already hinted at the fact that semantic norms and 'inner dictionaries' are problematic for this model. Henceforth we will consider the model of non-literal or transferred meaning to be similar to the model of substitution. In general, the same criticism can be levelled against the model of substitution as that for the model of non-

Diagram 11: Pattern of the model of non-literal or transferred meaning



literal or transferred meaning.⁵ Both models are similar inasmuch as they diagnose metaphor as a semantic problem. Both models also confound the communicative function of metaphor (which is to enrich a target of attribution or — where it applies — predication) with the problem of explaining the device 'metaphor' itself.

The model of non-literal meaning implicitly maintains the axiom that arbitrariness, which is a universal feature of concepts (or 'signs of the symbolic type', cf. chapter 5.2), is a distinctive feature of metaphor. This is shown by how the model of non-literal meaning focuses on metaphor. On further reflection, however, the idea of arbitrariness does not suffice in general. Arbitrariness denies that the link between a word and its concept is necessary, but that does not mean that this link can be whatever you like. For this reason we want to criticise Goodman's notion that a label changes its denotation. Where metaphor is concerned, it is not true that a concept ('label') changes its reference potential ('denotation'). Concept and reference potential remain the same: they continue to maintain the same relation. Otherwise metaphor would not have a double sense structure but it would only retain 'one sense', i.e. the replaced reference potential. If a concept were to change its reference potential, it would result in a 'new word', that is to say, another concept. Let us illustrate this through an amusing

⁴ In fact, Goodman used the term 'extension' which we have translated as 'denotation' according to modern linguistics (Nöth 1995: 94, and 2000: 147). Both terms denote the reference potential of the s-form, but do not denote any reference object in particular.

⁵ Interestingly, the model of non-literal meaning can also be found in Aristotle (Aristoteles 1996: 67–69). However, his examples appear to be metonymies, which I fear might further confuse the reader.

story by Peter Bichsel (1987, first printed in 1969). An old man changes the 'labels' (words, concepts) of all reference potentials. He names a bed a painting, a painting a table, and so on. But thanks to his idiosyncratic new language the old man is no longer able to communicate with other people. He has, as it were, become estranged from reality. Our point is that the meaning of a concept consists in the use of the word in question, and thus its usage is 'to have a certain reference potential'. If there is something going on with a 'place-changing label', then it might be the case that a concept is being used for an object that is not included in the reference potential of the concept and that the concept starts to semantically 'charge' this object — because this is the precise purpose of concepts in general! Metaphor induces an unusual 'charging'. No wonder the process of attribution ('charging'), or 'transference' according to the model of non-literal meaning terms, is the most conspicuous aspect of metaphor.

We previously determined that the problem of reference is central to metaphor. An additional problem, illustrated by the examples used in diagrams 7 and 8, is that of good old-fashioned misunderstanding:

(35) *Two men are talking:* 'Are you a craftsman?' — 'No, I am an artist.'

No one would think for a moment that 'are you a craftsman' is a metaphorical question. That is why Till Eulenspiegel (cf. diagram 8, page 50) could react to the accusation that he is an ass with the response, 'No, I am a joker.' If the reference situation is identical with the utterance situation, we have to decide for ourselves whether or not to take it seriously. Has the speaker, in other words, used a concept for an object that is not included in the reference potential of the concept? If we take it seriously, then the utterance in question could be considered logically. That is to say, we could evaluate the utterance as being either true or false. If we do not believe that the speaker has used a concept for an object that is not included in the reference potential of the concept, then we will understand that the utterance in question is figurative. But this this is not the case with metaphor. We cannot say that someone acting like a 'a lion in battle' is either true or false.⁶ The reason for this is that metaphor contains a reference situation within it; the context marker of the figurative phrase thus compels us to accept the seriousness of the statement. Without a context marker (cf. example 9 on page 39), we could conclude that it is not true that Achilles is a lion because he is a legendary warrior. However, it is not possible to 'cancel' the equation in the same way when dealing with a metaphor like that in diagram 10 (page 54). A dialogue comparable to the one in example 35 will only lead to something resembling the following:

(36) 'Achilles is a lion in battle.'
 'I am sorry but he is not a lion. He is a legendary warrior.'
 'No, I merely meant he's like a lion when he fights!'

The recipient's vocabulary and knowledge of linguistic usage are identified as the frame of reference, or, as Shibbes (1971b: 20, № 96) puts it: 'One of the most serious problems is not what it is to be metaphorical but rather what it is to be literal.' Urban (1971: 432–433) ad-

6 Nevertheless, the attribution of the metaphor to Achilles can be called into question. Achilles could just as well be considered a pig in battle. (See example 41 on page 71.)

dresses this question by explaining what ‘new application’ means in the context of metaphor. According to the model in question, Urban proposes that metaphor is a predication taken from one *intuitable* domain and applied to objects in a different, not directly intuitable domain. In the metaphorical sentence ‘Napoleon was a wolf’, ‘the term wolf is transferred from the context of wolves and sheep to the context of Napoleon and his subjects’ (Urban 1971: 433). However, predicates

are not really applied to the objects; it is only the common rule of reflection that is applied. (...) for there is no similarity, no common form of representation, in the strict sense, between Napoleon and the wolf (...) There is a similarity here neither for perception nor for conception, but only for interpretation. (...) the expansion of such a sentence involves the development of the rule of reflection. The sentence, Napoleon was a wolf, means that Napoleon was related to the people as a wolf is related to the sheep. Reflection on the context of wolf and sheep is carried over into the context of Napoleon and his people. To state the latter relation in terms appropriate to this context constitutes expansion of the symbol⁷ sentence. (...) Expansion of the symbol consists in expressing the operations involved in the notion in terms appropriate to (sc.: Napoleon). In contrast to the metaphorical, these are ‘literal’. (Urban 1971: 432)

The key point here is the ‘expansion’ of the metaphor (of the ‘symbol sentence’) regarding the new context. Urban’s notion of ‘expansion’, put simply, is an ‘explanation of the metaphor’. This explanation converts the model of non-literal meaning to the analogy-theory of metaphor (which we have already discussed). An analogy between wolves and men like Napoleon is possible because of the double sense structure of the metaphor; if there were no such structure, the sentence ‘Napoleon was a wolf’ would be a logical equation. That would then mean that Napoleon was the name of a wolf, which is clearly a syllogism.

Let us assume that literalness is closely bound to lexical stability. Each of us has an ‘inner dictionary’ which we acquire over the course of our lives and refer to whenever we communicate with others. This inner dictionary cannot be the starting point for an understanding of metaphors because — apart from the model of non-literal or transferred meaning — it cannot serve as a means of making a free-of-context distinction between ‘literal’ (proper, non-figurative) and ‘non-literal’ (improper, figurative) meaning. As Kurz (1988: 13) says,

However, ‘literal’, like ‘metaphorical’, is not an inherent quality of language itself, but is a feature of utterances. An utterance constitutes that which is said in a particular situation. We *mean* or *understand* a spoken sentence either literally or metaphorically depending on the context or on the situation (...) When trying to understand the meaning of a word, we have to think about its use.⁸

Searle (1994: 117–136, esp. 129f.) has shown that literal meaning is always stated in relation to a nexus of background assumptions about the context (situation) in which an utterance is made.⁹ The starting-point for any utterance is the assumption of a certain normality of conditions produced by our surrounding environment. We can see from the examples that Searle

7 Urban’s concept ‘symbol’ — i.e. ‘metaphorical’ or ‘metaphor’.

8 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘Aber “wörtlich” ist wie “metaphorisch” keine Eigenschaft eines Wortes oder Satzes an sich, sondern eine Eigenschaft von Äußerungen. Eine Äußerung ist das in einer bestimmten Situation Gesagte. Wir *meinen* oder *verstehen* einen gesprochenen Satz wörtlich oder metaphorisch. Dies hängt vom Kontext oder von der Situation ab (...) Wenn wir uns die Bedeutung eines Wortes klar machen, müssen wir uns seine Verwendung klarmachen.’

9 We previously referred to this aspect when dealing with the ideality of communication (see chapter 3.2).

(loc. cit.) uses that he is referring to 'objective' conditions, i.e. the groundedness that comes of gravity. However, the normality Searle has in mind can also be of a social, cultural or communicative nature. This notion of normality has already been usefully described with the help of several terms, such as Gadamer's (1990; 2006) 'horizons of understanding', Habermas's (2006) 'situation analysis', and Goffman's (2008) 'frames'.

The problem with the model of non-literal or transferred meaning comes down to the concept of literality. We can only talk of meaning as of 'meaning within a context/situation', that is to say, with a corresponding reference.

- (37) Der **Fall** der Mauer — *Transl.*: the opening up of the Berlin Wall (*there is no English equivalent to the German metaphor*).

The assertion that *der Fall der Mauer* has a literal meaning confuses two issues — first, a context, i.e. an utterance which creates (or presupposes) this context, and, secondly, the semantics of the concept being used. The word *der Fall* has a meaning independent of context but it is only a vague notion or, to be more precise, an empty semantic form. The s-form is consequently the sum total of our experience of reference acts in which the word has been used, and which provides a subjective definition (a set of restrictions or guidelines) for the word. The device of metaphor is a way to break these rules; it transforms the use of language into a game that wrangles with linguistic and semantic conventions. The model of non-literal meaning is right to stress the unconventional use of words with regard to metaphor.

The important point here, however, is that the 'conventional' rules of word usage do not lead to a literal meaning, as suggested by the model, but to an s-form that is independent of context. This demands, *summa summarum*, the invention of a suitable context or frame.¹⁰ As in the case of ideal reference, we invent fictitious ideal situations, i.e. an imagined reference situation in which the s-forms and the 'independent' utterance make sense.¹¹ That is why jokes like the following are comprehensible:

- (38) 'Not long ago a guide fell into the gorge at this place.'
 'How terrible!'
 'Don't worry, it was very old and a few pages were missing anyway.'

Our (ever susceptible) imagination can easily miss the point. The polysemous word 'guide' (or the first utterance situation in which it is used) becomes discernible from the 'spontaneous' context we place the utterance in. Of course, it is not entirely spontaneous as there are many pointers: the two people in question are evidently in close proximity (mentally or physically) to a gorge. It is the deliberate manipulation of the context of the phrase 'guide' by the teller of the joke that leads to the intentional (humorous) misunderstanding, i.e. that leads to the effect that the hearer chooses the wrong meaning of the polysemous word. The speaker

10 For semiosis takes place because a physical sign (word), reference object (acting), and thought (meaning, notion) converge.

11 A famous example of the creative but fictitious search for sense is the 'competition of ideas' put forward by Noam Chomsky (2002: 15) with his nonsensical sentence: 'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously' (cf. Beckmann 2001: 48). In other words, when communicating we consistently strive to make sense of utterances by placing them in their 'right' context.

is fully aware that in the context of gorges (nature, rough terrain) we will first think of a flesh-and-blood tourist guide. The so-called proper or literal meaning remains 'literal' for one reason only: because it generates our spontaneous contextual associations out of the habit of making references (from the reference potential). Ideal situations reveal an entire social and cultural world as it was experienced by their 'inventors'. This empirical framework constitutes the semantic bonds to which metaphors are bound.

Let us briefly return to diagram 11 on page 63 and the 'unconventional' use of 'B' with a metaphorical meaning of 'y'. Many theorists agree that the word B changes insofar as it denotes not only 'x' but also 'y'; first in the given context, and then afterwards if this example of metaphorical use occurs more frequently and generally. 'The metaphorical meaning, therefore, is an action rather than a result. It is a constructive generation of meaning somehow being performed by a dominant meaning; it is a movement from ... to' (Kurz 1988: 18).¹² Or as Shibles (1971b: 11, № 2) puts it: 'Metaphor may be thought of as a deviation from: the expected, the normal, social custom, grammar, usual behavior, the familiar.' This idea of the dynamic meaning of words is absolutely correct: an acceptable new use of 'B' by one speaker is a licence for other speakers to use 'B', which was formerly restricted to the meaning 'x', but which now carries the additional meaning of 'y'. This 'poetic licence' can spread with astonishing rapidity thanks to the media (traditional and new), especially when new usages are widely regarded as especially witty or cool (in which case they acquire prestige value). Gradually 'B(y)', which was at first a 'fresh', i.e. a newly minted metaphor, becomes part of the permanent meaning of 'B'. Kubczak (1978: 127–134) argues that this function of metaphors reflects a lexical necessity inherent to our linguistic system; the act (and consequent fact) of metaphorising has to be broadly accepted. Beckmann (2001: 79 ff.) plausibly describes it as a multistage process of habituation (see also Schumacher 1997: 20–23). With this in mind, let us now take a look at how metaphor becomes conventionalised.

12 Our translation; orig. in German: 'Die metaphorische Bedeutung ist daher mehr ein Akt als ein Resultat, eine konstruktive Bedeutungserzeugung, die sich irgendwie durch eine dominante Bedeutung vollzieht, eine Bewegung von ... zu.'

CHAPTER FOUR

How Metaphor Fades Away

A Question of the Semantic and Metaphorical Reservoir

The distribution of a metaphor could not occur without communicative competence, communicative forms of action (linguistic rituals) and the human faculty of linguistic memory. This is why linguists have established terms such as ‘mental lexicon’, ‘active vocabulary’ and ‘inner dictionary’. The idea of a lexicon is generally undisputed in linguistic research, although there are some doubts concerning the social aspects of this ‘vocabulary’. Traditionally, a lexicon is thought to consist of several ‘sub-dictionaries’, each containing different kinds of linguistic information (Lütge 2002: 96). However, as Schumacher (1997: 111–114) shows, specific problems occur if the lexicon is assumed to be a fixed or stable entity. Or, as Lütge (op. cit.) puts it, the model of the lexicon leads to problems concerning the autonomy and interaction of the sub-dictionaries (op. cit.: 97): ‘The mental lexicon contains (...) not only information units but also operative rules making the formation of form and content possible. These include rules pertaining to composition, derivation, redundancy and polysemy.’¹

Since we are not interested in neurolinguistics, or the ‘problem of mental representation’ (for an outline of this see Lütge 2002: 102–107), or the particular structure which these inner dictionaries might take (cf. Lüdi 1985: 88–89), we want to focus our attention on the ‘social memory’ of semantic units. Indeed, the question of any lexicon should be chiefly concerned with social linking. By this, we refer to a semantic reservoir (in short: s-reservoir) that is passed on in a speech community or social group. After all, it is a prerequisite of communication that we share not only a common stock of concepts but also shared conventions and agreement about how to use them properly. Our personal relationship with language may be subjective and formed by individual experience but we must be able to use and understand metaphors that bind a speech community and are conceptually accessible to all. In general, a semantic reservoir does not function without rules of reference (for instance, when and how to apply a word, or memorising several socially controlled linguistic usages) that a speaker has to keep permanently in mind.² Without rules of reference, we could not form notions (categories) to delimit our world, nor would words (or sentences) have any meaning. But reference is an action that always takes place in the present tense, whereas an s-form is an ab-

1 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘Das mentale Lexikon enthält (...) nicht nur Informationseinheiten, sondern auch operative Regeln, die die Bildung von Formen und Inhalten ermöglichen. Hier können z. B. Kompositions- und Derivationsregeln, Redundanz- und Polysemieregeln genannt werden.’

2 By no means do we claim to be original on this point. Most of the various aspects of the s-reservoir have already been discussed; Börner and Vogel (1994: 3–6), for instance, provide a comprehensive overview of them.

stract notion drawn from previously experienced and 'discussed' references. However, it is the concept that is socially relevant (discussed, memorised, etc.), and not the s-form per se. Therefore, the s-reservoir should be considered a flexible but objective social construction that consists of 'give and take'; it is a social construction that prestructures the understanding (usage, creation) of 'units of sense' inasmuch as it determines whether an 'idea of a metaphor' is possible. To the best of my knowledge, only a handful of scholars (mainly working in semiotics, e.g. Fleischer 1996) have hitherto taken a 'collective symbolism' (*Kollektivsymbolik*, op. cit.) into consideration, especially one grounded in the philosophy of social groups.

When it comes to metaphor, the phenomenon of the semantic reservoir (or any of its analogous incarnations) usually serves as a fixed point from which metaphor can be discerned as a manifestation of difference. However, if there is something like an individual 'mental mirror' coexisting with the s-reservoir of a speech community, the reservoir may also regulate the double sense structure of well-known metaphors and figurative idiomatic expressions (cf. Levelt 1989: 181–188). In the same way it will also enable us to distinguish homonymy in the relevant contexts (cf. chapter 1.1). If every use of words draws from the s-reservoir and possibly modifies the meanings of words therein, the metaphorical use of words can, in turn, modify the relevant terms in the lexicon of the 'experience-based' speaker. However, we assume that this dynamic is not evenly distributed throughout the lexicon but, rather, there are broad areas where the existing terminology is stable (i.e. has long been accepted). Thus, the reservoir becomes more irrelevant as a means for the discovery of metaphors to the same degree that expressions which were unconventional become more conventional. As Kurz (1988: 18–19) puts it,

Accordingly, as a metaphor becomes part of the lexical body of a language, the more independent of context the meaning of this metaphor becomes. At the end of this process we have a widely extended use of this word with various possibilities existing side by side.³

As far as the semantic reservoir is concerned, the question then arises why, with metaphors such as

(39) Daten**autobahn**, Strom**netz**, Zünd**kerze**, sich **herauswinden**, or **Sperr**minorität

Transl.: information highway, power network, spark plug, to wriggle one's way out of, or blocking minority
(not all English translations are equivalent to the German metaphors),

which are extremely common in German, we still persist in speaking of proper and improper usage (i.e. breaking the rules of reference). Yet while German speakers would most likely perceive the 'proper' and 'improper' meanings of the metaphors in № 39, they probably would not with the following examples:

(40) wahrscheinlich, windschief, erbaulich, Piepmatz, patzig or hänseln — *Transl.*: probable, crooked, edifying, dicky-bird, snotty or to tease

This is because the 'improper' meaning has long since superseded the 'proper' meaning in the

3 Our translation; orig. in German: 'In dem Maße, in dem die Metapher lexikalisiert wird, wird ihre Bedeutung kontextunabhängiger. Am Ende dieses Prozesses stehen dann ein erweiterter Anwendungsbereich und sind verschiedene, nebeneinander bestehende Verwendungen eines Wortes möglich.'

examples in № 40; no vestigial traces of contrast or ambiguity remain in the semantic reservoir.

In an interesting study of metaphor, Schumacher (1997) makes only one distinction: there are 'fresh metaphors' and 'old' ones. The author is right to regard only 'fresh metaphors' as a hermeneutical problem (loc.cit.: 21): apologists for the theory of the non-literality of metaphorical language have kept quiet about the fact that an offence against semantic congruity is only committed by 'fresh metaphors'; 'old metaphors' have already acquired congruity with the semantic reservoir. The reservoir we have in mind seems to comprise more than just semantic forms and their rules of application and articulation (as many psycholinguists believe; cf. e.g. Levelt 1989). Words or phrases which, although respecting the terms and rules of their application, but do not function according to the common views of a community of speakers, lead to misunderstandings. In a nutshell, they do not make sense. The semantic reservoir, it should be noted, also consists of connotations, imagery and socially and culturally established attitudes, or what Eco broadly refers to as *ratio facilis*, and Lotman as 'semiosphere' (cf. Nöth 1995: 127; 2000: 196 f.; respectively, 2000: 99, 286, only). Consider the following example:

(41) Achilles was a **cucumber** in battle.

'Cucumber' is a metaphor but it does not make immediate sense like the structurally identical metaphor in example 2 (page 31). This is because neither the metaphor in № 41 nor the idea behind it has yet been established. Of course, it is possible to give this ostensibly strange sentence a post-factum meaning. However, this meaning would be contrary to our traditional view of the brave Achilles because we are culturally conditioned to prefer metaphorical imagery extolling the qualities of men to be drawn from the animal kingdom rather than the realm of vegetables. We initially make sense of example 41 by realising that the misunderstanding arises from the misuse of 'cucumber in this context'. That is, we consult all the references for the term 'cucumber' in our s-reservoir. In doing so, we realise that the use of 'cucumber' in the context of № 41 can only be intended metaphorically (identification). This allows us to use the sentence in a context which is open to metaphor (interpretation). The attribution made by the new metaphor might actually seem plausible, however, if Achilles were suddenly to turn stiff and go green from fear when confronting Hector.

The process of the habitualization of metaphors, dividing them into 'old' (universally remembered) and 'fresh' (periodic), is socially and culturally connected. Once a metaphor becomes accepted into a particular in-group reservoir of images via a convoluted network of political, historical and social channels, it will then be passed on, first as convention, then as tradition. New or 'fresh' metaphors continuously modify the semantic reservoir. Conversely, our 'inner dictionaries' actively contribute to the same process by replenishing our discourse with 'old' metaphors. In other words, a traditional, socially linked reservoir of images allows us to make use of its contents; we can allude to these images and semantically play with them in whichever way we see fit. This voluminous reservoir of images is composed of linguistic and artistic codes, social symbolisms, literary traditions, and iconographies, etc. Or as Kubczak (1986: 87) put it, 'Under these conditions metaphors and metonymies (...) consti-

tute linguistic creations in the same way as other complex signs.⁴ Further examples of the reservoir of images are provided by Pöschl, Gärtner and Heyke (1964) and Kirschbaum and Braunfels (1990/94).

The positions of metaphorical units and non-figurative lexical units in the semantic reservoir seem to be the same. While this may be vexing for the humanities, it raises the intriguing question of the relation between the metaphorical reservoir and the rest of the mental lexicon. Lütge (2002: 96) identified certain problems pertaining to mental sub-lexicons (usually an area for psycholinguists). However, when we say,

- (42) Zündkerze, Pechvogel or Glückspilz — *Transl.*: spark plug, misadventurer or lucky beggar (*in English the German metaphors have no equivalent*),

the German terms are an exact fit for that which is to be signified. Moreover, there are almost no other terms that could work. The question of their iconicity is irrelevant from this perspective. The metaphors in example 42, which denote something for which there is no other word or term in the same language, are referred to by Blumenberg (1998) as ‘absolute metaphors’ (Germ. *absolute Metaphern*). Absoluteness is also ascribed if there are synonyms available which are also metaphors. This is the case with the following examples:⁵

- (43) sich in etwas **hineinsetzen**, von etwas **absehen**, jemanden **veräppeln**,

Transl.: to familiarise / to acquaint oneself with something, to refrain from doing something, to pull somebody’s leg (*in English the German metaphors are not translated*).

The existence of absolute metaphors is not only an argument against the assumption of literality (cf. chapter 3.3)⁶ — which word could be the *verbum proprium* or the literal meaning for an absolute metaphor — but it also shows the communicative necessity of the metaphorical reservoir. Absolute metaphors are not self-explanatory; our understanding of them must result from a formerly informed sphere of thought. In general, there has to be an intellectual ‘space’ from where a language or a community of speakers can derive concepts and metaphorical ideas; it would be simply impractical for a linguistic community to constantly create new lexemes. It would also be impractical for the speakers of a language to have to always react to changes in the descriptive world ‘spontaneously’, i.e. by the use of new metaphors.

Although it is possible to allude to the contents of the reservoir of images, this possibility is not to be understood as being a special quality of iconicity. If you read in the newspaper,

- (44) Hartz IV sorgt für Unmut in Städten und Gemeinden — *Transl.*: Hartz IV causes displeasure in townships and communities,

nobody would regard ‘Hartz IV’ as a metaphor for a political party, a dance event or a new

4 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘bei diesen Voraussetzungen sind Metaphern und Metonymien (...) ebenso wenig Sprachschöpfungen wie andere komplexe Zeichen auch’.

5 An anthology by Link (1984: 100 ff.) provides interesting historical examples, such as the spectacle surrounding the newly invented hot air balloon in the 19th century. The essays included in this anthology show that the transition from ‘political’ absolute metaphors to a culturally linked representative symbolism is clearly typical.

6 Though the existence of absolute metaphors has often been hinted at, in my opinion it has never been used as an argument against the theories of substitution or non-literality. This is surprising, especially for astute thinkers such as Black (1981: 32–33) whose examples include; ‘leg of an angel’, ‘osculating curves’ and ‘cherry lips’, etc.

avian disease. 'Hartz IV', in fact, stands for the problems of the German welfare state in the minds of most (if not all) Germans. Its meaning denotes much more than a particular law; it denotes an emotive issue and ongoing public discussion. Underlying all this is the same, often questionable, process of contextualisation which we referred to in chapter 3.1. Contextualisation enables us to find fictitious contexts by virtue of our imagination: it is akin in this regard to interpretation and exegesis. However, the symbolic meaning with which the term 'Hartz IV' is charged in example 44, and which many people (at present) immediately understand, totally differs from metaphor in one aspect. The symbol is devoid of any context marker; like any other s-form, it is independent of context.

Metaphors are dependent on context, and they are not part of the vocabulary of a language as long as they are 'fresh'. Being 'fresh', they may be occasional or familiar; in either case they are accepted and usable in a specific social environment. 'Old' metaphors are independent of context. However, because of the process of habitualisation and conventionalisation they have to undergo, they are closely connected to the attitudes of a specific community of speakers. From looking at literary and non-literary texts alike, hermeneutics offers convincing evidence of the social variability of interpretation. The social restriction of metaphor is also apparent in intercultural comparisons; consider the myriad failed attempts to literally translate metaphors (cf. chapter 2.3). If an obvious correspondence is missing between two languages in the translation of a metaphor, it is increasingly likely that the translator will draw on the sense (utterance meaning), visualised images (ideal reference) or degree of political acceptance of the metaphor. At this point the poor translator will start to realise the extent to which metaphors are socially restricted in both their mother tongue and the source language with regard to the three crucial factors of understanding, visualisation, and acceptance. Numerous studies bear this important fact out.

Time is an important factor in revealing the social restriction of images. As hermeneutics demonstrates, temporal distance from a text helps create a conscious awareness of its semantic differences. The same holds true for images. This historical dimension of iconicity is illustrated by the chronological development of dictionaries, such as Spalding (1959/2000) and Röhrich (1994) with regard to German. Returning to examples 6 and 7, I suggested in chapter 2.2 that we ascribe a meaning to the term 'lion' which is temporarily and culturally restricted, i.e. we regard the lion as a ferocious but fearless animal. In earlier times this metaphor might have been understood differently. In the emblems of the the Early modern period, for example, the lion is represented as being generous, well-mannered, noble, brave and strong, as well as merciful to weaker creatures. The lion was also seen as terrifying, aggressive and irascible (Henkel and Schöne 1996: 370–401). However, if we go back to the dawn of antiquity the lion serves as a symbol of lament and mourning:

In the Iliad (18, 316) the Achaeans lamented Patroclus all night; Achilles began the lamentation, laying his murderous hands on the breast of his friend, groaning deeply like a bearded lion, whose whelps have been stolen by a hunter. (Webster 1956: 114)

The cultural valency of the concept 'lion' constitutes the reservoir of images. We mentally and socially store all the bits (and bytes) of information about 'lions' and everything else together

with what we called the idea of the metaphor. The reservoir of images also contains typical meanings (reference rules) of 'older', conventionalised metaphors. However, the reservoir cannot determine in which way a 'fresh' or occasional metaphor is understood, although the reservoir of images can be regarded as a prerequisite for the formation and interpretation of a new metaphor being accepted within a particular group. In other words, images beget new images.

The Conventional Metaphor. Criteria.

The Tricky Historical Background

We have shown how metaphors change and evolve over time. It is important, however, to make an objective distinction between the different classes of the 'age' of metaphors. We like to believe, thanks to our extensive research, that we can easily detect metaphors in our mother tongue. Yet, paradoxically, this apparent abundance of metaphors is in large part a result of our research into metaphor. This does not tally well with linguistic reality because many of the metaphors we have found act as a hindrance to understanding. It is worth repeating that not all metaphors constitute a hermeneutical problem. After a metaphor has entered the semantic reservoir of a community of speakers, i.e. the metaphorised concept has been altered objectively and permanently, a metaphor, thus conventionalised, should not be regarded as a communicative obstacle anymore.

It makes sense to differentiate between at least three levels or stages within the process of the conventionalisation of a metaphor:

- A. 'fresh', i.e. individual, occasional metaphors;
- B. 'old', i.e. conventionalised metaphors, and:
 - 1st level: 'living', and
 - 2nd level: 'solidified' metaphors.

This is, naturally, a shortened explanation as far as the hypostatical number of stages is concerned. Newmark (1986: 85), for instance, identifies five stages: 'dead', 'cliché', 'stock', 'recent' and 'original'. The fundamental question here is how does the process of conventionalisation take place? Although we are mainly approaching this problem from a linguistic perspective, several of the studies we have cited show that it is also possible to regard the process (how metaphor essentially conquers a language) from a socio-psychological perspective.

As far as the quality of the word metaphorised is concerned, Kurz (1988: 19) was right to point out that level B.2 is redundant because the use of a metaphorical concept (like that in B.2) would not differ in any way from the normal use of words. Kurz narrows it down to two stages of metaphor: stage A, or in his words 'creative metaphors' (e.g. German *die Sonne grinst*, 'the sun is grinning'), and stage B.1, or in his words 'clichés' (e.g. German *die Sonne lacht*, 'the sun is laughing'). The aforementioned study by Schumacher (1997) excludes conventional metaphors (that is, both B-levels) altogether from this list. Schumacher only recognises stage A (in his words, 'fresh metaphors') as a valid object of research. On the basis of an

empirical study, Schumacher (1997: 187–188) concluded, ‘Fresh metaphors are absorbed as quickly as their non-metaphorical counterparts (...) However, if they are to be understood, it takes more time to process their meaning.’¹ The amount of time required to understand a metaphor remains constant if the context (utterance situation) becomes more complex. Furthermore: ‘Fresh metaphors need about one seventh of the amount of time to be comprehended than their non-metaphorical counterparts.’² Schumacher also investigated ‘non-metaphorical counterparts’. For him, this is a class of words that includes normal concepts as well as those metaphors which ‘fade away’ (metaphors belonging to both B-levels).

The academic *status quo* comes down to the unhelpful fact that metaphor exists. There is at least some consensus over the question as to how problematical metaphors are ‘living’:

- firstly, they are identified by the relevant speakers as ‘living’, i.e. as a linguistically exceptional device;
- secondly, the relevant speakers are still able to make use of these metaphors creatively, for instance by referring to them as an image.

The occasional metaphors (stage A) fulfill both of these conditions in every respect and are consequently regarded as the epitome of creativity (of wit, freedom of speech, etc.). They are often quoted from literature where they can be found in abundance.

Until now research has not done enough to come up with more precise criteria for deciding which stage of conventionalisation a metaphor belongs to; cf. similar Veisbergs (2012: 7–10) on phraseology. Howarth (1996) was the first to identify four subtly differing forms of iconicity. Using these criteria he moved towards establishing a typology, albeit in a condensed form. However, Howarth’s study concentrates on the distinction between idioms (for instance, ‘blow the gaff’), collocations (‘blow one’s trumpet’; op.cit.: 33) and on their internal typology. Consequently, his work only partly applies to our problem with metaphors (namely, to stage-B-metaphors). As Howarth (op.cit.: 24) puts it, ‘figurative idioms are in origin metaphorical expressions which have become stabilized units in the language system.’ He then differentiates between the criteria of ‘semantic unity’ and ‘motivation’, the latter of which ‘indicates the ability of the reader / hearer to recognize the origin of an idiom, and it is this criterion that distinguishes figurative from pure idioms’.

figurative idioms are clearly motivated (for example, one can easily identify the footballing origin of the idiom *move the goalposts*), pure idioms such as *shoot the breeze* are unmotivated (...) this criterion is applied relatively, since individuals will have different perceptions of an idiom’s motivation, depending, perhaps, on age and knowledge of the world. (Howarth 1996: 24)

Because it is so relative, the latter criterion is applicable only with difficulty. This is why Howarth himself added ‘restrictions on commutability’ to his catalogue of criteria. This effectively means that the single parts of specific collocations are exchangeable but the collocation as such (as a specific connection of words) nevertheless remains intact (op.cit.: 41 ff.).

1 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘Frische Metaphern werden ebenso schnell erfasst wie ihre nicht-metaphorischen Entsprechungen (...) Wenn sie aber verstanden werden sollen, verlangen sie mehr Verarbeitungszeit’.

2 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘Frische Metaphern brauchen etwa ein Siebtel mehr Zeit zum Verstanden werden als ihre nicht-metaphorischen Entsprechungen’.

Metaphors ('figurative idioms'), according to Howarth, are always restricted. Accordingly, the criterion of 'commutability' cannot be used to determine their stage of conventionalisation.

Beckmann (2001: 141–143) distinguishes between seven indicators that help show if a metaphor has been conventionalised. The first four indicators (frequency of use, using without indication and explanation, occurrence in oral reports, and general explicability) can be applied to any form of new concepts. With regard to the question of the conventionalisation of metaphor, these indicators are adequate but unnecessary. Beckmann's fifth criterion for the conventionalisation of metaphor is the 'meta-linguistic usability' of the metaphor in question (Germ. *metasprachliche Verwendbarkeit*). According to Beckmann, it is an indicator of conventionalisation if a particular metaphor can serve as a key for speaking about or understanding a text. In my opinion this is certainly a worthwhile point. A good illustration of this 'in action' would be when an entirely unknown metaphor is introduced at the start of a novel but is used so frequently over the course of the narrative that by the end of the book the author is able to use the phrase meta-linguistically (in accordance with Beckmann's criterion).

Two last indicators remain to be mentioned: these are Beckmann's criteria of the 'specific' and the 'widened capability for metaphor' (*spezifische und erweiterte Metaphernfähigkeit*). It is worth looking at these two ideas more closely. Kurz says (see above) that as a metaphor becomes increasingly conventionalised and enters the lexical body of the language so it becomes increasingly liberated from context. This insight should be taken further. In my opinion, the fact that a metaphor can be used in free combination is of central importance. Terms (concepts) can be combined freely as long as those combinations do not contradict the logical entailment of the semantic form. (The substitution model takes this fact as its basis.) Under normal circumstances, and in accordance with the semantic reservoir it is, for example, impossible to say in German (as well as in English),

- (45) Der Apfel fällt den Berg herauf *or* Mein Teppich kochte Kaffee — *Transl.*: The apple falls up the hill *or* My carpet makes coffee.

A conventionalised metaphor which is part of the lexical body of the language has to be similarly restricted in such cases but is otherwise free to be applied in any combination. The question of the freedom of combinations of a conventionalised metaphor must be addressed, of course, on the newly applied level of meaning, that is, the new utterance meaning. In contrast, we assume that the application of 'fresh' metaphors is totally restricted by their context because their intelligibility is wholly dependent upon it. To put it succinctly, a stage-B-metaphor can be used in any context, a stage-A-metaphor cannot.

As far as example 37 and example 39 are concerned, it is possible to freely combine them without any obvious or lingering sense of clumsiness:

- (46) Bundesrechnungshofangestellter, Bundesnetzagentur, Zündkerzenschlüssel, Sperrminoritätsgesetz *or* Der Fall der Mauer und die Orangene Revolution haben gewisse Ähnlichkeiten;

Transl.: clerk of the Federal Audit Office, Federal Network Agency, spark plug wrench, blocking minority law *or* The opening (up) of the Berlin Wall and the Orange Revolution (in the Ukraine) have a few things in common.

Another example by Beckmann (2001: 219) taken from the *Neue Züricher Zeitung* (interesting combinations in bold):

- (47) Der total **vernetzte** Zuschauer auf der **Datenautobahn** — *Transl.*: The totally networked audience on the information highway.

These further examples are taken from journals:

- (48) Er ist ein **eingefleischter Vegetarier** or Sie hat sich mit der Forschung **näher auseinandergesetzt** — *Transl.*: He is a confirmed vegetarian or She has tackled research problems.

In contrast to the above examples, the following combinations are not possible:

- (49) **Ohrwürmersammlung** — *Engl. no equivalent*: ‘collections of earworms’;³
 (50) ‘Smoothy’ ist die neue Salbe gegen **Handverwelkung**, die auch Sie ... — *Transl. by sense*: ‘Smoothy’ is the new cream to protect against ageing skin. You should also ...⁴

In example 51 the use of a metaphor consisting of the components ‘fuel’ and ‘fire’ is bewildering when it appears in the same context as ‘uranium’ (itself a special fuel for a special kind of ‘fire’):

- (51) *Headline in the Stuttgarter Zeitung*: Teheran gießt mit seiner Anreicherung von Uran Öl ins Feuer — *Transl.*: Teheran adds fuel to the fire with its conversion of uranium. (Spiegel 2010a)

One more example:

- (52) *From a newspaper in Lippstadt*: Tückische Straßenglätte. Streudiensnt lebt von der Hand in den Mund — *Transl.*: Tricky black ice. Gritting workers live hand to mouth. (Spiegel 2010b)

The juxtaposition of ‘hand’ and ‘mouth’ with the unsavoury elements of salt and grit is jarring. If the metaphor retains a figurative meaning for speaker and audience, the intended utterance meaning and metaphor, or figurative phrase used to express it, cannot be obviously linked in their essential meaning. Otherwise the speaker runs the risk of sounding unintentionally comical (or worse). Stage-B-metaphors, however, should also (where there is an essential similarity between the intended utterance and metaphor in question) be completely unobtrusive and consequently guarantee freedom of combination. Hence, the metaphors in examples 46 to 48 are stage-B-metaphors, whereas those in examples 49 to 52 are stage A.

However, the idea that metaphors may be freely combined does not always agree with our ‘everyday’ language awareness. It should be evident that examples 39 and 46 contain metaphors although we have shown that they have been conventionalised to such an extent that they are equal in position to any other linguistic concept. It seems that we need a further criterion to define the ‘age’ of a metaphor and therefore propose the following criterion: realisa-

3 We give the literal translation knowing full well that this metaphor does not exist in English. To explain how this German metaphor works, the German ‘earworm’ is a melody or song you cannot get out of your head. Whereas the metaphor works in the German sentence *Dieses Musikstück ist ein echter Ohrwurm* (‘This piece of music is a real earworm’), it is not possible in German to form the compound in example 49.

4 A fictitious advertising slogan inspired by the literary example 4 on page 35: **Handverwelkung < verwelkte Dirnenhände*, ‘wilted hands of a slut’.

Table 4: Grades and criteria for conventionalising a metaphor

Grade \ Criteria	Freedom of combination	Realisation
stage A: 'fresh' metaphors	–	+
stage B.1: 'living' metaphors	+	+
stage B.2: 'solidified' metaphors	+	–

tion (Germ. *Realisierung*). In literary criticism scholars refer to realisation when an instance of iconicity has been taken at face value. This can be done by using other terms that match the metaphorical level, creating a kind of 'weird' allegory in the process. It can also be done by linking the metaphor to other means of cohesion. An example of a realised metaphor can be found in the following stanza of the poem *Request* (*Aicinājums*, 1930) by Aleksandrs Čāks (1901–1950), a highly respected Latvian poet (example 53):

Mēness, dzeltēns kā sviests. Žēl, ka nav līdz naža un maizes, bet kas pēc tā aizies? Sapņu dzeltēna sviestmaize derētu tagad man labi. Abi tad sēdētu klusi mēs kopā. (Čāks 1991: 192)	The moon, yellow like butter. It's too bad that I don't have a knife and bread to hand but who wants to go and fetch it? A yellow dream sandwich would be good for me now. Both ⁵ of us would quietly sit together then. (Our translation)
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As always with poetry, this is a complicated case. The realisation 'that I don't have ... to hand' refers to a metaphor for butter which does not appear as such because the word 'butter' is used as a comparison for the colour of the moon. After the butter-comparison metaphor has been realised, the narrative shifts to the realm of dreams ('A ... dream sandwich would be good for me now'). Thus, the level only just established as the 'real' but reinterpreted level is metaphorised anew, and the realised metaphor then conveys a third meaning. This all occurs within 10 lines!

The criterion of realisation applies to metaphors for which the speakers of a language share a corresponding awareness (that is, metaphors from stages A and B.1), thereby allowing the metaphor to be 'realised' without any loss or distortion of meaning. Metaphors from stage B.2 (as in example 40), however, cannot be realised. Beckmann (2001: 176–177) sees it similarly: if the image (metaphorical component) in the metaphor *Datenautobahn* (information highway) constitutes the starting point in terms of content, it is possible, while remaining on the same metaphorical level, to use the expression *Autobahnzubringer* (approach

⁵ This refers to the lyrical self and the unknown person being addressed.

road) as a metaphor for the telephone network, and thus realise the basic metaphor ‘information highway’.⁶ Beckmann correctly observes that the basic metaphor constitutes the context marker for all further metaphorical realisation in cases of realised metaphors. This is evident in the following example:

- (54) Die deutsche Vereinigung als mythische Heilung und (...) grundiert vom **Rauschen** der Daten**autobahnen**. — *Transl.*: The German reunion as a mythical curing and (...) accompanied by the roaring of the information highway.

The context marker for the metaphorisation of ‘roaring’ is the metaphor ‘highway’ (whose qualifying context marker is ‘information’).

The examples Beckmann (2001: 195 ff.) provides in her study are full of such realised metaphors:

- (55) **Verkehrsstau** auf der Datenautobahn, **Ausbau** der Datenautobahn, **Geisterfahrer** auf der Datenautobahn, Mit einer **Panne** auf der Datenautobahn hat... or ...verheißen für die Zukunft noch weit höhere **Geschwindigkeiten** auf der Datenautobahn;⁷

Transl.: Traffic jam on the information highway, extension of the information highway, ghostdriver⁸ on the information highway, a breakdown on the information highway ... or ... the promise of even greater speed on the information highway.

The realisation of metaphor also led to this inscription on a sick bag from a well-known German airline:

- (56) Ihr Magen will auschecken? Hier ist der Notausgang. — *Transl.*: Your stomach wants to check out? Here is the emergency gate.

The underlying logic is that it is possible to predicate ‘B’ on the notion that the stomach is ‘A’. ‘A’ stands for the basic metaphor of ‘checking out’ and ‘B’ for the figurative use of the emergency gate. This twofold structure of ‘sentence with metaphor’ plus ‘sentence with realisation of the metaphor’ corresponds logically-pragmatically with the structure of ‘make an assertion’ and ‘draw the consequences’. It offers multiple possibilities for writers because the assertion does not have to be a denotation of what is real. In Vasilij Aksyonov’s (Василий Аксёнов) tale *The Fool* (Дукой, 1964), for instance, the so-called ‘teasing’ (дразнилка — a kind of proverb) contains a twofold structure of a fantastic assertion and its notional consequences. Aksyonov uses the teasing to point out to his readers that *The Fool* also possesses this double structure (Kessler 1998: 88–89 and 97–98).

When both the defining criteria for metaphor — elaboration and freedom of combination — are taken together and applied to Stage A metaphors, it becomes clear that an elaborated (coherent) metaphorical level cannot be ‘naturally’ combined in the same context with an-

6 Beckmann (2001: 177) notes that because the phrase ‘information highway’ is not explicitly mentioned, the basic metaphor is unnamed in example 44. Her use of ‘information journey’, however, is an implicit reference to ‘information highway’ and justifies the following realisation.

7 The use of the preposition ‘on’ in ‘on the information highway’ (*auf der Datenautobahn*) is itself a concession to the metaphorical level instanced by ‘highway’. Strictly speaking, one has to be in or on something when using the internet.

8 In German this is a well known metaphor for someone driving in the wrong lane of the motorway.

other metaphorical level. Metaphors from Stage A are open to elaboration but cannot be combined wily nily with other metaphors without causing the feeling that something is not quite right:

- (57) *The ex-football star Paul Breitner in an interview:* 'Ich habe nur immer meinen **Finger in Wunden** gelegt, die sonst **unter den Tisch gekehrt** worden wären.' (Spiegel 2007)

Transl. by sense: 'I always add salt to my wounds, which would otherwise have been swept under the rug.'

The speaker clearly has no regard for metaphorical consistency, although hopefully the editors at the German weekly magazine *Der Spiegel* (as well as our readers) are aware of the strangeness of this incongruous mixing of metaphors. 'To add salt to the wound' is the dominant metaphor, which is why the relative clause connected to it ('wounds, which ...') is possible. The second metaphorical phrase ('to sweep something under the rug') does not continue on the same metaphorical level as the first metaphor although the relative pronoun 'which' raises this expectation. We come away from the utterance with an impression of inconsistency even though the various parts somehow fit together. The inconsistency is, in fact, on the level of sentence meaning (wounds cannot be swept under the rug) while a vague sense of semantic coherence arises from the utterance level. We broadly understand what Mr Breitner means by his mixed metaphors: he wishes to openly address a difficult or controversial problem that others would prefer to ignore.

However, if the expression 'to add salt to the wound' were no longer 'fresh' (Stage A) but had already been conventionalised (Stage B) it would be a perfectly coherent sentence. The original German statement uses the literal phrase 'to put my hand into the wound'; the 'hand' has long served as a popular basis for metaphors, many of which have merged into 'obscure' idioms today (see the examples in Wandruszka 1981: 285–292). One can likewise find various cases of figurative but 'obscure' idioms involving stage B.1-metaphors in Spalding (1959/2000), e.g.:

- (58) *Das geht dich einen feuchten Dreck an!* (op. cit.: II, 494) — *Engl. equivalent:* That's none of your damned business!

Firstly this idiom can be elaborated with reference to its metaphorical component *feuchter Dreck* 'dump dirt'. It is possible to add something like 'no matter how much you want to have of it' or 'but no dry dirt either'. Of course, these elaborations are, if anything, amusing, however, the metaphor can be elaborated. Secondly, this idiom fulfills the criterion of free combination, as well:

- (59) *Er sagte, er stecke zwar schon bis zum Hals in der Scheiße, aber die gehe mich einen feuchten Dreck an!*
— *Transl. by sense:* He said he was up to his neck in it, however, that would be none of my damned business!

Both criteria, freedom of combination and elaboration, can serve as a convincing means for differentiating between stage A and stage B.1 metaphors.

As far as metaphors belonging to stage B.2 are concerned, a slight distinction must be made between single metaphors and figurative idioms. Initially, we are dealing with B.2-

metaphors. It has already been stated that lexically absorbed metaphors are inconspicuous; they ‘disappear’ into language awareness:

(60) Nadelöhr *and* im Vorfeld — *Transl.*: the eye of a needle *and* in the run-up to something.

Who would even recognise these examples as metaphors? It is difficult, for the purposes of research, to provide proof of such ‘disappearing’ concepts because their semantic changes have developed diachronically on the condition that certain concepts could be used metaphorically (Kubczak 1986: 88). In other words, it is often only the semantic change that can still be observed. In order to assess the metaphorical background of a particular phrase, the relevant historical evidence of common parlance and language awareness would be needed. However, these are often missing.⁹ In the following paragraphs I would like to discuss two examples, each of which is ‘tricky’ in its own way.

I apologise in advance for my choice of example but I can assure you I have learned many valuable lessons from it:

(61) **Scheiß**arbeitsplatz — *Rough transl.*: shitty/effing job.¹⁰

This is a metaphor according to the scheme in diagram 8 on page 50 and is constructed from a spoken attribution, e.g. ‘*Das ist aber eine Scheiße!*’ That’s a damn shit!’ Needless to say, the use of the word ‘shit’ (*Scheiße*) was once socially taboo (in many social groups the normal non-figurative use of the word still has to be avoided). The metaphorical use of the word was not regarded as ordinary swearing but as extremely vulgar. Nevertheless, the metaphorical use of the word spread as the years went by until it eventually lost its negative associations and its metaphorical meaning was absorbed by the ‘lexicon of society’. The decontextualised metaphorical usage found a new lease of life through morphology: today *Scheiß-* is a highly productive and versatile prefix-modifier in German which simply expresses the negative attitude of the speaker towards the object to which he has added the suffix attributively.

As far as the elaboration of the metaphorical prefix is concerned, no hints of the original excremental meaning of the word can be traced. In general, it is extremely hard to imagine a figurative elaboration of a B.2-metaphor:

(62) Auf seinem **Scheiß**arbeitsplatz **stank** es Peter. — *No English metaphorical equivalent*: Peter was fed up with his shitty job (because it was dead boring, for instance).

Or:

(63) Bin ich der **Toilettenreiniger** für eure **Scheiß**klausuren? — *Transl.*: What do you take me for? The toilet cleaner for your shitty exam papers?

Admittedly, it is almost impossible to find plausible examples that would prove the elaboration of a metaphor. But this is because such examples would inevitably be understood as

⁹ Contemporary studies (cf. Panagl 2003, for instance) provide reasonable proof of semantic changes through linguistic discourse analyses based on mass media (e.g. Thielemann, 2014, or Innerwinkler, 2010) and ably document the subtleties of language.

¹⁰ In German a compound in which the metaphorical component *Scheiß-* has a derogatory connotation for the ensuing ‘place of work’; there is no English equivalent.

'fresh' metaphors. We can only go from experience to see that nobody is presently trying to use elaboration as a meaning-generating device. In example 55, however, dozens of elaborations can easily be found. But apart from the cases presented in examples 54 and 55 we do not draw a link between the two metaphors in example 62. We do not apply 'stank' in № 62 and 'toilet cleaner' in № 63 to the German prefix of 'shitty'. In the example 'traffic jam on the information highway' (№ 55), we readily understand the meaning of 'traffic jam' in connection with 'information highway'; we automatically form the syllogism of 'information highway = internet' $\Rightarrow$ 'traffic jam = data or access blockage'. However, this gives us only one piece of information: some blockage of data (access) is happening. The 'continued' reference to the original context marker of 'information' is significant. With examples 62 and 63 we do not make such a reference and therefore obtain two discrete pieces of information. In example 62, we learn from the attitude of the speaker that, firstly, Peter has a miserable job and, secondly, we are informed of the fact that Peter does not like it. In example 63 we learn that an exam went badly and that the speaker (presumably a teacher) does not want to be a 'toilet cleaner'. Since the context is so fragmented we only can guess at what this might have to do with exams.

For the second example we will delve into the the history of language itself. In a public lecture given at the University of Vilnius in 2014, Oswald Panagl spoke about conventionalised metaphors in the work of Germany's 19th-century indo-germanists (especially Franz Bopp, 1791–1867). Panagl identified an abundance of metaphors, such as:

- (64) **Wortwurzel**, **Wortstamm**, **Sprachfamilie**, (zwei Sprachen, die) aus einer gemeinschaftlichen **Quelle** fließen *or* (eine Sprache,) strahlend im Glanz der **Blüten** (cf. Panagl 2016);

Transl.: word **root**, word **stem**, language **family**, (two languages that) gush out of a common **spring** *or* (a language) gleaming in the brightness of its **blossoms**.

In the context of diachronic linguistics, it is evident that 'root', 'stem', 'family' and so on, are heuristic metaphors expressing the abstract relations of the languages and concepts under historical comparison. However, our interpretation of these terms runs the risk of being affected by our modern or 'advanced' perspective. It might have been perfectly normal in Bopp's time to view the development of languages as an organic process comparable to the development of plants, in which case the words 'root', 'stem', and 'family' would have seemed like the right (non-metaphorical) terms for the reference objects in question. So a hermeneutical problem arises for us: it is almost impossible to know whether the indo-germanists' terminology developed as it did because the indo-germanists saw language development as part of the natural world, or, conversely, they forced this sense on their ideas. If they considered language development as metaphorically 'natural', we cannot ascertain what they 'really' (non-figuratively) thought about the development of language relations because they were speaking in absolute metaphors. On the other hand, if the early indo-germanists consciously considered language development to be part of the natural world, their terminology would be non-figurative; it would simply conceptualise the subject in a way they deemed appropriate. The crucial point here is that we can never fully understand the beliefs and worldviews of the indo-germanists. However, it is axiomatic to conceptionalists (as well as numerous re-

searchers working with phraseology) that, firstly, there is a one-to-one relation between the use of an image and the worldview (beliefs) of the speaker using the image, and secondly, one can objectively detect an image by conceptually visualising it.

Let's take a brief look at some figurative B.2 idioms to further clarify the process of conventionalisation. Although the images that belong to this stage are already 'invisible', another variation of a stage-B.2 (or solidified) metaphor occurs if the metaphorised concept does not undergo any semantic changes over the course of time. In that case the whole semantic unit ('metaphor + context marker')¹¹ undergoes a kind of fossilisation and a 'fixed' figurative phrase (idiom, clause)¹² is born:

- (65) Einen Streit vom Zaun brechen, jemandem den Hof machen *and* auf etwas ganz versessen sein — *Transl.* (no metaphorical equivalents in English): to pick a fight, to woo a woman and to be obsessed with something.

Naturally, when we use idioms like these it does not occur to us that they are, in fact, metaphorical. Indeed, our awareness of metaphor is often tenuous at best. As we have seen, metaphors may be accidental in origin, and validated by highly subjective circumstances. Spalding (1959/2000: II, 512-3, 523, 555, 566, and 712) offers the following examples:

- (66) Im **Dunkeln** ist gut munkeln, Dankbarkeit ist hier **dünn** gesät, Im Ärmel war ein Loch und das Hemd **guckte durch**, Er lebte in einer **eigenen** Welt or Nachdem man ihn geschnappt hatte, wurde er **eingebuchtet**, *and last but not least* Im Theater sollte man keinen **fahren lassen**.

Transl. (no metaphorical equivalents in English): The night is a cloak for sinners, Gratitude is few and far between, There was a hole in the sleeve and the west was peeping through, He lived in a world of his own or After they had caught him, he was locked up, *and last but not least* You should not break wind in the theatre.

The German concepts that were metaphorised in earlier times are printed in bold: 'dark', 'thin', 'peep out', 'own', 'lock up' and 'break wind'. It is no longer possible to elaborate the solidified idioms in examples 65 and 66, but they can be freely combined. This basically sums up the three stages of metaphor and their corresponding criteria. However, idioms cannot be treated on a par with metaphors. Idioms (phrases, clauses) like those in example 65, which seem to be (parts of) utterances that are 'independent' of reference, are pragmatically equal to ironic statements (see, for instance, example 35). Imagine a student who finishes her final exam with the comment: 'Dobby is free at last!' Clearly, we need to delve deeper into the nature of figurative idioms.

11 Howarth (1996) pointed out that figurative idioms are always restricted with respect to their commutability; see my paraphrasing of Howarth on page 75.

12 The term 'phrase' automatically implies social diffusion and conventionalisation.

Searle's Position

In the previous chapter we differentiated between metaphors according to their stages of 'freshness', i.e. they have not yet become conventionalised or an autonomous part of the semantic reservoir. Behind this differentiation is hidden, in a modernised form, the notion of linguistic impropriety; fresh metaphors can generate an impression of 'incorrectness' in the recipient. Many assume (Abraham 1975: 156; Weinrich 1976: 319; Hönigsperger 1994: 88; Kurth 1995: 89–91) this impression must be grounded in the context of the utterance. This must be so because metaphor, as we saw in chapter 3, is not a problem of concept. For the very reason that the words mean what they mean, a problem arises between the chosen expression and the intended meaning. According to the theory of understanding, it is not the logic of the attribution which is problematic with regard to metaphor; attribution follows automatically, as soon as the metaphor is recognised (understood). Many theorists nevertheless spend a lot of time and energy trying to prove that attribution and content are the same thing. However, this is simply not the case. Searle (1994: 112–116) saw clearly that metaphor acts as a third linguistic device alongside indirect speech and irony, with all the advantages of equivocation and ambiguity that confers upon it.

From the perspective of rhetoric, Searle's (loc. cit.) distinction between the three linguistic devices of metaphor, indirect speech and irony could be criticised for the reason that metaphors are generally considered to be single words, whereas indirect speech and irony are a phenomenon of utterances. But Searle has good reason for disregarding this point. Concepts become metaphors only in connection with an utterance. Searle showed that metaphor and irony are strikingly similar (in his view they bear more similarity to each other than to acts of indirect speech). According to Searle, indirect speech acts mean something and, at the same time, they mean *a little bit more* than that. For instance, in the exclamation:

(67) PERSON A: 'Ooh, there is a nasty draught in here!'

Person A is indirectly encouraging someone to close the window. Nevertheless, the utterance remains a true statement as its sentence meaning is the 'right' meaning. The 'real' meaning of the utterance would be construed by learned cues (tone, politeness, etc); it would be perfectly clear to most people that you are not merely making chit-chat about the weather.

Metaphor and irony, though, mean something different from sentence meaning. In the case of irony, it is even the opposite of sentence meaning. Both metaphor and irony occur within an utterance; their meaning does not derive from an interpretation of that utterance. For example, when Homer characterises Achilles as a lion in battle, we readily understand the metaphor (the statement Homer makes), but it is harder for us to say whether Homer is being respectful or critical of Achilles with this utterance (the speech act Homer wants to express; cf. chapters 2.1, 2.2 and 4.2). We already discussed a further example of this in chapter 3.3 (Nos 31–33 on page 60), although we saw the ambivalence that arises from its use in speech acts from another point of view. Thus, metaphor and irony differ from indirect speech, which

stays true to sentence meaning while implying additional meaning. In my opinion irony could even be regarded as a special case of metaphor because saying the opposite (for example in the form of litotes) is a form of saying 'something different'.

We need to briefly digress from Searle in order to better understand his division of speech acts into two kinds: direct and indirect. Austin (1975) does not make this distinction but, rather, identifies the functions of speech as being either locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary; but these three functions are only aspects of the same speech act; he sees all speech acts as being one and undivided.¹ Austin (op. cit.: 94–98) regards locution as a formal linguistic act that is necessary for the production of correct, competent grammar. However, locution is not lacking in content: it 'is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference' (op. cit.: 109). Austin contrasts this with 'illocution': the sentence as action in a communicative situation; or, how the locutionary act is performed as part of the speaker's role (op. cit.: 99–100). If there is anything in a communication which seems to us to be indirect, this is so, according to Austin, because there is a difference between locution and illocution; cf. our discussion of example 67. The locution often falls short of what is meant on the illocutionary level: 'I (...) shall refer to the doctrine of the different types of function of language² (...) as the doctrine of "illocutionary forces"' (loc. cit.). However, for Austin the act of speech is the interdependence of locution and illocution: 'To perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say, also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act' (Austin 1975: 98).

Searle (1994), in contrast, thinks that there are three acts of speech: locution, illocution and indirect speech. He regards illocution (his notion of sentence meaning) and indirect speech (his notion of utterance meaning) as independent speech acts (op. cit.: 42–43). But this is a premature conclusion since it fails to take into account Austin's very notion of illocution.⁴ Thus, the utterance in example 67 would be an assertive act (op. cit.: 12–13). The indirect speech act (the intention of what is said in example 67), according to Searle, would occur, if, for instance, in a particular situation the utterance of № 67 were understood as a wish for the window to be closed, i.e. as a directive act (loc. cit.). Though the relations Searle describes are perfectly correct and do not differ from Austin's, it is wrong, in my opinion, to regard sentence meaning as an independent speech act and to use the term 'illocution' to describe it. If the 'literal' sentence meaning becomes an illocutionary act, this speech act is created against a background of an imaginary situation, that is to say, at the cost of an ideal situation invented for the sake of illocution. This would mean there is no longer any 'literal' meaning. Searle (1994: 79) himself came to this conclusion about the literal meanings of sentences. His chapter on literal meaning (op. cit.: 117 ff.) is full of 'strange' imaginary situations which make the 'normal' literary meanings of the statements seem questionable.

1 Unfortunately, Austin does not always observe his own strict terminology. He speaks about 'illocutionary acts', 'perlocutionary acts', etc. also. This opens the floodgates for misunderstandings.

2 Here we may say that 'language' is a synonym for 'locutions'.

3 In contrast to Austin, Searle also includes predication and reference within the linguistic act (see Searle 1999). This is correct.

4 In contrast with Austin, Searle rightly includes predication and reference within the linguistic act (see Searle 1999).

Table 5: The steps of interpreting a sentence

Steps of 'meaning', and 'problems'	Austin's operation
1°. sentence meaning ('literal') <i>possible</i> : 'confusion' caused by metaphor or irony	locution , grammatical competence 'some words are not used in the right way' (their reference is complex, double sense structure)
2°. utterance meaning (speaker's acting) <i>possible</i> : 'confusion' caused by illocutionary forces	illocution , communicative competence 'true statement, but it must be reinterpreted with regard to the situation'
3°. apprehension and response of recipient <i>possible</i> : the recipient does not follow the <i>gestalt</i> (shape) the speaker has given the situation; he then has to interpret the speaker, which in turn leads to another illocution	perlocution , objective feedback; the speaker's illocution has transformed the utterance situation into a definite <i>gestalt</i> (or shape; see the comparison in my text), and the recipient gives a response that extends this shape as well as the sequence of the dialogue the recipient's reply extends the shape he has given the utterance situation, and thus his reply starts a further sequence in the dialogue (using the terms of Brinker & Sager 2001: 74 ff.)

Searle (1994) does not comment on either locution or perlocution although perlocution is extremely important. According to Austin (1975: 101, 107–108), perlocution is the part of the speech act that lies in or on the side of the recipient (audience, target of statement, etc.). It is, we might say, the fulfilment of the illocutionary part of the speech act. In consequence, one can control that the recipient has understood the speaker's illocution by the recipient's reaction. In example 67, person A can control his/her observation for being understood as a kind of directive. This effect can be 'happy' (in Austin's terminology; op.cit.: 14): somebody goes to close the window which was admitting the draught; it is clear in this case that person B has understood the statement of person A as a directive to stop the draught. But 'infelicities' (loc. cit.) are also possible. After uttering № 67, person B might conceivably reply:

(68) PERSON B: 'Yes! All your papers are flying around! It's so funny!'

This answer is possible because person B has (mis)interpreted the statement of person A in № 67 as another illocutionary act (linguistically, it is immaterial whether person B in № 68 wants to annoy person A or whether person B is unfamiliar with our linguistic concerns). The possibility of the reinterpretation of the speech act given by person A in № 67, that is to say, the existence of illocutionary forces in general, shows that the 'pure' locution is still in- or under-definite. Sentence meaning (locution) is like a ball of dough that you can shape to fit the situation. It is never irrefutably certain but fits into several illocutionary speech acts. Therefore, an illocutionary force constitutes a single and inseparable linguistic act. It is not necessary to assume two acts in order to make the logical step from the sentence to the utterance meaning. The speech act constitutes this transition itself. Speech acts change the sentence into an utterance meaning, that is, a locutionary into an illocutionary utterance. Or to

put it another way: through illocution the speaker projects his intentions and transforms the utterance situation into a definite shape. If a wooden board (= locution) is turned into a shelf (= illocution), it is because a carpenter has transformed it; neither the board nor the shelf played any part in it. This analogy neatly illustrates the logical connection between the two things (Austin and Levinson (1995: 276–278) believe the same principle applies to metaphor; see the three levels in table 5).

There are two points to consider here. Firstly, we should explain metaphor (and maybe irony) through pragmalinguistics, that is, in a similar way to how we 'discover' and understand illocutionary forces. Consequently, we need a 'reconstruction' of meaning by means of logical conclusions, which is essentially what Searle (1994: 105 ff.) concluded. So the 'fixed' point we can find for reconstructing metaphor's double sense structure might consist of the classical cooperative principle and conversational maxims, as described by Grice (1991: 26–27).⁵ Secondly, metaphor is not the same as illocution because one can make several illocutions when expressing a metaphor. Furthermore, metaphor is specifically connected with sentence meaning and with the metaphorised concept due to the logical structure of metaphor (cf. chapter 3). Metaphor is a fixed linguistic device that speakers are aware of and that, from a historical perspective, enriches the lexical reservoir; in some cases metaphor produces figurative idioms which remain stable over long periods of time.

These points lead us to the conclusion that metaphor has more in common with linguistic devices such as implicatures than with illocution. Beckmann (2001: 51–54) was correct to criticise the narrow pragmalinguistic focus on metaphor. According to Beckmann (op. cit.: 53), a purely pragmalinguistic approach fails to take into account that

the specific achievement of metaphors consists in the fact that the words and expressions used metaphorically, by virtue of their affiliation with particular language games, open particular semantic horizons or make particular modes of speaking possible. This exact ability, however, is closely linked with the words and expressions used metaphorically. (...) Particularly in complex metaphors the 'utterance meaning' is directly connected to the sentence uttered.⁶

We have, however, already tackled this question. From a diachronic perspective, is the metaphorical use of certain words communicative and socially legitimised? Or is metaphor a necessity that constitutes a conversational implicature when considered from a synchronic perspective? We hope this book will help put that question to bed.

5 Also Hönigsperger (1994: 75–78) makes reference to them. Unfortunately, she looks at the wrong linguistic phenomena; see my criticism of Black's examples in the next chapter.

6 Our translation; orig. in German: 'die spezifische Leistung von Metaphern gerade darin besteht, daß die metaphorisch verwendeten Wörter und Ausdrücke kraft ihrer Zugehörigkeit zu bestimmten Sprachspielen bestimmte Sinnhorizonte eröffnen oder bestimmte Sprechweisen ermöglichen. Genau diese Fähigkeit ist aber aufs engste mit den metaphorisch verwendeten Wörtern und Ausdrücken verbunden. (...) Insbesondere bei komplexen Metaphern ist das 'Gemeinte' daher unmittelbar an das Gesagte gebunden.'

Instead of a Summary: Metaphor as Conversational Implicature

Grice (1991: 33–37) classified metaphor under the category of conversational implicature (op. cit.: 24–31). Levinson (1995: 147–162) follows on from Grice and summarises the latter's interpretation of metaphor by describing a multi-stage process that ranges from the identification of a metaphor via the application of conversational maxims through to the interpretation of the figurative language involved (op. cit.: 157–160). However, the reason Levinson makes these distinctions is because he (along with many others) wants to explain the decoding of all kinds of tropes, not merely that of metaphor alone. More recently, Abraham (1998: 54–57) is just one of several scholars to describe metaphor as belonging to conversational implicature.¹ Since Abraham neglected to provide any proof for his claim, we will attempt to do so now.

Metaphor is conversational implicature because it possesses the same distinguishing features. These features, according to the terminology of pragmatics and the definition offered by Meibauer (2001: 31, 45 and 49), are:

- calculability,
- variability,
- defeasibility or cancellability, and
- constancy under negation.

EXPLANATIONS

Calculability: The calculability of metaphor consists of the fact that the understanding (interpretation) of a particular metaphor can logically be deduced from the metaphorised concept itself and from its context, as well as by using the principles of cooperation and conversational maxims. Therefore, the explanations put forward by Grice, Levinson and Abraham, along with all the other studies that attempt to interpret specific metaphors, can be regarded as evidence for the notion of calculability. The authors of these studies inevitably developed their interpretations beginning with a concept and corresponding context, and drew 'logical' conclusions from an interpretative frame (cf. chapter 3.1).

Variability: Variability is whether the meaning of a phrase or word changes with the context it belongs to or not. Above all, only the meaning of a 'solitary' concept (semantic form) is independent of context. However, we have already clearly shown that a context marker is needed if a word is going to become a metaphor in an utterance — there can be no metaphor without 'its' context. The marker 'binds' an s-form to a specific context (syntax) so that a 'stable', autonomous unit of sense is formed within the utterance (double sense structure) — thus the concept is metaphorised (meaning 1°, cf. table 5). In contrast, this metaphor, that is, the

1 Abraham (1998: 227–267) devotes a whole chapter of his book to metaphor. The chapter was first published independently in 1975 but we need not concern ourselves with it. It contains all the usual errors, not least of which is using the reductive formal logic of Black's analogy theory.

entire unit of 'metaphorised concept + context marker', can change its meaning when it is used in different utterance situations. Meaning 2° of the metaphor-unit is dependent on the performance situation.

Defeasibility: In prolonging the dialogue, conversational implicature can be 'cancelled' without misunderstanding or a sense of strangeness. Following on from Searle (1994: 40–41),² the participants in a conversation who mainly refer to the illocutions of their interlocutors are able to 'betray' the illocutionary force (meaning 2°) of a metaphor (thus breaking its traditional use) by reacting to the metaphor in a way that is coherent with its iconicity (meaning 1°). Imagine, for instance, the following classroom exchange:

(69) TEACHER: 'If you carry on misbehaving like this, I will **blow my top!**'

PUPILS: 'Well at least that might warm the classroom up a bit...'

The pupils interpret the metaphor used by the teacher in such a way that the implicature intended by the teacher has been eliminated. The pupils do not react to the utterance meaning (as the teacher expected them to) but they respond to the sentence meaning, that is, to the level of the image 'blowing one's top'. However, in doing this they do not simply achieve coherence with the metaphorical vehicle of the teacher's utterance (an action described by us as elaboration; cf. chapter 4.2) but they also differently interpret the situation in which the figurative sentence was made. Here it is important to note that the reinterpretation of the situation by the pupils does not contradict the context marker of 'blow my top'. The pupils do not see 'blowing one's top' as an inducement to behave better (utterance meaning), but as a humorous way to warm up their backsides (the teacher's context marker). One can thus say that the pupils in example 69 ignore the teacher's illocution (a threat) by reinterpreting the illocutionary force of the teacher's statement. Metaphors can thus be 'cancelled' by utterances which transform the illocution to which the metaphor belongs into a different speech act. We have already discussed two more suitable examples (Nos 67 and 68) in chapter 4.3. In fact, the problems linguists have had with defeasibility speak for themselves, and serious, if less artistic, examples can be found easily:

(70) Achilles was a lion in battle — 40 hoplites were needed to stop the beast.

The defeasibility of metaphor is also known as 'realisation' (cf. chapter 4.2); in examples 69 and 70 there is no metaphor at the end of the utterances referring to the explosive potential of both Achilles and the teacher.

Constancy under negation: A conversational implicature does not change its meaning after negating the clause or sentence. With regard to metaphor, Kurz (1988: 14) observed,

2 Searle (loc. cit.) wanted to distinguish conventionalised idioms from non-figurative utterances by maintaining that the latter can be taken literally whereas the former can not. According to Searle, it is possible for Henry to answer the non-figurative directive speech act 'Why don't you be quiet Henry?' by taking it literally, such as, 'Well, Sally, there are several reasons for my not being quiet. Firstly, ...' However, Searle's metaphorical example 'Jones kicked the bucket' can also be treated literally. Some might reasonably reply to that statement with, 'Why didn't he use a football?' This scenario might have some comedic value but the criterion Searle proposed is useless.

Typically, the negation of a metaphorical utterance, e.g. 'the moon is not a lemon', does not negate the literal meaning but the intended specific meaning of the metaphor. (...) No one would really think that the utterance 'the moon is a lemon' should be taken literally. It is also worth pointing out that metaphors remain metaphors even as they are under negation.³

CONCLUSION

We can conclude that metaphor shares all the features of conversational implicatures. As such, metaphor may be considered a kind of conversational implicature.

Levinson (1995: 160–162), in a clear summary, considers metaphor to be a phenomenon characterised by the following points:

- firstly, metaphor can be characterised by its performance situation and by the way it undergoes realisation as described by pragmatics, leading to the identification of metaphor and revealing its 'indirect' effect as a special case of conversational implicature;
- secondly, Levinson argues that metaphor can be characterised by thinking in analogies, a means of understanding common to all human beings and, above all, the reason for our desire to square inconcity with reality.⁴ This is the reason why analogies mean much more than the mere agreement of semantic features among themselves or the mere agreement of speech with 'reality'. The general cognitive faculties that metaphor stimulates were central to a key study by Ortony (1993). We would like to emphasise the importance of cognitive faculties like visualisation (including the forming of ideal references), a good memory (the semantic reservoir and reservoir of imagery), as well as the power of the imagination in reconstructing 'matching' knowledge of the world (presuppositions);
- thirdly, Levinson mentions a number of features of metaphor that he only vaguely grasps and touches upon. These features, however, reveal a third and crucial factor: culture. To put it more clearly, by 'culture' we mean the connection of metaphorical meanings to a social group and its shared imagery. Above all, this explains why a particular metaphor is understood in a particular way at a particular time. Furthermore, it explains why it is not the concept itself that is crucial to shared understanding but what is visualised by the concept and what this visualisation symbolises in the culture concerned.

Since metaphor is at the intersection of all these things, it is frequently problematic and often vexing. But that is also what makes it so fascinating and rewarding as an object of study.

3 Our translation; orig. in German: 'Bezeichnenderweise negiert die Verneinung einer metaphorischen Äußerung, z.B. *Der Mond ist keine Zitrone*, nicht die wörtliche Bedeutung, sondern die intendierte spezifische Bedeutung dieser Metapher. (...) Es wird erst gar nicht unterstellt, die Äußerung *Der Mond ist eine Zitrone* sei wörtlich gemeint. Auch verneinte Metaphern bleiben Metaphern.'

4 Levinson (1995: 160) sees metaphor as comparable to maps and models. According to the theory of understanding, he regards all three things as similar, that is to say, as vehicles of analogy. He terms this approach to metaphor, in keeping with certain other authors, especially from the field of psychology (see the following chapter), 'correspondence theory'. In my opinion, Levinson's line of reasoning could be improved upon by exploring biblical parables and fiction. His macrofocal, excessively generalising view, however, is not a solution to establishing a cogent theory of metaphor but, as I explained in chapter 1 and hinted at above, it is only the precondition for thinking with images done with metaphor.

CHAPTER FIVE

The 20th Century Discovers Metaphor

The Theory of Interaction (Richards, Black)

The theory of interaction formulated by Ivor Armstrong Richards (1893–1979) in 1936 (revised in 1964) was an approach to metaphor that claimed to break with the tradition of regarding metaphor as anomalous linguistic ornamentation. Richards, working within the parameters of rhetoric and philosophy, ascribed value to two factors we have discussed:

As individuals we gain our command of metaphor just as we learn whatever else makes us distinctively human. It is all imparted to us from others, with and through the language we learn, language which is utterly unable to aid us except through the command of metaphor which it gives. (Richards 2001: 60)

That metaphor is the omnipresent principle of language can be shown by mere observation. We cannot get through three sentences of ordinary fluid discourse without it, as you will be noticing throughout this lecture. Even in the rigid language of the settled sciences we do not eliminate or prevent it without great difficulty. (op. cit.: 61)

Richards (2001: 62) then elaborates on his understanding of metaphor:

The view that metaphor is omnipresent in speech can be recommended theoretically. If you recall what I tried to say in my second lecture¹ about the context theorem of meaning — about meaning as the delegated efficacy of signs by which they bring together into new unities the abstracts, or aspects, which are the missing parts of their various contexts — you will recollect some insistence that a word is normally a substitute for (or means) not one discrete past impression but a combination of general aspects. Now that is itself a summary account of the principle of metaphor. In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction.

Speech, for Richards, is a repetition of what is already available as a thought; the objects and facts of reality are verbalised as thoughts of themselves. If a thought occurs, it can find ‘support by a word.’² But why are there two thoughts underlying a metaphor? Does Richards mean that one thought (that is the one with ‘word-support’) is the word or sentence meaning and the other thought (that is the one the first one is entering into active interaction with) is the ‘fixed’ context for the concept to metaphorise or, respectively, its reference situation produced by the speaker? When Richards refers to the ‘resultant of their interaction’, does he

1 For his second lecture, *The Aims of Discourse and Types of Context*, see Richards 2001: 15–29.

2 Our argument is somewhat similar (cf. chapter 3.2). We argued that the concept is partly a flexible form consisting of an inherent grasp of semantics that is developed by the use of words. This semantic form, we continued, is filled with culturally and socially transformed notions of the world that are relevant in ‘visible’ (present) utterance situations or become relevant when a situation has to be visualised (or, at least, should be visualised before we go on speaking).

mean the utterance meaning of the metaphor syntagma, and therefore have in mind the double sense structure of metaphor (cf. chapter 3.1)? If yes, then the theory of interaction would be an early pragmalinguistic approach to solving the enduring conundrum of metaphor.

Subsequent studies that tried to build on Richards' theory narrowly focused on the two 'thoughts of different things' and their 'interaction', and paid no attention to the 'resultant of their interaction', as Richards outlined it. Furthermore, they overlooked that one of the two interacting thoughts could be what Richard called 'context'. Richards was suitably broad in scope in his understanding of context: it meant 'the circumstances under which anything was written or said', as well as 'anything whatever about the period, or about anything else which is relevant to our interpretation' (Richards 2001: 22); cf. our particulars of what is called background (pages 50–52). Richards is right, too, that 'context' is closely connected with interpretation. However, what exactly needs to be interpreted in this scenario? Richards' understanding of one of the two thoughts interacting entails a mental subject that exists meta- or non-linguistically (without using words). This is in contrast with later studies that believed both interacting thoughts are available with 'word-support'. Although human imagination forms the basis for Richards' theory — encompassing as it does the ideas, attitudes and imagery of particular cultures, groups and times — all the subsequent studies that refer to Richards (at least to the best of my knowledge) focus solely on concepts and ignore these other dimensions. Most of the research following on from Richards is rooted in the tradition of formal logic and tends to favour sentence models like 'A is B' (i.e. 'time is money'), in which the word or phrase represented by 'B' is regarded as a metaphor. With respect to the interaction of two thoughts (represented by the words A and B involve), it was generally accepted, as Richards argued, that the metaphor in concept B has an effect on concept A, but the idea that concept A (as Richards had supposedly understood it) should also modify metaphor B (cf. Schumacher 1997: 28–31, esp. 30) was criticised.

Most criticism of Richards basically deals with the problem of reference, and especially with both attribution (see chapter 2.1) and what, in reference to the moment of linguistic initiation, philosophers have called elementary predication (see below). Richards deals with reference from a more psychological and, one might say, earthier point of view than linguistics or philosophers had hitherto done: he tried to explain how we connect our subjective thoughts, mediated by words (language), with extraneous objects and objective facts, to create our sense of reality. In other words, the age-old problem of how to categorise and conceptualise the phenomena surrounding us. Richards maintained that metaphor did not differ in any meaningful sense from other, 'normal' uses of language. Instead, he explains metaphor as a general principle of language:

The traditional theory noticed only a few of the modes of metaphor; and limited its application of the term *metaphor* to a few of them only. And thereby it made metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a borrowing between and intercourse of *thoughts*, a transaction between contexts. *Thought* is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language derive therefrom. (Richards 2001: 63)

Although it is hard to disagree with this, this is neither (though the quotation seems to say just this) what Jakobson nor Lotman had in mind (cf. chapter 1.1). Richards reflects instead

on linguistic arbitrariness (cf. chapter 1.3), which, for him, is a sign that the only important process beyond that of 'word support' is thinking. For Richards a thought (concept, notion) is an entity of thinking, and every 'applied' thought is the result of noetic comparison and intercourse.

In this way Richards turns the rhetorical term 'metaphor' into a heuristic metaphor and disregards a longstanding philosophical, sociological and semiotic tradition³ that generally treats the phenomenon of metaphor as 'symbolic'. Why did Richards do this? Why ignore tried and tested methodological principles, not to multiply categories (concepts, *termini technici*) without need.⁴ Cassirer, for instance, was by no means the first but probably the most thorough when he argued (in 1923):

Another indication that the creation of the various systems of sensuous symbols is indeed a pure activity of the mind is that from the outset all these symbols lay claim to objective value. They go beyond the mere phenomena of the individual consciousness, claiming to confront them with something that is universally valid. This claim (...) belongs to the essence and character of the particular forms themselves. They themselves regard their symbols not only as objectively valid, but for the most part as the very core of the objective and 'real'. It is characteristic, for example, of the first seemingly naïve and unreflecting manifestations of linguistic thinking and mythical thinking, that they do not clearly distinguish between the content of the 'thing' and the content of the 'sign', but indifferently merge the two. (...) And we need only transfer this notion from the real to the ideal, from the material to the functional, to find that it contains a kernel of justification. In the immanent development of the mind the acquisition of the *sign* really constitutes a first and necessary step towards knowledge of the objective nature of the thing. For consciousness the sign is, as it were, the first stage and the first demonstration of objectivity, because through it the constant flux of the contents of consciousness is for the first time halted, because in it something enduring is determined and emphasized. No mere *content* of consciousness as such recurs in strictly identical form once it has passed and been replaced by others. (...) But to this incessant flux of contents, consciousness now juxtaposes its own unity and the unity of its forms. (...) Through the sign that is associated with the content, the content itself acquires a new permanence. For the sign, in contrast to the actual flow of the particular contents of consciousness, has a definite ideal *meaning*, which endures as such (... it) persists as the representative of a totality, as an aggregate of potential contents, beside which it stands as a first 'universal'. In the symbolic function of consciousness — as it operates in language, in art, in myth — certain unchanging fundamental forms, some of a conceptual and some of a purely sensory nature disengage themselves from the stream of consciousness. (Cassirer 1970: 88–89)⁵

When Richards said that thought was metaphoric, and that thought proceeded from comparison, according to Cassirer this is because in order to speak we have to do precisely that: to compare the multiplicity of phenomena with the 'ideal meaning' of the sign in order to determine (before the act of utterance) whether there exists an adequate agreement or analogy between perception (Cassirer's 'flow of the particular contents of consciousness') and concept (the 'ideal meaning' of the sign).

In logic there would be a problem of predication, too. It could be represented by a sentence structure such as 'X is a' where 'a' logically and syntactically denotes a predicate to 'X' that is an object and noun substantive (see, for instance, Cassirer 2001: 249–252; 1970: 278–281; or Searle 1999: 123–124, and 97 ff.). In contrast, Kamlah & Lorenzen (1985) ob-

3 I am referring to Richards' renewed edition of 1964. Before World War II, the tradition we are speaking about was more a matter of language philosophy. Richards ignored this, however.

4 The principle 'the entities should not be multiplied except if necessary' (*non sunt multiplicanda entia praeter necessitatem*) is credited to William of Ockham (1285–1347), and is often referred to as 'Ockham's razor'.

5 Orig. in German — Cassirer 2001: 19–20.

served that utterances like ‘This is an X’ do not completely fit the category of predication because in ‘This is an X’, a concept (term, word) ‘X’ is connected with an object of perception for the first time, at least, conversationally. Thus, Kamlah and Lorenzen (op.cit: 23–34) named this particular act of reference an ‘elementary predication’. Two ‘thoughts’ (Richards) or, more precisely, two objects of thought — an apperception and the concept of it — are made to coincide. However, the communicative aspect of this effort is twofold: Searle (1999: 85 ff., 123 ff. and 155) discriminated between (i) predication and (ii) reference by the activities

- i ‘raising the question of the truth of ...’ or ‘being committed to the view that ...’; and
- ii identifying an object or fact (for instance, by giving a description).

While an utterance like ‘This is an X’ is a one-banana problem regarding reference, it is more difficult to realise its predication because the exact qualities one has to attribute to ‘This’ by naming it ‘X’ remain unspoken. The exact qualities are hidden in the concept of X in question (although they are verifiable). Of course, if ‘X’ denotes a table, identification will coincide with predication and the qualities of the latter will be named by the description of the former. However, if concept X is social or political then the peculiarity of the act of predication will come to light because the qualities of ‘X’ will necessarily be disputable or will be limited to the views of a particular *Weltanschauung*. For instance, when a sizable number of people left their homelands in the Middle East and reached Germany in 2015, the general public called them *Flüchtlinge* (‘refugees, fugitives’). However, when Germans speak about those people who went (fled) to the USA and other countries during Hitler’s regime, they conveniently remember them as people who went into exile. Why we do not say the same thing about contemporary migrants?

To conclude, the kind of predication in the structure ‘This is X’ (or, in fact, ‘concept X’) apparently differs from structures like ‘X is a’. The concept X categorises X as an object of thought. This act is reflexive for no other quality is ‘added’ other than what is meant by the concept. ‘Concept X’ is the answer to the question ‘Who/what is this?’; if we do not agree with the intended qualities conveyed, we can only use another concept because the previous categorisation would seem inadequate. Therefore, we already have used ‘attribution’ for the kind of ‘predication’ in ‘concept X’ (chapter 2.1). However, in the case of ‘X is a’, it is correct to use the concept ‘predication’. This is because the ‘a’ gives us the characteristics of ‘X’ as the speaker is convinced of them; the sentence ‘X is a’ is the answer to the question ‘How is X?’ or ‘Does X have a?’ If ‘X is a’ comes under criticism, only the relationship between ‘X’ and ‘a’ becomes questionable; the concept of X and its reference will be beyond doubt. Hence, Kamlah and Lorenzen’s elementary predication is not a special instance of predication but of categorising an object or attribution. If ‘This is X’ is debatable, the question that arises will be ‘Okay, so what is X then?’, *not* ‘Does this object possess the essence of X?’. The example of ‘This is X’ would be better summed up by the phrase: elementary categorisation. Although we will not be needing this phrase for our further purposes, the point to remember here is that we regard the sentence ‘A is B’ as a special instance of this elementary categorisation. It can be considered a free classification because the references of ‘A’ and ‘B’ are completely hid-

den, and we only learn that ‘something stands for something’ (Latin *aliquid stat pro aliquo*). This makes it an equation; if we do not agree that ‘A is B’, we can only contradict this statement by asserting that ‘No, A is not the same as or, at least, similar to B, but it is X’. For example, we may contradict the saying ‘Time is money’ by claiming ‘No, time is a monster!’. ‘Time is green’, however, would not be regarded as a contradiction to ‘Time is money’ and would frankly sound downright strange.

Richards makes a further distinction with regard to metaphor that has been widely accepted; he differentiates between ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ (Richards 2001: 64, 66–67). By ‘tenor’ he understands ‘the original thought’, that is a kind of *verbum proprium* or something essential; the thought in question is not a word but an idea, new situation or sensory impression. By ‘vehicle’ he understands ‘what the original thought is compared with’ — what it is thought of as in what is said about the tenor, as in what is already known of one’s understanding of it. The crucial point here is that it is possible to identify Richards’ ‘tenor’ with whatever perception one has in mind (see above). It is not possible, however, to equate Richards’ ‘vehicle’ with ‘concept’ because Richards regards his ‘vehicle’ as a secondary thought and not, in the philosophical tradition does, as a linguistic entity.

The indistinct definition of the term ‘vehicle’ is not the main problem with Richards’ theory. The main problem lies in the assertion that the coexistence of the tenor and vehicle in metaphor would result in a ‘meaning clearly different from the tenor’. When we consider this with regard to attribution, it is problematic that perception (Richards’ ‘tenor’) is taken to be meaningful in itself, whereas western language philosophy generally agrees that perception as such is meaningless and that it is structured into sense solely by predication (attribution). As Cassirer (1970: 281) puts it: ‘Hence the original and decisive achievement of the concept is not to compare representations and group them according to genera and species, but rather to form impressions into representations.’⁶ It seems likely that Richards had classical metaphor in mind while formulating his idea and that he confounded phenomena belonging to classical metaphor with the separate problem of predication (further confusing an already confusing situation). If we accept tenor as a first thought and vehicle as a second, then a ‘meaning clearly different from the tenor’ would be a third thought. Using our terminology in diagram 10 (page 54) we may remodel Richards’s theory as follows:

- the third thought (Richards’ ‘extra meaning’) covers meaning A;
- the second thought (‘vehicle’) corresponds with the visualised concept B, that is, sentence meaning in the form of ideal reference B;
- the first thought (‘tenor’) would then be something like the ‘extended’ concept A that should have been used ‘literally’ for referring object A — something reminiscent of the theory of substitution, only with Richards believing that concept A-substituted-by-concept B has not been made to disappear but remains valid mental content, that is, it remains present as a basis for understanding.

Richards has knowingly or otherwise used a triadic model of semantics, that which we also use as a basis for diagrams 4 to 10 in chapters 3.1 and 3.2. Richards deserves praise for this

6 Original in German — Cassirer 2001: 252.

because later studies tend to base their arguments exclusively on a dyadic model of semantics.

The last point listed above is doubtlessly the most problematic. It does, however, become plausible if one draws on the insights of psychoanalysis, as Richards does (2001: 91–92):

A 'command of metaphor' — a command of the interpretation of metaphors — can go deeper still into the control of the world that we make for ourselves to live in. The psychoanalysts have shown us with their discussions of 'transference' — another name for metaphor — how constantly modes of regarding, of loving, of acting, that have developed with one set of things or people, are shifted to another. They have shown us chiefly the pathology of these transferences, cases where the vehicle — the borrowed attitude, the parental fixation, say — tyrannizes over the new situation, the tenor, and behaviour is inappropriate. The victim is unable to see the new person except in terms of the old passion and its accidents. He reads the situation only in terms of the figure, the archetypal image, the vehicle. But in healthy growth, tenor and vehicle—the new human relationship and the family constellation — co-operate freely; and the resultant behaviour derives in due measure from both. Thus in happy living the same patterns are exemplified and the same risks of error are avoided as in tactful and discerning reading. The general form of the interpretative process is the same (...).

From the parallels of this description we are able to conclude that by 'tenor' (the content remaining present) Richards has in mind the utterance situation as well as the original content (of perception) or reference object which are to be signified (attributed) according to the sense of the trope.⁷ The obverse of this would be when the 'tenor' is only conceived of as an act of attribution and classification, and not from identifying an object. So Richards (2001: 52) concludes that the general form of the interpretive process remains the same, no matter whether we are dealing with the correct understanding of a figure of speech or with the saving of a rocky relationship. Epistemologically speaking, this may be true but it is far too general and linguistically vague to help us understand the problem of classical metaphor (or the rocky relationship for that matter). With regard to the problem of (elementary) predication, Richards' reflections are not wrong but his version of predication lacks conceptual clarity when it comes to his use of the term 'vehicle' (as well as the role language as a whole plays). Moreover, he seems to have ignored or overlooked much contemporary research, although this might explain his idiosyncratic choice of terminology.

Over the course of the 20th century, an entire paradigm of ideas developed out of the work of Richards (see, for instance, Kurz 1988: 13–15, or Salim-Mohammad 2007: 32). Max Black (1909–1988) was the first to take up Richards' arguments back in 1954. He then 'updated' Richards by incorporating the idea of semantic congruity (cf. chapter 2.1):

'The chairman plowed through the discussion.' In calling this sentence a case of metaphor, we are implying that at least one word (here, the word 'plowed') is being used metaphorically in the sentence, and that at least one of the remaining words is being used literally. Let us call the word 'plowed' the *focus* of the metaphor,⁸ and the remainder of the sentence in which that word occurs the *frame*. (...) One notion that needs to be clarified is that of the 'metaphorical use' of the focus of a metaphor. Among other things, it would be good to understand how

⁷ In this respect Richards' term 'tenor' is polysemous, a fact which has been criticised by Black (1981: 47, note 23).

⁸ Black happens to be a little indistinct here: Why does he identify 'plowed' as the focus of the metaphor? It is the metaphor! Black himself (1981: 39) identifies his term 'frame' with the context; in this respect the 'focus' has to be the metaphor (a single word used metaphorically). On the other hand, Black considers the whole sentence to be a metaphor ('In calling this sentence a case of metaphor:'). This view is supported by other examples (discussed below), which consist of equations of the kind 'A is B'. If 'A is B' then 'B' is also 'A'; the one explains the

the presence of one frame can result in metaphorical use of the complementary word, while the presence of a different frame for the same word fails to result in metaphor. (Black 1981: 27–8)

Though it is admirable that Black realizes a concept to be metaphorised does not have the feature of variability (cf. chapter 4.4), he does not draw any further conclusions from this. As with Richards, Black's interest in metaphor is broadly general and philosophical. If Black's object of study were, say, classical metaphor, he would have to describe the specific relations of focus and frame occurring in metaphorical utterances (if these specific relations appear). Black is not interested, however, in the specific distinctive qualities of a trope. Furthermore, the terms 'focus' and 'frame' are applicable to all statements and situations of communication in general (but not to metaphor in particular), a fact already proven by research: in syntax 'focus' and 'frame' are known as the theme–rheme–relation;⁹ outside of linguistics they have been used by Goffman (2008) among others.¹⁰

Black's predominantly philosophical interest in the subject is betrayed by the kind of questions he asks about metaphor and the examples he provides. He is not interested in the metaphorical device itself but in the intellectual origin of this device.¹¹ However, the latter can only lie in metaphor's uniquely human and linguistic nature (as far as we know). Let us say, for example, that one task of phonology is to define phonemes and their correlations. However, it is a completely different task to explain why a wide range of phonemes and their correlations can and do exist at all. Neither Richards' nor Black's work is of much help here. It is mainly worth reading Black to obtain a useful definition of the device of 'metaphor'. He describes the focus-frame-relations as follows:

Let us try, for instance, to think of a metaphor as a filter. Consider the statement, 'Man is a wolf.' Here, we may say, are *two* subjects — the principal subject, Man (or: men) and the subsidiary subject, Wolf (or: wolves). Now the metaphorical sentence in question will not convey its intended meaning to a reader sufficiently ignorant about wolves. What is needed is not so much that the reader shall know the standard dictionary meaning of 'wolf' — or be able to use that word in literal senses — as that he shall know what I will call the *system of associated commonplaces*. (...) From the expert's standpoint, the system of commonplaces may include halftruths or downright mistakes (as when a whale is classified as a fish); but the important thing for the metaphor's effectiveness is not that the commonplaces shall be true, but that they should be readily and freely evoked. (Black 1981: 39–40)

other. But this is true only if the equation contains or is based on an elementary predication like 'This is B'. For example, if 'B' is a metaphor like that in diagram 8 on page 50, the equation 'A is B' makes a definite statement about 'A'. Otherwise *aliquid stat pro aliquo*. Notabene: with regards to metaphor we stated that this relation is a statement and an attribution (see above).

- 9 Black (1993: chapter 3) equates 'frame' with 'theme'.
- 10 In Goffman's model 'frame' stands for the realisation or perception of situations in which utterances are a performance or can become performative. According to Goffman, the frame we give an event or see a situation from is the horizon to which we implicitly refer all utterances. For him everything is framed: the utterance situation as well as the reference situation, real and fictitious worlds, real and ideal reference acts, etc. Goffman closes the theoretical gap that Searle (1994) had left unresolved. For Searle literalness was always a relative notion because of unspoken references to certain assumptions about context or situation. Searle left this question unresolved because he did not specify these assumptions more clearly.
- 11 What kind of device is metaphor for Black? One has a pretty good idea by the last sentence in the quotation from Black on the previous page ('how the presence of one frame can result in metaphorical use ..., while the presence of a different frame ... fails to result in metaphor') that Black has variability in mind.

Black (1993: 28) also explains his use of the expression 'commonplace' with Aristotle's ἐνδόξα, or the common outlooks and attitudes shared by the members of a particular language community. Black then further elaborates on the filter function of metaphor:

The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others — in short, organizes our view of man. Suppose I look at the night sky through a piece of heavily smoked glass on which certain lines have been left clear. Then I shall see only the stars that can be made to lie on the lines previously prepared upon screen, and the stars I do see will be seen as organized by the screen's structure. We can think of a metaphor as such a screen and the system of 'associated commonplaces' of the focal word as the network of lines upon the screen. We can say that the principal subject is 'seen through' the metaphorical expression — or, if we prefer, that the principal subject is 'projected upon' the field of the subsidiary subject. (Black 1981: 41)

It is certainly an advantage of Black's explanations that they are easier to comprehend than Richards'. — *Notabene*: the reader can find further depictions of Black's theory with Levinson (1995: 148–150),¹² Searle (1994: 85 ff.)¹³ and Guldin (2000: 16–17),¹⁴ among others.

A flaw in Black's theory is that neither reference nor understanding metaphor (interpretation) play a key role in his considerations. In the second quotation Black simply assumes that 'the metaphorical sentence in question will not convey its intended meaning to a reader.' In other places, too, he presupposes an understanding of metaphor (for instance, Black 1993: 24–25, 29–30). Beardsley (2002: 161) criticised Black back in 1958 for these shortcomings: 'But I judge his (sc.: Black's) theory incomplete in not explaining what it is about the metaphorical attribution that informs us that the modifier¹⁵ is metaphorical rather than literal.' Black (op. cit.: 33–35), in response to this criticism, denied the existence of a definite criterion for the identification of metaphor, essentially because he was not interested in classical (rhetorical) metaphor. If 'metaphor', however, means a heuristic metaphor for a general process within the theory of knowledge that is called 'symbol' within the philosophical tradition (we will return to this point later), then Black (op. cit.: 34–35) is correct to assert that a crucial methodical mistake would lie,

in seeking an infallible mark of the presence of metaphors. The problem seems to me analogous to that of distinguishing a joke from a non-joke. If a philosopher, whose children have trouble in deciding when he is joking, introduces the convention that a raised thumb indicates seriousness, he might sometimes be joking in raising his thumb! An explicit assertion that a remark is being made metaphorically (...) cannot guarantee that a metaphor is in question, for that does not depend simply upon its producer's intentions, and the sign (sc.: of explic-

12 Levinson (loc. cit.) shows how Black's theory necessarily leads to the application of the semantic differential, that is, to sem-analysis (cf. chapter 2.1).

13 Part of Searle's criticism (op. cit.: 90 ff.) is unfortunately incorrect because his variants use devices of cohesion which make cross-references to his 'Sally'. This is a context marker and we have metaphors of this kind of model in diagram 8 on page 50.

14 Guldin (2000) is an example not untypical which shows how the theory of interaction is blown up. He uses phrases, for instance, like 'metaphors (...) build bridges across heterogenous fields of life and knowledge' (*Metaphern ... schlagen Brücken zwischen heterogenen Lebens- und Wissensbereichen*, op. cit.: 16) or 'metaphors (...) are processes of transfer between different object domains and language contexts' (*Metaphern ... sind Übertragungsvorgänge zwischen unterschiedlichen Gegenstandsdomänen und Sprachkontexten*, loc. cit.). However, he doesn't really explain what he wants to say with these overblown statements or what they have to do with the work of Richards or Black. Both Black and Richards avoid such obfuscatory language.

15 Here we mean Black's 'focus', or the concept metaphorised.

itness) might itself be used metaphorically. Every criterion for a metaphor's presence, however plausible, is defensible in special circumstances.

The remarkable point here is Black's assumption that 'that does not depend simply upon its producer's intentions'. Black's denial of the important role of intentionality in decoding metaphorical utterances constitutes the main difference between his approach and other theories of metaphor. How can Black disregard the producer's intentions but nevertheless speak of metaphor? Firstly, because Black's issue is somehow predication, and in terms of logic a predicate can be true or false but it cannot be intentional. Secondly, Black can do this because the main problem with the theory of interaction is highlighted by examples with structures such as:

(71) Man is wolf.

Please note that the structure of example 71 is 'A is B', i.e. it is an equation, *not* a metaphor! Searle (1994: 99–100) also provides similarly awkward examples, as does an otherwise praiseworthy study by Coenen (2002). Indeed, misleading examples can be found in numerous contemporary studies. Even in literary criticism examples of this kind are routinely used as an object of study, although one might reasonably expect a better understanding of metaphor and its rhetorical origins from that most meta of disciplines. Let us take a short look at example № 71 to elucidate some of these misunderstandings. For instance, if we say 'cats are animals', the equation is possible because the concept 'cat' is already included semantically in our concept of animals. The sentence tells us that 'cat' and 'animal' are supposed to share common features or that the speaker has categorised 'cats' as a (partial) subgroup of 'animals'. If we ask 'Are cats dogs?', it would then be normal to ask: 'Do they have something in common?' However, if we attribute wisdom to Socrates for asking 'Is Socrates wise?', the reaction can only be either 'Yes, he is!' or 'No, he isn't!'. The question 'Do Socrates and wisdom have something in common?' would not fit the context. Whilst 'animal' is a hypernym (category) for 'cat', 'dog' and so on, there is no obvious hypernym (category) to cover 'wise' and 'stupid'.

The 'Wolf' in example 71 is a metaphor in only one case, i.e. if the utterance is assumed to be made in a type-II-situation like that illustrated in diagram 8 on page 50 (see Lakoff 1972: 200). What kind of situation, exactly, might that be? Who constitutes 'man' in this damning example? Let's try reversing the question; when does a situation like that illustrated in diagram 8 belong to the reference potential of the utterance in № 71? This would be the case if we make the statement in response to witnessing how Man X is hurting Man Y for base motives (envy, greed, spite, etc.). If we make our statement as discreetly as possible because we are afraid of Man X, our interlocutor will still understand that by 'man' we are actually referring to person X. In this utterance situation 'wolf' is a classical metaphor. We have an 'external' context marker for wolf and the context is the situation that the utterance is referring to. But Black is not interested in such cases! He is more concerned with utterances *per se*. For this he would be better served, for instance, by examples № 7 and № 10 (pages 39–40) which carry their context marker 'internally', that is to say, in the utterance itself. Black mistakenly believes that his examples do not contain any rhetorical (i.e. clearly textual) metaphors for

one reason: the general focus-frame-relations he describes are not a distinctive criterion for the identification of metaphor. (We pointed out in chapter 3.3 that, as in Black's case, the model of non-literal or transferred meaning maintains arbitrariness, a universal feature of concepts, as a special feature of metaphor. Is there a relationship, we wonder, between Black and the traditional model of metaphor?)

We presume Black developed his interaction theory from Roman Jakobson, since Jakobson also uses the concepts 'metaphor' and 'metonymy' as heuristic metaphors (cf. chapter 1.1). If one does not contextualise example 71 in an utterance situation (which transforms the utterance into a classical metaphor), the example can be regarded as including the 'process of semantic similarity' (cf. Jakobson & Halle 2002: 72–76, 90–96), an idea Jakobson explains in the following analysis:

In a well-known psychological test, children are confronted with some noun and told to utter the first verbal response that comes into their heads. (...) To the stimulus *hut* one response was *burnt out*; another, *is a poor little house*. Both reactions are predicative; but the first creates a purely narrative context, while in the second there is a double connection with the subject *hut*: on the one hand, a positional (namely, syntactic) contiguity, and on the other a semantic similarity. (op.cit.: 90–91)

Jakobson calls the first narrative process 'metonymical' but deems the workings of contiguity and process of similarity 'metaphorical'. The similarities Jakobson has in mind can be seen if you visualise the subject of the sentence and form its ideal reference. Then the complement 'automatically' obtains a parallel form to the subject, or both parts of the sentence can be compared to each other in view of the parallels you have imagined. This would be the case if the children in Jakobson's example had responded to his stimulus with '... is a pigsty'. This would create a logical equation like that in № 71. Jakobson, Black and others were not wrong in focusing on equation and predication but they were mistaken to believe their work provided insights into metaphor, and they were wrong to exclude philosophy from their analysis of predication.

Jakobson distinguishes between predication / equation in two types of processing, one being 'narrative' and the other 'contiguity / similarity'. Why Black focuses solely on the latter is a mystery. Like Black, Coenen (2002) and others also base their theoretical reflections on metaphor on semantic affinity. It is not surprising, then, that they make an analogy out of logical equations ('metaphors') like that in example 71. Interestingly, Coenen's explanations are most plausible when the metaphors in his examples are elaborated, as is the case with poetry (cf. Coenen 2002: 131 ff.). This seems to suggest that some scholars describe an allegorical or parable-like text (passage) by 'analogy', that is, if the allegorising is founded on a logical equation in the text.

The idea that metaphor is an analogy dates back to Aristotle (cf. Aristoteles 1996: 66–69). However, he was more accurate in his understanding and regarded analogy as one sub-category of what he called *μεταφορά*. The other sub-category for him was metonymy (loc.cit.). Aristotle must have meant *μεταφορά* to be a generic concept for both analogy and metonymy. The parallels between Aristotle and Jakobson are obvious although Jakobson conceptualises analogy (equation) as 'metaphor' and uses 'predication' as the generic term. Who knows? Maybe Aristotle had predication and equation in mind. Either way, both, Jakobson

and Aristotle are somehow misunderstood and their theories have been being reduced to only a particular instance.

Current research needn't necessarily concern itself with antiquity and may consider 'metaphor' a separate form of insight. But then one has to acknowledge, in agreement with Beardsley (2002: 160), 'It seems to me unfortunate that, in his effort to draw a broad contrast between two methods of knowledge, Black 'has stretched the term "metaphor" to the point where all verbs (...), the word "being" (...), and even causality (...) are "metaphorical"'. Where, exactly, does the assertion 'Man is a wolf' and other similar examples discussed by Black (1993: 24–25, 28 ff.) lead? It was originally intended to be understood philosophically. Any 'depth' of understanding is reached by an interpretative procedure towards an equation with 'wolf', a procedure which is not mentioned or uncovered by argumentation. This 'process of semantic similarity' becomes a meaningful metaphor only because Black's explanation implicitly starts not with the 'pure' semantic form but with a visualisation of 'wolf' that derives from what is arguably a long philosophical tradition. This tradition is present as our *mundus intelligibilis* (Lotman would say 'our semiosphere'), but Black calls this sphere ἐνδόξα, 'a filter', as well as a 'system of associated commonplaces' (cf. quotations above). This 'system' is no different from our symbolically mediated reality, that is, from the world we communicate symbolically, evaluate culturally and order socially. It is the world in which a whale is a fish (Black's example) and a lion is brave; it is decidedly not reality itself (what Popper [1993: 109–110, 160] called 'world I') but a reality made out of our cultural, philosophical and ideological traditions (Popper's 'world III', loc. cit.). These are our 'objective opinions' about things and have little to do with the things themselves but an awful lot to do with ourselves. The fact that we have such 'objective opinions' about the things linked to our ideas and beliefs leads to all manner of difficulties in translating metaphors. We shall analyse the philosophical aspect of metaphor more closely to illustrate this point.

Before doing so we shall underline that Black (1981: 38–47) declares statements which include a logical equation to be a type of metaphor ('metaphor' is a hypernym for predications and equations now). Black calls this type to be described best by his 'interaction view of metaphor' (op. cit.: 38) that we have got acquainted with above. Though Black is thinking of a special type of metaphor, the followers of Black, however, made of this type and of this view a theory for all metaphors. Nevertheless, Black accepts other types of metaphor apart from interaction, and he claims it to be best described by the traditional theories of substitution or shortened simile (op. cit.: 45 ff.). However, he has passed strictures on these theories at the beginning of his article. Strictly speaking, Black (1981: 27–28, *et passim*) is looking at the tolerated theories this way that both, the theory of substitution and the theory of shortened simile, only aim at examples of metaphors, which are of no interest because they are trivial and unproblematic. 'The point might be met,' Black (op. cit.: 45) writes, 'by classifying metaphors as instances of substitution, comparison, or interaction. Only the last kind are of importance in philosophy.' On the whole, we are surprised to see that Black, instead of discriminating types of metaphor only, earmarks an extra theory for every type he can find. In this context one cannot understand, too, why Black, after concluding that the metaphor should be defined by seven criteria, dismisses this outcome of research because he is afraid that,

If we were to insist that only examples satisfying all seven of the claims (...) should be allowed to count as 'genuine' metaphors, we should restrict the correct uses of the word 'metaphor' to a very small number of cases. (...) And such a deviation from current uses of the word 'metaphor' would leave us without a convenient label for the more trivial cases. (Black 1981: 45)

That is a nice intellectual manoeuvre into a defense of potential criticism, but methodically it is untenable.

Our two most important points of criticism of Black are his fixation about processes of similarity and the universal validity he confers on the focus-frame-relations. The first point determined all theory building in succession of Black and Richards, but not in a favourable way: metaphors — especially Black's 'interaction metaphors' — were re-interpreted as being definitions. In example 71 it seems to Black to be the case that 'wolf' defines 'man'. This view stands against all rationality: logically, 'Man is wolf' is of ' $A=B$ ' or ' $A \cap B$ '; the partial as well as the total equation implies that ' $B=A$ ' or ' $B \cap A$ ' is as well true. However, Black, too, should have noticed that 'Wolf is man' is not as 'reasonable' as 'Man is wolf'. If example 71 shall contain any meaningful definition (and it obviously does), an elementary predication regarding 'wolf' had to take place first. And it already did in the philosophical discourse, indeed; and Black, of course, knew what 'wolf' philosophically means at the best! He unspokenly treats example 71 in this way from the very first beginning. Therefore Chesterman (1997: 44) argues that such 'metaphorical definitions' should be treated like theories; 'metaphors have been of some expository use, but in some sense they also themselves represent theories, inasmuch as they are "views" of something. But Chesterman (loc. cit.) continues that 'metaphorical theories can be valuable conceptual tools; they may provide enlightenment, insight, understanding; yet they are not empirical theories (on Popper's criterion), because they cannot be falsified.' The consequence is that if 'wolf' in example 71 is a metaphor for man's nature, the metaphor gives us a quasi definition or quasi theory only. Because 'wolf' becomes a synonym of what we already know about 'man', but missed to utter or specify yet. Though, of course, in times of Hobbes his *homo homini lupus est* might have been a new theory about men.¹⁶ Nevertheless, if the supplement 'wolf' does neither add anything new to the subject 'man' nor say less than it, but if both 'theories' are true or false in just the same instances, then 'wolf' is not only a logical equation with 'man' but it is even a logical entailment of the latter one.

The second point we counted is the universal validity of the focus-frame-relations. Indeed, one can find the focus-frame-relations Black has investigated in metaphors (in interactive as well as in classical). Since metaphors are 'built' by concepts, what you can discover from concepts is valid for every metaphor as well. But what you have discovered does not give you any criterion for (classical) metaphors because metaphor is a case more specialised than concepts in general. In other words: the focus-frame-relations Black has investigated are sufficient conditions for classical metaphor, but they are not the necessary conditions one needs to define this linguistic device.

16 To be precise, about the relation of nations — the proverb is from Hobbes' *De Cive* published in 1642. Before Hobbes, however, there have been other authors (for instance, Plautus and Erasmus) who used the proverb, too, and they did it indeed in the sense of how Black understands the proverb.

Black renewed his theory in 1977 by taking up some criticism. His theory hence became clearer. Black introduced a new term, namely ‘projection’. According to Black (1993: 28) ‘projection’ means that a speaker works with particular features on the part of the focus (i.e. of ‘metaphor’), by which he organises corresponding and isomorphic features on the part of the frame (i.e. of the target of attribution): ‘A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, to be identified as the “primary” subject and the “secondary” one; the ‘secondary subject is to be regarded as a system rather than an individual thing’ (op. cit.: 27); and, at last, the ‘metaphorical utterance works by “projecting upon” the primary subject a set of “associated implications”, comprised in the implicative complex, that are predictable of the secondary subject’ (op. cit.: 28). Black focuses his renewed theory on the term ‘projective relations’ that means an analogy formation in the mind which a ‘metaphor’ (predication, equation) is the result of. Black (1993: 29–30) distinguishes, too, between various classes of cognitive analogies. So Black’s later version of his interaction theory amounts to a revised edition of the famous theory of analogy (cf. chapter 2.1). Black is better than the modern theory of analogy in this respect that he is not fixated on the metaphorical word only and that he works without the assumption of any word substitutions. Even better, Black can explain more precisely how the phenomena of predication or equation are generated (Black’s ‘projecting upon’), that is, how it happens that the subject is charged with the meaning that is expressed by the complement:

I have said that there is a similarity, analogy or, more generally, an identity of structure between the secondary implication-complex of a metaphor and the set of assertions — the primary implication-complex — that it maps. In ‘Poverty is a crime,’ ‘crime’ and ‘poverty’ are nodes of isomorphic networks, in which assertions about crime are correlated one-to-one with corresponding statements about poverty. (Black 1993: 30)

However, this is what Aristotle had principally meant by his approach to metaphor,¹⁷ though perhaps he did not tell it as elegantly.

Unfortunately, in his version of the matter Black takes again the visualisation of concepts to be the starting point: in the example given by him, the ‘primary implication-complex’ is all that one knows about crime; and the ‘secondary implication-context’ answers the question of how one has to imagine poverty if poverty is regarded to be isomorphic to crime.¹⁸ And so Black (loc. cit.) concludes: ‘Every implication-complex supported by a metaphor’s secondary subject, I now think, is a model of the ascriptions imputed to the primary subject: every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model.’ That’s right — if Achilles is a lion, then the model ‘the lion’ answers to the question, how we have to imagine Achilles. Here, ‘lion’ is, in terms of Chesterman, a theory of the speaker about Achilles. However: if Achilles is a lion in battle, then this answer has been given, too — but only if we have previously understood, what the phrase ‘a lion in battle’ means. That brings us back to the beginning of all questions concerning the understanding of classical metaphor.

But Black’s theory also opens up a real and important dimension. This dimension is rooted in the ‘associated commonplaces’ or ‘implication-complexes’, that Black wants to cap-

17 To be precise: ‘... by his approach to what he has conceptualised with “metaphor” ...’ — because Aristotle speaks about predication or equation (see above).

18 With regard to the quotation from Black given by us before, our paraphrase of Black (1981: 39–41) who, however, elaborates on another example.

ture with the term ‘model’ (his former ‘definitions’, Chesterman’s ‘metaphorical theories’). Unfortunately, we believe ‘model’ not to be suited best: it creates a theoretical horizon nowadays that does automatically connect to psycholinguistics. Too many contemporary scholars are only interested in speaking about mental representations.¹⁹ However, we are not (as probably Black, too, was not) interested in any ‘pure’ subjectivism, that is, in any *cognitive* dimension. What does Black’s ‘model’ mean in the context of metaphor theory? Once, scholars have factored the meaning of model as ‘thought, idea, category, broader sense’ into the term ‘concept’ itself — see, for instance, Germ. *einen Begriff von etwas haben, eine Vorstellung von einer Sache haben*; see also de Saussure (1994: 98): ‘Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique.’ But if one thinks of concepts as being semantic forms only (cf. chapter 3.2), then you need a new term to describe the concept conditions outlined so very eloquently by Black. A new term is important, too, because we will see in chapter 5.3 what conceptualism has made of Black’s approach.

Fortunately, Black’s idea of what ‘model’ refers to is not new. Peirce had such insight before Black,²⁰ and he called what was called ‘meaning’ or ‘concept’ once, ‘interpretant’ (cf. Nöth 1995: 42–44; 2002: 62–65). It is right and important to use Peirce’s terminology, not only because it is the elder, but also because Peirce differentiates where Black does not. According to Peirce (2002: §§ 4.536, 5.475–5.476, 8.314–8.315, and 8.343), the interpretant has three dimensions:

- *The immediate interpretant.* Before any interpretation, the sign has to be recognised as such (Peirce 2002: § 8.315); ‘Peirce defined the immediate interpretant as a semantic potentiality’ (Nöth 1995: 44). It seems to us as if this aspect of signs and meaning is deliberately unrecognised by most modern researchers. However, Eco’s three levels of understanding an optical image (cf. page 22f.) are following Peirce’s three dimensions, and therefore the first of Eco’s levels is adequate to Peirce’s immediate interpretant.
- *The dynamical interpretant.* It is the actual effect of the sign; it is that which is experienced in each act of interpretation and which is different in each from that of any other (Peirce 2002: § 4.536; Nöth: loc.cit.). We tend to equate Peirce’s dynamical interpretant with Black’s ‘model’. However, Peirce emphasises the situativity of this dimension. He has less interest in any linguistic, social or mental conditions of the ‘pragmatic role’ of the sign.
- *The final interpretant.* ‘It is that which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were

19 Instead of ‘model’ they often use terms like ‘concept’ or ‘category (of thought)’. The first one is confusing because of its homonymy with the linguistic concept; the latter one is problematic, too, because of the philosophical tradition he descends from but is not used to denote representations there. Other attempts to re-interpret ‘model’ have been made by, for instance, Bierwisch (1989: 72–73) and Lakoff and Johnson (cf. Radden 1994: 76). Bierwisch (loc.cit.) uses the term ‘conceptual structure’ (Germ. *konzeptuelle Struktur*); Lakoff (e.g., 1993: 208) think in ‘conceptual domains’ (but Lakoff and Johnson [1994: 9] avoid ‘domains’ and write instead of these ‘a coherent system of metaphorical concepts’; therefore, this phrase seems to be an implicit definition of ‘domain’). These scholars, however, describe mental representations. Such subjective representations do not provide any viewpoint from which one could explain the classical, objective metaphor.

20 Black could have known Peirce’s findings, because Peirce already undertook his terminology until 1932 when the first two volumes of his *Collected Papers* have been published. However, in an article of 1906 which Richards (2013: 280) quotes Peirce still understood his three terms slightly different.

reached' (Peirce 2002: § 8.184); or, it is the one interpretative result to which every interpreter is destined to come if the sign is sufficiently considered (Nöth: loc. cit.). The final interpretant hence is an ideal reached by logic, reflexion and consensus. Peirce's final interpretant can be equated with the semantic form being 'objectively' immanent to a certain language system.

All in all, in the context of metaphor theory we want to talk about the dynamical interpretant (or, in short, 'd-interpretant') to refer to that what Black has meant by 'model'. So, if 'concept' is a superordinate and 's-form' is one of its parts as we set down equal to the view of the two-level-semantics, we can now name the d-interpretant to be the other part of the concept (i.e. the part that comprises 'commonplaces', a 'definition', or a 'theory'). In addition we can see it this way that a visualisation makes 'our' d-interpretant visible with respect to a definite context (similar Hülzer 1987: 12). To visualise is a way to make a d-interpretant concrete; you bring up the d-interpretant only in this way.

We come back to Black's idea he had of predication or equation while he was reflecting on his interaction metaphor. It is Black's idea that by 'metaphor' we slip a d-interpretant of an object or fact over a target of attribution. In other words: every attribution does not ensue neither from the utterance meaning of a metaphor, nor from a semantic form metaphorised, but from the dynamical interpretant the word metaphorised is carrying on. This idea is basically correct. Let us, for instance, once more assume, that Achilles is a lion in battle. The utterance meaning of this assumption sets the focus on Achilles and his behaviour, i.e. the attribution to Achilles is fulfilled. The sentence meaning regarding to the metaphor 'a lion in battle' is of a lion and a battle,²¹ but the metaphor is based on your cultural thinking about such animals like lions. It is about the dynamical interpretant. You visualise even this interpretant and, at least, the d-interpretant gives you the reason why you do know that lions are beasts but brave. So the d-interpretant of 'lion' is the answer to metaphor's question why we do not think of Achilles as that Achilles moves on all fours and has got a mane, but of Achilles as courageous and dominant (cf. chapters 2.2 and 4.1).

In consequence, literary or cultural studies which deal critically with images and metaphors are only useful, if their scholars reflect (as do Guldin in 2000 or Drössiger in 2007), firstly, which dynamical interpretant is represented by the concepts metaphorised by a writer and, secondly, with which target of attribution these 'metaphorical theories' (Chesterman) are connected. Indeed, the decisive moments are political questions: What is the writer trying to imply? What kind of reality the writer wants to tell us by the help of images and metaphors he uses in his text or speech? How reasonable are his d-interpretants expressed by metaphor, in regard to the target of attribution? Which gaps the writer's d-interpretants may have, or, are they even more shaping things and facts? How far is the writer's iconicity bound to? For such a critical approach to iconicity and d-interpretants, respectively, Beckmann (2001: 184–186) introduces the term 'perspectivation' (Germ. *Perspektivierung*) — following discourse analysis where the term means the assignment of a particular vantage point to a nar-

21 As far as the semantic forms of the expression have some meaning, 'a lion in battle' means something special (cf. chapters 3.2 and 5.2).

rative through the use of language. Beckmann (op. cit.) successfully applied 'perspectivation' in her criticism of certain metaphors.

We shall illustrate the perspectivation in a famous example, namely

(72) Time is money.

We have to assume in sense of the interaction theory that the communicative basis of example 72 is a situation in which we do know what money is because we have the d-interpretant of money in mind, but we do not know clearly what time is, respectively what the speaker has meant by uttering 'time'. We have to assume this because of the unidirectionality (i.e. to be a definition) that Black's theory of metaphor implies (cf. chapter 2.1). Therefore, in Black's 'mental' view, our d-interpretant of the concept of time has to be considered to be empty or uncertain; it would not fit Black's theory to assume that sentence № 72 could have been uttered for any other illocutionary spurpose. Here, we explain (or let explain us) the time by the d-interpretant of money because the logical-syntactical relationship of concepts (i.e. the equation) can make us do an analogy on the level of interpretants. This analogy with 'money' makes us realise the vantage point the speaker of № 72 occupies in relation to 'time': he is an inveterate mercantilist head; he wants us to use time economically; if he would make a movie out of his interaction metaphor, it would be *In Time* (premiered in 2011, directed by Andrew Niccol).

But do we have the d-interpretant 'money' on hand? How do we get insight of what money is in the context of example 72? Is money a scourge or a blessing in the speaker's estimation? As we have already stated, we get our insight of what 'money' conceptualises by referring ideally on money; this ideal reference is part of the dynamical interpretant of 'money' (otherwise communication would be difficult). However, there is a hermeneutical problem for the recipient. He does not 'see' the speaker's ideal referent — he knows only 'his own' d-interpretant (his own view of the concept in question) but there is no dead certainty that this d-interpretant fits the speaker's one. That there is a semantic identity up to a certain degree, this is ensured by cultural and linguistic conventions (by the usage of language as well as by the s-form) which speaker and recipient have to share and, thus, to habitualise. We elaborated in previous chapters that especially imagery has come to us by socialisation. That is why we have to discuss so many 'meanings', 'misunderstandings', 'views' constantly. By the way, this part of semantics is a perpetual process, moreover. However, if in a particular communication situation the ideal reference is not elaborated by the speaker using his visualisation,²² the attribution which the speaker intends is not noticeable. Poor thing, you can speak in such a case, assuming (as Black does) that the speaker has offered a 'model' of time for the listener. This 'predication' is indeed based on experience, as Black and the later conceptualists stated

22 For instance, in saying 'Time is money. This is to say, I imagine that ...' Another instance to learn about d-interpretants is literature. One can see a function of literature just in this. If the narrator depicts the 'consciousness' of his characters, he will *inter alia* illuminate to the reader what normally is 'invisible' in communication processes and insofar uncertain to know about — complete with the visualisations of concepts. Maybe this is one reason why 'psychological' fiction has a great fan community. Anyway, literature is a good possibility to get acquainted with the 'inner world' and 'experiences' of other people one need to know for understanding. (The rub is: literature is fiction.)

Table 6: Further terminological approaches

the superordinate: concept	
‘strongly linguistic’, stable semantics: semantic form (system-related)	‘extralinguistic’, variable semantics: dynamical interpretant (for creating a particular perspectivation) i) as individual action: ideal reference ii) as social action: ‘bounding’ (see chapter 5.2)

correctly. Let us leave aside that already Herder had described this effort as well as Richards (2013) did it — the point is that experiences are needed two times separately when predicating: on the side of the speaker and on the side of the recipient. And both experiences do not come together through any ‘transport of contents’ as what Black’s ‘interaction’ and ‘projection’ might turn out to be.

Every perspectivation or d-interpretant is hence determined individually as well as socially (cf. table 6). In literature the double-faced nature of perspectivation is evident: the writer himself may have developed the literary images that he needs to give his text a perspective, or he can develop such imagery bit by bit in his literary text; or the literary images a writer uses can stand in a long iconographic tradition; ultimately, the writer’s use of images may be a mixture of both, of individual performance and of iconographic tradition. Here, it is the duty of the literary scholar to fracture the prevailing conditions and to draw appropriate conclusions. But just in our visualisation of any interpretant this mixture of the individual and the social occurs because, as explained in previous chapters as well, iconicity is just a special case of our ability to give ourselves a picture of something. On the one hand, we visualise for our being and feeling (Schumacher 1997: 115–155, esp. 151 ff.), on the other hand, we can read the typical world visions of our social group or culture in these ‘imaginings’. Just: what is what in the world of ideal references and d-interpretants, and how can you distinguish it?

Black and these scholars who are following in his footsteps owe us an answer. They have no interest in political criticism of images; their interest ends at the psychological processes. They pretend that each concept (‘model’) has a fixed, invariant, non-individual, known to all people and all people equally meaningful dimension or gestalt. They pretend that all the equations of the type you can find in example 71 and 72 are uttered in a culturally or epistemologically homogeneous social ‘space’. Black and his successors work a-historically and culturally undifferentiated, although we all know that at any two places of our world neither ‘time’ nor ‘money’ does not produce the same dynamical interpretants or visualisations — not to mention any historical differences that you must consider looking back through time. At last, Black & Co. forgot the aspect of communication: they do not consider the fact that expressions, as in examples 71 and 72, are often used like formulas to infringe the maxims of conversation. Here, such expressions like in Nos 71 and 72 are leading to a ‘new’ utterance meaning without saying that you could (or without that it would be relevant to the specific situation, to say this), a ‘projection’ has taken place. For our illocutionary forces the expressions in their entirety are turned into something else, whichever way its individual parts

could always be correlated. For such cases pragmatics has many examples at hand (cf. Meibauer 2001: 27–28, *et passim*).

Criticism of Weinrich. His 'Bildfeld'.


From the Symbolic to the Indexical Type of Signs

We have now identified that in understanding a metaphor the dynamical interpretant (cf. pages 104 f.) plays a decisive role. This d-interpretant has an individual face and a social one; both faces appear in a visualisation of the metaphor (cf. table 6 on page 107). The visualisation is needed to speak about the dynamical interpretant. However, if with regard to a particular utterance the ideal reference is only a matter of question because both faces of the dynamical interpretant, the individual and the social, are reflected in the speech of a person. What is important for linguistics is the socially determined part of the visualisation. This part includes the objective features of d-interpretants which belong to Popper's 'World 3' and which individuals adopt through social (linguistic, communicative) conventions, that is, by habitualising social roles. The individual part of a visualisation (the ideal reference, our imagination) is artistic language performance. The social part, that is, a speaker's 'socially bounding', however, can be very artistic, too. And aside from aesthetic issues, every visionary product may be subject to criticism, when it is expressed and thus it is on the way to becoming socially relevant.

We want to call the hyperindividual and objective, that is, the socially shared or 'bounded' features of dynamical interpretants and its visualisations 'anchorage' (cf. diagram 12). By these features, a speaker 'anchors' in a reservoir of images at both the intellectual and the linguistic level; his anchoring may be a fiction but it expresses a particular relationship. In other words, your visualisations find safe anchorage with the imagery of your social group. One can also look at it the other way around: the social reservoir of images lays the foundations for individual visualisation and for knowledge of d-interpretants, respectively. However, our idea of a reservoir of images (cf. chapter 4.1) remains a theoretical construct, as in reality it is, of course, only of knowledge that is shared by individuals, and to which they have come by socialisation. It's not different from the vocabulary of a language that depends on the knowledge of the speaker. This also means that every culture seeks to transfer this knowledge from generation to generation, or from member to member. Additionally, there is a suspense-creating factor between the individual and its group; so there is identification through a shared imagery (a mutual reservoir of images). Sociologically orientated research about this reservoir of images, about similar constructs, or about social phenomena associated with such a reservoir, have repeatedly discussed processes, relationships, and transfer. We would like to cite three examples of such work stemming from different scientific areas: one of symbolic interactionism (Alltagswissen 1973), one of life history (Gries, Ilgen and Schindelbeck 1989) and one of collective symbolism (Fleischer 1996).

The questions we want to pursue further are first, what is the epistemological significance that anchorages have, and second, how anchorages and a single metaphor are logically related

Diagram 12: Relations of theoretical categories and terms used by us



to each other. We limit ourselves, in our presentation, to contributions that are relevant to metaphor theory; we do not consider the approaches of system theory, semiotics and discourse theory, although each offer promising solutions. Moreover, literary criticism and metaphor theory have developed their own answer to the problem of iconicity and its social anchorage. The answer lies in the assumption of an objective mental space with regard to iconicity (see, for instance, Searle 1994: 95–98, or Kurz 1988: 19). Probably one of the first to do so¹ was Harald Weinrich (b. 1927) who in 1958 claimed that the West is a 'community which shares a field of images' (Germ. *Bildfeldgemeinschaft*).

Weinrich (1976: 277) holds — and we agree with him — that there is 'beyond good or bad metaphors of an author or of the man on the street, another hyperindividual world of images

1 Philosophers may have thought about images, image fields, iconicity and their anchorage before Weinrich, however, we are not going to write a history on this question. Therefore, Weinrich's thinking may be a good example here, for subsequent writers have often referred to his ideas. Liebert (1992), for instance, gave detailed descriptions of such subsequent relations.

as an objective and material metaphor possession of a community:² ‘The individual is always in a metaphorical tradition, partly mediated by his/her own mother tongue, partly by literature. He/she recalls this tradition as linguistic-literary world view’ (Weinrich 1976: 278).³ However, Weinrich (op. cit.: 283) also claimed:

As far as a single word has not an isolated existence in language, a single metaphor is connected to its image field, too. The single metaphor is a spot in the image field. (...) In fact, a linking of two linguistic spheres of sense takes place in an actual and apparent selective metaphor.⁴

This is a point that is open to debate. Although it seems the ‘Bildfeld’ is defined clearly in Weinrich’s work, the question remains unanswered yet: What kind of ontological quality does the image field have? Is it made of meaning, signs or artefacts? Or, by what kind of relationship is the single metaphor connected to its image field? Is it a static, dynamic, formal, semantic, objective, subjective, hierarchical, one-on-one, simile or equivalence relationship? (The enumeration of relationships could be prolonged.) Coenen (2002: 183) gets to the heart of this criticism by noticing:

The application of Weinrich’s ‘image field’-concept seems to assume a fixed (...) distribution of both, of the world of things and of world of meaning, into spheres of sense. This assumption is problematic. Are ‘finanical system’ and ‘language’⁵ spheres of sense whose boundaries and internal structure arise necessarily from the semantic system of language? A researcher dealing with images is tempted to define his spheres of sense without regard to other foundations so that image fields are created which are maximum rich in content.⁶

Before we turn back to Weinrich’s ‘image field’, we need to take a short look at his theory of metaphor. As the quote above shows, Weinrich has developed his own meaning of metaphor. What does the ‘linking of two linguistic spheres of sense’ (Germ. *die Koppelung zweier sprachlicher Sinnbezirke*) mean with regard to Weinrich? It is essential to notice that Weinrich’s ‘linking’ is more or less what Black means by ‘interacting’ (cf. chapter 5.1). However, there is a decisive difference between the theoretical models of both Weinrich and Black. Weinrich looks at German language’s genitive metaphors which bear their context marker. As explained in chapter 2.2, in the context of metaphor theory, German genitive metaphors are

2 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘dass es jenseits der guten oder schlechten Metaphern eines Autors oder des Mannes auf der Straße noch eine überindividuelle Bildwelt als objektiven, materialen Metaphernbesitz einer Gemeinschaft gibt.’

3 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘Der Einzelne steht immer schon in einer metaphorischen Tradition, die ihm teils durch die Muttersprache, teils durch die Literatur vermittelt wird und ihm als sprachlich-literarisches Weltbild gegenwärtig ist.’

4 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘Im Maße, wie das Einzelwort in der Sprache keine isolierte Existenz hat, gehört auch die Einzelmetapher in den Zusammenhang ihres Bildfeldes. Sie ist eine Stelle im Bildfeld. (...) In der aktuellen und scheinbar punktuellen Metapher vollzieht sich in Wirklichkeit die Koppelung zweier sprachlicher Sinnbezirke.’

5 Coenen regards to examples given by Weinrich; see our following pages.

6 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘Die Anwendung des Weinrichschen Bildfeldbegriffs scheint eine feststehende (...) Aufteilung der Sach- und Bedeutungswelt in Sinnbezirke vorauszusetzen. Diese Voraussetzung ist problematisch. Sind etwa “Finanzwesen” und “Sprache”^a Sinnbezirke, deren Abgrenzung und innerer Aufbau sich aus dem semantischen System der Sprache zwingend ergeben? Für den Bildforscher liegt die Versuchung nahe, seine Sinnbezirke ohne Rücksicht auf anderweitige Fundierung so zu definieren, daß möglichst gehaltreiche Bildfelder entstehen.’ — *My note a:* Coenen makes a reference here, see previous note 5.

comparable to compounds in English. Although genitive or compound metaphors naturally are metaphors, Weinrich's self-restriction towards them significantly limits the validity of his theory. Additionally, he drives his self-restriction to the extreme by only considering compounds of two nouns — for instance, compounds such as 'information highway' (cf. example 39 on page 70). Why cannot the spheres of sense that Weinrich studied occur in compounds that use other types of modifiers? For example,

(73) *Germ.* Schwarzes Meer and Rote Beete — *transl.:* Black Sea and 'red' beetroot.


By using the phrase 'linking of two linguistic spheres of sense', Weinrich also alluded to the theory of the transferred meaning (cf. chapter 3.3). In contrast to this theory, Weinrich was convinced that the utterance meaning cannot be detected in one part of the compound and its metaphorical meaning only. Therefore, 'information highway' cannot be understood by concentrating a one-sided interest on the metaphor 'highway'. Weinrich (1976: 284) said, 'it would be an improper and deceptive abstraction, to isolate the field giving an image, from the field receiving an image.' In his criticism, Black developed a similar argument (cf. chapter 5.1). By using the term 'field giving an image', Weinrich took up Black's argument. Weinrich, alongside Black, thought of a classical metaphor and its semantic implications as being about the 'model' that moves from metaphor to another object, which in his terminology is known as 'the field receiving an image'.⁸ Unlike Black, Weinrich does not see any syntactic equation ('A is B') at work here. For Weinrich, the two 'fields' or 'spheres' get together in the same word, i.e. just in the compound. The metaphor is a metaphor for that very reason. The problem is: the metaphor B in a statement of the type 'A is B' can be equation or definition, of course (cf. chapter 5.1), because 'B' is given in supplementing 'A'. (Here, 'supplementing' means a syntactical device only.) This means that 'A' as well as 'B' are separately referring; in a statement of the type 'A is B' are both referring to two discrete objects. In contradiction, the compound AB refers to one 'new' object or fact — new in the sense that neither 'A' nor 'B' as such could refer to the object or fact AB equally. The compound AB eliminates the reference of its parts A and B. We have already pointed out in chapter 2.3 that compounds are emergent from their parts (*Germ.* *übersummativ*). Moreover, there is often only a compound type of metaphor for certain reference potential, and a single 'A' or 'B' does not exist at all (cf. chapter 4.1). Therefore, we must conclude: it would be misleading to argue implicitly (as Weinrich does) that 'A' and 'B' of the compound AB can be treated as well as the instances of the type 'A is B' which Black is using. If interacting (Black) or linking (Weinrich) was a feature that could be applied to compounds also, then German genitive metaphors as well as English compound metaphors should explain themselves through their components. They do not.

According to Weinrich, every semantic content that depends on the d-interpretants of 'A' and 'B', comes together in the compound metaphor AB and is understood; the reason is the syntactical structure. It seems as if Black's view that the parts of every sentence 'A is B' are in-

7 Our translation; orig. in German: 'Es wäre eine unzulässige und trügerische Abstraktion, das bildspendende Feld vom bildempfangenden Feld zu isolieren.'

8 The question should be allowed what exactly is moving? Just the dynamical interpretant (the 'model')? This seems to be impossible, however.

Diagram 13: Pattern of Weinrich's model of metaphor



interacting semantically is preceded by Weinrich who just focuses his attention on compounds (syntactical micro-units, so to say). If you put it this way, Black’s interaction theory is even better with regard to our criticism of Weinrich in the previous paragraph: only ‘Black’s’ pattern ‘A is B’ can be explained out of its components. However, semantic relationships on the level of syntax are an everyday experience as well as they have been described by researchers for a long time. It must be remembered that syntactically linking of spheres of sense (which is to say, linking of words) is nothing special, nothing metaphor-specific (however, Black and the interaction theory do claim this) — finally, it is the meaning of ‘syntax’ that concepts are getting linked.

Therefore, the question is not whether semantic relationships exist in statements, but of what kind they are. Weinrich thinks the ‘two spheres of sense’ connected in the compound metaphor, as having a relationship of equal status. Let us compare two German compounds: How do we know that the word

(74) Butterfässchen — *transl.*: butter churn (*diminutive*)

means a small keg that contains butter, and that this word does not name a keg made of butter? ‘Made of butter’, as there is a German compound that is structurally identical:

(75) Schokoladenfässchen — *transl.*: chocolate churn (*diminutive — in Germany a popular confection, which is sold at Christmas and Easter*),

and here is the keg that is made of chocolate. Yet, the contents of the keg are not revealed. Al-

though compounds in general and compound metaphors in particular represent different semantic relations despite being structurally identical, Weinrich did not reflect upon this.

However, Weinrich (1976: 288) concludes 'that the image field is present not only as an objective, social entity of language, but also that the image field is realised subjectively in every metaphorical speech act by being meant by the speaker at every time and by being understood by the listener as well.'⁹ For this purpose, according to Weinrich's notion, the linguistic 'spheres of sense' are the ones that we have already put together culturally, before we speak metaphorically about them (or, more correctly, with their help). Weinrich (op. cit.: 288) says

Only the coinage of a new image field is really creative. And this coinage happens very rarely. Mostly, we just fill out free metaphor spots which are set in advance by an image field already existing — at least, they are set potentially. So we take and give at the same time.¹⁰

This means that there are 'fields' of thought or language that are determined by social or cultural background. Herein, the *Bildfeld* is a stable connection of some dynamical interpretants interacting ('the field giving an image'). This 'field' is used to capture a typical range of the world linguistically ('the field receiving an image'). In this way, Weinrich's view explains some phenomena that occur within the anchorage of the metaphor. In this we want to go further; a criticism of Weinrich's theory of metaphor itself would be tantamount to what has already been said about Black. The greatest difficulty is that Weinrich and Black do not differentiate between sign (metaphor), reference object and interpretant (concept, meaning). However, Weinrich as well as Black, could have done this triadic differentiation, because Ogden and Richards (2013: 8–13) in 1923 as well as Peirce before them have already done so.¹¹ The work of Ogden and Richards is quite famous.

Weinrich's notion of a 'spot within a *Bildfeld*' can explain why many metaphors are similar according to what we have called the idea of the metaphor beforehand (cf. chapter 2.3), and why, for certain targets of attribution, metaphors are formed in endless variation — metaphors whose d-interpretants are similar in the respect that they hold the same perspective on the target. Thus the point is very simple: if a speaker, on the one hand, would like to express his/her opinion by using a metaphor and if he/she, on the other hand, would not like to reveal oneself to be conventional (not to say boring), he/she can use the utterance potential (cf. page 53) to create a new version of an appropriate but conventionalised metaphor while he/she maintains idea and perspective. As Weinrich (1976: 277–290) elaborates, language and speech, for instance, are repeatedly depicted through metaphors from the financial world. In

9 Our translation; orig. in German: 'daß das Bildfeld nicht nur als objektives, soziales Gebilde im Gesamt der Sprache vorhanden ist, sondern daß es auch im einzelnen metaphorischen Sprechakt subjektiv vergegenwärtigt wird, indem es vom Sprechenden mitgemeint, vom Hörenden mitverstanden wird.'

10 Our translation; orig. in German: 'Wirklich schöpferisch ist nur die Stiftung eines neuen Bildfeldes. Und das geschieht sehr selten. Zumeist füllen wir nur die freien Metaphernstellen aus, die mit dem bestehenden Bildfeld bereits potentiell gegeben sind. So nehmen und geben wir zugleich.'

11 Ogden and Richards (2013: 279–290) already discuss Peirce's theory of signs critically. By the way, Peirce (2002: §§ 2.274–2.308) speaks of 'representamen' (material sign), 'object' (reference object reflected by thinking) and 'interpretant' (meaning as action) — a differentiation of terms which on superficial examination, however, can be somewhat misleading.

Weinrich's opinion, we are dealing with the Bildfeld 'word coin' (Germ. *Wortmünze*). Weinrich gives a list of several examples, cross-picked from European literature; amongst them

- (76) einen Begriff **prägen**, Wortschatz, **Lehnwort**, **goldene** Worte, and Wort**krämer** — *transl.*: to coin an expression, treasury of words (i.e. vocabulary), loanword, golden words, and word dealer (*pejorativ*).

We can easily see even more parallel metaphors:

- (77) Reden ist **Silber**, Schweigen ist **Gold**; eine Beleidigung mit gleicher **Münze** zurückzahlen (Coenen 2002: 182); das **kostete** ihn viele Worte; or das war **wertloses** Geschwafel. — *transl.*: Speech is silver, silence is golden; it is an insult to pay back in kind; it costs him many words; or it was worthless drivel.

Weinrich also refers to the problem of jointly anchoring these images — and the objective Bildfeld that a speaker who would like to utter a metaphor can access is Weinrich's solution. Above, we enumerated the primary reasons for the existence of a reservoir of images. However, these reasons were about an 'extended' vocabulary only, that is, about a 'stock' of concepts (words) metaphorised which is shared by the group and the individual. And Weinrich? Weinrich sees 'his' Bildfeld not only as restricted as a phenomenon of individual and social memory but for him the image field is objectively present in language as well (cf. diagram 13). This way, examples, such as Searle (1994: 95–98) discusses in vain, become more understandable: if

- (78) Sally is a **block of ice**

should be a metaphorical expression for

- (79) Sally is feeling **cold**,

then nothing is clearer, because the explanation also contains a metaphor. The problem is apparently that in many cultures temperatures generally represent a code for the quality of inner emotions. This possibility allows us to contextualise (to understand) examples 78 and 79 in a specific, figurative way. Following Weinrich, example 78 is just one (more) 'metaphor spot' of an 'image field' which one can deduce from many metaphors similar to № 79.

However, beyond memory an image field describes a logical union. It's about what fits with the idea of a particular metaphor. One can determine on the basis of examples such as 76 to 79, that the idea of the metaphor is always the same, only the linguistic realisation of this idea is different (cf. chapter 3.2). The expressions of №s 78 and 79 are only parts of the utterance potential of that one 'idea' describing Sally's condition metaphorically. As we have pointed out, the idea of metaphor is the perspective that is generated, including the fact that a certain perspective is possible at all. However, with regard to examples 76 to 79 the claim of a 'stable' set generated by one and the same idea applies especially to interpretations of the financial system (Weinrich's 'field giving an image'), and 'stability' applies not to the reference objects (Weinrich's 'field receiving an image') as well. It is something to pay back in kind, as long as this is only a human act.¹² Here, the anchorage means that speakers take (and insofar share) the same perspective; if all metaphor variants, then, are part of the utterance potential of the same perspective, a specific 'metaphor variation' is fulfilled. With respect to Weinrich's

Bildfeld, it's about the 'subjective' speech acts we are talking. If there is anything 'objective' in the image field, it is, then, that we can perform the same act of attribution by uttering different expressions. This is a commonplace.

Moreover, Coenen (2002: 182) explains:

As a rule, a metaphor is — from a paradigmatic point of view — part of a larger set of metaphors, every element of which uses an expression of the same domain of sense for describing an object of the same domain of matters. For instance, the metaphor 'coin' describing a word is in the same set as the metaphor 'thesaurus' describing a dictionary and as the metaphor 'to mint' describing the creation of a word or a new way of using a word. All three examples attach the same linguistic domain of matters to a domain of sense containing the financial system.¹³

Here Weinrich's theory comprises a very classic method, in fact: to analyse iconicity, scholars pay attention to the spheres of sense which the 'image donor' (Germ. *Bildspender*) and the 'image receptor' (Germ. *Bildempfänger*; both are Weinrich's terms) come from. To what knowledge does this method lead? Already Coenen (2002: 184) has criticised:

Belonging to Weinrich's image field does not interpret a metaphor. Who categorizes a 'coin' under the sphere of sense 'financial structure' and a 'word' under the sphere of sense 'language' understands not necessarily the descriptive content, which the metaphor 'coin' assigns the word described by it.¹⁴

The question also arises as to the criteria by which a metaphor performs a spot in an image field and how we know the field to which such a spot belongs? For instance, with which field shall one associate the metaphor

(80) Wasch**straße** — *transl.*: car wash (*literally*: wash street)?

There is no second metaphor-compound similar to this spot in German language. Is it reasonable to speak of a 'field' when there is just one spot? Weinrich (1976: 286) claims that not every metaphor is a part of an image field, but that there are also isolated metaphors. He also claims that an isolated metaphor is always possible. But these statements contradict his other ideas, of course, perfectly.

Weinrich says it this way that the metaphor AB is the image field Y (for abbreviations see diagram 13): that the image field does not result from a single word metaphorised (for instance, 'B') but from both parts of the compound AB. However, this leads to greater problems.

12 On the other hand, it is true (or should I say: frightening?), what Weinrich claims that by culture (tradition, habit) often even typical reference potentials are tenaciously connected with imagery (although, of course, they are not connected with metaphors of the same field).

13 Our translation; orig. in German: 'Im Regelfall gehört eine Metapher – aus paradigmatischer Sicht – in eine größere Metaphernmenge, deren jedes Element einen Ausdruck aus demselben Bedeutungsbereich zur Beschreibung eines Gegenstandes aus demselben Sachbereich verwendet. Die Metapher "Münze" etwa gehört, wenn sie ein Wort beschreibt, in dieselbe Menge wie die Metapher "Thesaurus", wenn sie ein Wörterbuch beschreibt, und wie die Metapher "prägen", wenn sie die Neuschöpfung oder neuartige Verwendung eines Wortes beschreibt. Alle drei Beispiele koppeln den Sachbereich der Sprache an den Bedeutungsbereich des Finanzwesens.'

14 Our translation; orig. in German: 'Die Zugehörigkeit zu einem Weinrichschen Bildfeld deutet die Metapher nicht. Wer die Münze in den Sinnbezirk des Finanzwesens und das Wort in den Sinnbezirk der Sprache einordnet, erfaßt nicht notwendig den Beschreibungsinhalt, den die Metapher "Münze" dem beschriebenen Wort zuordnet.'

If there is still no second spot in German that is similar to example 80, we can nevertheless find another compound including the same metaphor, for instance:

(81) Produktions**straße** — *transl.*: production line (*literally*: production street).

In both examples, in № 80 as well as in № 81, the part *-straße* is the metaphor, and the modifiers are context markers. Because of the common metaphorical part of the compounds we want to assign the examples to one image field. However, if Weinrich is correct that the image field does not result from the single *-straße* metaphorised, but from both parts of the compound, then example 80 is a spot in an image field Y but example 81 — in an image field Z. And there is no possibility to capture the interrelation that results between the word 'street' used metaphorically and semantically in both examples. *Nota bene*: why does Weinrich's image field always link only two spheres of sense? Could the number of spheres linked not be three? Please take a short look at the following example:

(82) **Zwölffingerdarm**, **Blitzlichtgewitter** — *transl.* (*only of sense*): duodenal, flashlights.

We want to do three more remarks on Weinrich's terminology. Firstly, by the term 'field' a line is drawn parallel to 'lexical field' (see, for instance, Kurz 1988: 24–25). The well-known lexical field is a set of synonymous concepts whose meanings limit each other semantically by covering together ('tessellated') a specific conceptual or functional area. This is a structuralist conception (and, as regards semantic fields, perhaps not wrong). As a consequence of the structuralist view, the meaning of each word in a lexical field depends on the meaning of the remaining words of the same lexical field (see, for instance, Schmidt 1973). When transferring the idea of the lexical field to metaphors, however, there is a catch. The expression 'a lion in battle' is significant insofar as it does not mean 'a bunny in battle.' Nevertheless, the expression creates neither an accurate statement nor any definite meaning in this way because the comparisons that can be made in lieu of 'lion' are infinite. Secondly, sometimes, scholars (for instance, Kurz 1988) have enlisted support for the idea of structured 'fields' to explain that a literary image can be broken down into several smaller files and then it can be distributed over a text. In this literary case, the dislocated, partial images appear logically as a reversion to the overall image of the text and they also get their meaning from their position in that overall image (cf. Kessler 1995: 102–137; and 1996). We think it is easy to notice that this aspect concerning relationships within literary texts has nothing to do with the aforementioned image fields which everybody has a part in.

Thirdly, as is evident from Weinrich's theory, the individual, a person's speech and their pragmatics fade in importance in favour of culture and language 'as such'. The world of (literary) images has become independent, and this research subject seems to be absolutised. Such a kind of independence is not uncommon in literary studies, too, especially when artistic imagery is analysed (for instance, by Pavlovič 2007, Becker-Nekvedavičius 1994, Shim-Lee 1987, Janelisīņa-Priedīte 1987, or Hooffacker 1988). However, when the question at stake is how the individual artistic iconicity refers to certain language patterns, then there are good reasons not to take the risk of absolutising what is to be researched about this iconography. Thus, for the analysis of complex literary texts and their intertextuality a close-reading pro-

cedure may be appropriate. But when it comes to metaphor theory, then one should understand that we are dealing with communicative competence, group behaviour, socialisation and speech.

Concluding this chapter, we would like to highlight a problem that is fundamental in metaphor theory. If we regard metaphors as being exponents of an objective iconographic tradition, of a particular group behaviour, or of any other kind of *weltanschauung*, the metaphor is becoming another type of sign. It is well known that a distinction is in iconic, indexical and symbolic signs, if one views the relation between a sign and its object (Peirce 2002: §§ 2.274–2.308; Nöth 1995: 44–45, and 2000: 65–66). If using a metaphor is a play on words, a rhetorical figure, a linguistic device, or a conversational implicature, then the concept metaphorised is a sign of the symbolic type. However, if metaphor is the exponent of an iconographic tradition, a key concept that is derived from an image field, or the symptom of a certain perspective to explain the world, then metaphor is a sign of the indexical type (cf. Urban 1971: 423–425). Symbolic signs are like ‘general laws’ (Peirce 2002: § 2.243), and semantic forms are of this kind. Their outstanding feature is the arbitrariness of the relationship between the sign’s content and the sign’s *gestalt*. Indexical signs are based on a relationship of causality (Peirce 2002: § 2.229); therefore, they represent what is signified. They often seem to be an attribute or a part of what they represent, at least, the relationship of causality they are based on can be conceptualised by such a metonymic or *pars pro toto*-relation. A famous example of an indexical sign occurs in Schiller’s *Wilhelm Tell* (premiered in 1804). In this play, the landvogt Geßler hangs his hat on a stick and orders that his hat must be greeted the same way as he usually must be greeted. And really, the peasants and other subordinates obey Geßler. This way, Geßler’s hat — an insignificant thing — was transformed into an indexical sign as it is accepted that Geßler’s hat now represents Geßler himself. Even Wilhelm Tell tastes the bitter fruits, ignoring this type of sign and its relationship of causality.

It is not clear how often concepts change from symbolic to indexical. Spells in modern fantasy novels are a good guide. The spell (the magic situation) transforms symbolic utterances into indexical ones: if ‘Mike is an ass’ is neither a statement of fact nor a metaphor, yet it is a magic spell like Geßler’s order, and everyone shall deem Mike’s identity to be a donkey, like Geßler’s hat was seen to be Geßler himself. By the way, who has been involved in the situations of ‘spelling’ on the hat or Mike, for him/her Geßler’s presence or the donkey are the pure reality. Therefore, if one believes that metaphor is an indexical sign, for them metaphor will be like a spell. As a consequence, one cannot utter the word of a metaphor just without their one fixed sense, and only this sense is genuine and true.¹⁵ Similarly, one cannot ‘talk a lot of hot air’ by metaphor either, nor play on words by means of their fuzzy reference potential. One cannot enrich language through new usage of concepts or use hackneyed figures either, or shape a speech act by maximum indirectness. Finally, one may not notice metaphor’s death and its decline in the world of ordinary terms. Therefore, if understood in such a way, like that of Hülzer (1987: 12) who believes that the term ‘image’ may describe the results of an inner process that helps to design a reality, and that metaphors are parts of external acts

15 This is what representation (*aliquid stat pro aliquo*) means, in fact.

of individuals that exist only as a correlation to specific internal acts — the external acts are based on the internal ones — then metaphor will be ‘symptomatic’, i.e. indexical like a spell, and thus evidence of your world view. In example 72, therefore, the mere mention of ‘time is money’ would reveal a mercantilist world view, and the equation would necessarily represent our mercantilist’s behaviour only because we have uttered it. Whether we in fact have a different political conviction or whether we see progress or perversion in the mercantilistic worldview is then irrelevant. The point is that neither convictions nor their truth would play a role. For example, because a performative verb is well known to be an indexical sign, then it does not matter if I did right by christening the ship Beelzebub — if I spoke the formula correctly, so the ship has been christened.

Over and above that, if we would accept that a statement such as ‘time is money’ is an indexical sign (symptom) of our behaviour, then it would be strange to argue (as Black does) that there are two concepts that somehow interact by analogy, and that the commonality of one concept occupies those of the other, and so on. Finally, if a compound metaphor like *Produktionsstraße* (example 81) is an index of an image field that is rooted in our century-old European tradition of imagery, then the question is how important the linking of the two linguistic spheres of sense in Weinrich’s theory about metaphor is?

Criticism of Conceptualism (Lakoff, Johnson)

In the current chapter we are dealing with the model of metaphor according to George Lakoff (b. 1941) and Mark Johnson (b. 1949), also known as conceptualism or cognitive metaphor theory. Lakoff and Johnson are not the only advocates of conceptualism. Others include Eve Sweetser, William Croft, Alan Cruse, Leonard Talmy, Vyvyan Evans, Melanie Green, Gilles Fauconnier, Mark Turner and Ronald Langacker — in the next and last chapter of our book we will investigate some contemporary exponents of conceptualism. Interestingly, conceptualism is relatively common in literary studies about matters touching metaphor, probably, as one expects, due to criticism of hidden ideologies in everyday speech. Thus, conceptualism has inspired research that has critically extended the model produced by conceptualism, in various directions, by Hülzer (1991: 37–48), Kövecses (2002) and Jäkel (2003), among others.

Conceptualism can open a way to critique language usage by focusing on stereotypes, ideologies or anthropological constants of seeing the world (for instance, in spatial analogies). For instance, Hänseler (2009) who develops her criticism from Black’s model of metaphor investigates the epistemic role of iconicity in Robert Koch’s bacteriology, which is rooted linguistically in contemporary scientific metaphorical expressions. Like Hänseler, we don’t need to go deep into Lakoff’s and Johnson’s views in this chapter since both scholars mainly follow Black’s footsteps — at least, from a perspective of research on metaphor. However, like Black, Lakoff claims a break with tradition: ‘In classical theories of language, metaphor was seen as a matter of language, not thought’ (Lakoff 1993: 202). And that’s something he wants to change.

Perhaps inspired by Jakobson's differentiation of predication in 'metonymic' based on contiguity (when the predicate discursively adds something to the subject), or 'metaphoric' based on similarity (when an equation is created between a subject and a complement), Lakoff divides conceptual thinking into 'metaphors' and 'hedges'. For Lakoff both terms are heuristic metaphors, just as the term 'metaphor' was to Jakobson (cf. chapter 1.1), Black and Weinrich (cf. chapter 5.2). This, in itself, is not a problem, but for Lakoff, too, language becomes an indexical sign that shows what takes place in the mind. Above all, even though Lakoff finds out two principles of language — 'metaphors' and 'hedges' — which he in fact uses as 'indexical' to processes in the mind he does not draw the conclusion (as Lotman does, cf. chapter 1.1) that there are two spheres of thought that correspond to these principles. With Lakoff and Johnson there are absolutely no such 'Lotmanian' spheres;¹ language seems to be a straight emanation or instrument of thought; thinking is really not polymorphic; and in speech, moreover, the emergence of meaning is such simple like carrying a brick out of a store.

Though Lakoff's concept of metaphor is very close to Black's or Weinrich's models, Lakoff's concept of hedges is a new idea which corresponds only slightly to the concept of metonymy (in its classical conception as well as in Jakobson's). In 1972 Lakoff came up with the idea of 'hedges' which he defines as all phrases that indicate the degree to which an object resembles a category. Lakoff (1972: 195–198) thinks of categories when they are applied to objects or facts, as prototypes. At that time, prototypes were a new approach in psychology against the background of a contemporary concern with semantic vagueness (Pinkal 1985: 47–48). With respect to Lakoff's hedges the prototype theory (see, for instance, Rosch 1978) becomes an issue when a speaker tries to make an elementary predication (cf. chapter 5.1). Then he/she often gives his/her opinion, too, on how the object or fact he/she is referring to fits to a mental prototype. For this, he/she uses typical phrases like 'basically', 'sort of', 'in essence', 'a veritable' or 'can be viewed as' (see Lakoff's word list; Lakoff 1972: 196). Hedges are therefore linguistic markers (in the form of adverbs, particles, phrases etc.) 'whose job is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy' (op. cit.: 195). For instance, 'sort of' is a hedge in the utterance

(83) A penguin is sort of a bird (Lakoff 1972: 196)

because the particle shows that the penguin is not really regarded as a bird, but only to a certain, comparable or transferred extent. With regard to Lakoff's relatively pragmalinguistic investigation, hedges are independent of context (op. cit.: 207). Though there are fundamental differences in Lakoff's conception of hedges to Jakobson's understanding of metonymy, the idea of hedges remains the same with regard to the gradual way the meaning of a word is being modified. In some of their later writings, Lakoff and Johnson did not focus on the extension (reference) of concepts but on the possibilities of categorising, and they also spoke of 'metonymy' (Lakoff and Johnson 1994: 35–40; Lakoff 1994: 77–90, 381 ff.). Though concepts

1 As Radden (1994: 75–79) points out, Lakoff argues indeed that the first structures a child is developing are not conceptual but image schemas. However, it is surprising that in general the child's language acquisition is not taken into consideration in Lakoff's reasoning.

are seen to be fuzzy in general, the meaning of 'bird' becomes 'more fuzzy' (Lakoff) when adding 'sort of', as in example 84. Lakoff's investigation was essentially a part of logic. Even in those days, fuzziness was a new approach in logics (see, for instance, Seising, Trillas, Moraga and Termini 2013: VII–X, 147–152, *et passim*). On the other hand, Lakoff's idea of hedges referred to the structuralists' view on language that was the contemporary paradigm in linguistics. In this view, semantic entities should be as discrete as phonemes or morphemes. However, the idea of a general fuzziness of word meaning calls the structuralists' view into question.

With respect to Lakoff's hedges, from an outsider's perspective, 'sort of' is a hedge, as in example 84, as it is difficult to clearly see what is really meant by the complement. From an inside point of view, the meaning of the concept 'bird' does not end at a decisive and dividing line (that one can imagine as a wall) any longer, however, 'sort of' provides the meaning of 'bird' with a limitation that is, in fact, flexible and permeable (that one can imagine just as a hedge) so that the true value of the concept is gradually extended. It is then possible to accept a penguin as a bird, or, in other words, the category 'penguin' can be added to the set 'bird'. In terms of Lakoff, then, it can be considered true, that a penguin is an animal which belongs to the category of birds; we can reasonably predicate (equate logically) 'bird' to 'penguin' now. Lakoff's hypothesis of hedges was supported by an experiment reported by Labov in 1973 (1974). Labov showed subjects pictures of cuplike items, and the research subjects had to identify the objects as either 'cups', 'mugs' or 'vases' (with variations in the course of the experiment). The experiment sought to find where speakers would end referring to an object exactly as a 'cup' and instead start using an additional hedge particle, or term it a 'mug' or 'vase' at the end. However, Labov's experiment is not valid in the context of hedges. Labov does not investigate meaning criteria in general but in terms of semiotics the sigmatic dimension of signs only, because the concepts 'cup', 'mug' and 'vase' remain invariable in every round of the experiment whereas the reference objects (the pictures shown) change. In this way, Labov's experiment has indeed been adopted, as it seems to us; it gives evidence of the reference potential of concepts. In addition, Labov also changed the context settings of the experiments and can state (1974: 357)

the consistency profiles for any given term are radically shifted as the subjects conceive of the objects in different functional settings. (...) The consistency profiles are regularly elevated for cup by the Coffee context, depressed by Food, and even further depressed by the Flower context.

This so-called Cup experiment is clever, anyway, but it is in no way surprising that 'function depending on setting' which means nothing more than 'meaning', is referred to by different terms: after all, the same man may, depending on the context, once be referred to as 'worker' and sometimes as 'father', 'lover', 'old man' or 'husband'.

Interestingly enough, the formula 'X is the A of B' is regarded by Lakoff as an hedge as well, for instance,

(84) America is **the Roman Empire** of the modern world (Lakoff 1972: 196).

However, this structure is a classical metaphor; the part of the sentence printed in bold faces

is the concept metaphorised, and ‘of the modern world’ is its context marker (cf. examples in chapter 2.2). But later, Lakoff uses only less complex examples — of a type we already know best, namely ‘A is B’! We have likewise criticised the implied assertion that utterances of the type ‘A is B’ are metaphors. By choosing such examples Lakoff underlines that, in fact, he is, just like Jakobson and Black, interested in logical equation. Like his predecessors Lakoff, too, cuts off any line to the philosophical tradition and its terminology. This is strange because this approach in itself shifts the view on metaphor to a completely general and epistemological level. Of course, by being critical of Lakoff’s theory we do not intend to diminish its epistemological value. Being interested in categories of thought, in the ontogenesis of these categories, and in the principles of categorising objects by concepts, conceptualism is probably right to take language and concepts into consideration, even though we are sceptical about the relationship between speech (language) and thought, a relationship conceptualists regard as being distinct and clear. By the way, in addition to the already criticised examples of the type ‘A is B’ Lakoff is also interested in the imagery of whole sentences or phrases, a matter which traditionally is under investigation by a discipline of linguistics, namely the phraseology — however, Lakoff does not undertake to refer to this tradition of research anyway.

Lakoff and Johnson wish ‘to show that the everyday language of a linguistic community is structured metaphorically, and thus their conceptual system and their actions’ (Liebert 1992: 28).² By “metaphor” the two Americans understand a basic structure of thought that is mirrored in language and that allows us to understand a conceptual domain by recourse to a different realm of experience’ (Jäkel 2003: 16).³ Thus, in essence, we deal with Black’s ‘projection of models’ again although his idea has a new appearance. This is how it becomes clear with Hülzer (1987: 218–246), Liebert (1992), Radden (1994) and Jäkel (2003: 19–41). These authors also give detailed descriptions of conceptualism, in general, we refer to their work. Lakoff and Johnson postulate *inter alia* the following: categories of thought, perfectly represented by concepts, in language, are based on experience. Categories or concepts respectively have an ‘open end’ so they can be modified by further experience, but they can also be applied to other experiences (Lakoff and Johnson 1994: 124–125). That is consistent with the findings of linguistics and philosophy: we have even brought the two-level-semantics into play. Based on this theory (see again, for instance, Bierwisch and Lang 1989: 472 ff.) we argue that a concept is an under- or undetermined and hence ‘openly applicable’ semantic form which is accompanied by an ‘experience-based’ d-interpretant that is anchored in our lifeworld (social group) and that gives us a perspective on our world (cf. diagram 12, page 109). Of course, on balance, the conceptualist would not deny this — it is the political-linguistic criticism of often ‘unquestioned’ perspectives (as, for instance, Wehling 2016 did) that are the commendable research results of conceptualism. Thus, conceptualism carries on the tradition of philosophical criticism of language usage.

2 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘zu zeigen, daß die Alltagssprache einer Sprachgemeinschaft metaphorisch strukturiert ist und damit auch deren begriffliches System und deren Handlungen.’

3 Our translation; orig. in German: ‘Unter Metapher verstehen die beiden Amerikaner eine in der Sprache widergespiegelte grundlegende Denkstruktur, welche uns eine Begriffsdomäne durch Rückgriff auf einen anderen Erfahrungsbereich begreifen lässt.’

According to Lakoff and Johnson an expansion of concept may happen gradually (the already mentioned ‘hedges’) or as a categorical leap: Lakoff and Johnson call such jumps ‘metaphor’ or ‘conceptual metaphors’. Here, the core idea of conceptual metaphors is that known and named gestalts (categories) are projected onto certain unknown structures⁴ what is now called ‘mapping’. We would like to add that, in case of an elementary predication, of course, categorising by means of a metaphor can be the best way — and often the only way — to utter what shall be expressed. However, Lakoff (1993: 208) provides the following example:

What constitutes the LOVE AS JOURNEY metaphor is not any particular word or expression. It is the ontological mapping across conceptual domains, from the source domain of journeys to the target domain of love. The metaphor is not just a matter of language, but of thought and reason. The language is secondary. The mapping is primary, in that it sanctions the use of source domain language and interference patterns for target domain concepts. The mapping is conventional, that is, it is a fixed part of our conceptual system, one of our conventional ways of conceptualizing love relationships.

Therefore mapping slips ideas (experiences) over even those human domains about which you can make bad or no experience: for instance, about love (‘Love is a journey’) or about time (‘Time is money,’ Lakoff and Johnson 1994: 115).

Our language is peppered with expressions like ‘I demolished his argument,’ ‘I attacked his major thesis,’ ‘He mustered many facts to support his position.’ Such expressions, according to Lakoff and Johnson, derive from and reflect the presence in our minds of a metaphorical *concept* which holds that ARGUMENT IS WAR. Conceptual metaphors need not, as such, be expressed. Evidence for their existence is provided by, and inferred from, those metaphors, like the ones listed above, which occur commonly and consistently in the everyday speech of most speakers. (Levin 1993: 119–120)

In this respect, the domain of experience (thought) that is mapped somehow corresponds to Weinrich’s field giving an image (cf. chapter 5.2) as, according to Lakoff and Johnson, mapping a source domain onto a target domain can be solved in speech quite differently, as long as the conceptual metaphor remains the same in all expressions. Therefore, the conceptual metaphor corresponds to our idea of a metaphor (cf. chapter 2.3). For explaining the manifoldness of statements, an idea of metaphor can reveal itself, yet instead of ‘fields’ or ‘domains’, the utterance potential in general and in particular the metaphorical perspective that both are based on human ability to differentiate between type and token exists. However, the idea of metaphor is predication (attribution), as we demonstrated in chapter 2. With regards to predication, it is not conclusive to assume mapping cognitive domains. We dispute the axiom of conceptualism that in contexts of statements such as ‘time is money,’ or ‘love is a journey,’ or ‘argument is war,’ the predication is needed for mapping known contents (‘money,’ ‘journey,’ ‘war’) onto unknown (‘time,’ ‘love,’ ‘argument’) ones.⁵ Just on the contrary: precisely because we very well know what really means time, how love can burn, what argument indeed means, we are able to put our experiences into words by means of an equation or another predica-

4 Structures? What are they made of? And where can we find them? In the *mundus sensibilis* (so they are perception, i.e. objects and facts of the world one can experience) or in the *mundus intelligibilis* (so they are apperception, i.e. other concepts or representations of perception)?

5 By the way, what kind of person is he who knows the war, a journey or the money, but not an argument, nor love, nor the time?

tion. Above all, such a predication is then an act of expected agreement with the audience, that is to say, an act of trial and error, since the audience is able to respond to our statement and dispute it.

Admittedly, our own approach does not completely contradict the view of Lakoff and Johnson, it merely shows how we deal socially with both the general phenomena of the nature of language, as well as of speech acts. In this context, the obvious facts raise questions. If concepts have an ‘open end’ and if this is understood as a peculiarity of their scope of meaning (and may this be called a conceptual metaphor), thus two questions arise: first, how can we — speakers and listeners — cope mentally and communicatively with all these uncertainties and gray areas of concepts; and secondly, where and how do we draw a boundary line between several concepts or conceptual metaphors in the end? Because we do! For instance, Lakoff (1993: 206) assign the following statements to the conceptual metaphor ‘Love as journey’ (by him, phrases in bold faces are underlined):

(85) It’s been a **long, bumpy road**, or We may have to **go our separate ways**.

(Nota bene: it is presupposed by Lakoff that these statements are about love.) However, it is clear to everyone that, if I agree to Shakespeare (cf. his 18th sonnet) that

(86) I may compare you to a **summer’s day**,

I would not try to explain my love by the same conceptual metaphor. But we ‘naturally’ draw a boundary between the metaphors of both examples 85 and 86. Although I want to argue at this point, that for me and for many other people summer days are of the closest associated with journeys — namely, with holiday trips. This association is the result of our experiences, of course, we have had on holidays. Therefore, according to conceptualism, I would have to assign example 87 to the conceptual metaphor ‘Love as journey’ — just as Lakoff does with his examples 86. But how would my assignment fit in Lakoff’s and Johnson’s theory? How could one objectively ascertain that my speech (example 86) reflects just this love-is-a-journey mapping, i.e. my ‘understanding the domain of love in terms of the domain of journeys’ (Lakoff 1993: 206)? Or, let us turn the question around: Why should example 86 reflect this mapping, this understanding? In chapter 5.2 we have dealt with a comparable problem wondering on how metaphors could be objectively assigned to Weinrich’s ‘Bildfelder’. It is the type-token-association that is treated rather poorly in conceptualism, but at last Lakoff goes to the heart of the problem — as seen in the following paragraph.

In a recent work Lakoff (1994) does not change examples, research questions, methods of analysis and his approach to metaphor, but he combines these features to depict how men categorise objects. Lakoff (1994: 7) is thus concerned with the prototype theory because ‘categories, in general, have the best examples (called “prototypes”):’

Reason, in the West, has long been assumed to be disembodied and abstract — distinct on the one hand from perception and the body and culture, and on the other hand from the mechanisms of imagination, for example, metaphor and mental imagery (...) The approach to prototype theory (...) suggests that human categorization is essentially a matter of both human experience and imagination — of perception, motor activity, and culture on the one hand, and metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery on the other. (Lakoff 1994: 7–8)

By the way, Lakoff's criticism about reason may be right. We look at visualisation and anchorage in a similar manner. However, his idea of metaphor is still a process that assigns something to a particular category (for instance, love to the category of traveling). This process does not simply carry out an elementary predication, but our thinking sees every metaphor in a large, reality-forming context of meaning structured in terms of prototypes and their characteristics (cf. Lakoff 1994: 15). Lakoff calls such a context of meaning an 'idealised cognitive model' (op.cit.: 13, *et passim*). So, in Lakoff's newer approach, there are no 'image fields' by which metaphors such as in example 72 or example 86 are fed and by which such metaphors were understood, but there is a general idea of traveling and money that we agree with, this is to say, an idea that includes Black's 'model' as well as it is idealised by prototype thinking. The idealised cognitive model is the basis for our understanding metaphors: 'This are gestalt-like knowledge structures that form the cognitive backdrop for our acting in the life world, including language comprehension' (Jäkel 2003: 138).⁶ Lakoff (1994: 381 ff.) shows in detail an example of how many statements circulate around a certain metaphor. Lakoff (op.cit.: 397–406) also agrees that the general idea that is most clearly related to the prototype is the so-called best example. Here, the characteristics of prototypes — for instance, family resemblance, membership gradience, or basic-level categorisation (op.cit.: 12–13) — produce the relationship of the utterance potential of a metaphor with its idealised cognitive model, and these characteristics of prototypes justify the classification of certain utterances under a proposed prototype, also. We stress that this description of how tokens are assigned to types is certainly an advantage of Lakoff's and Johnson's theory. However, explanations were put forward, the questions about the boundaries of particular type-token-associations that were raised with regard to examples 85 and 86 at the end of the last paragraph have not, in fact, been answered. Boundaries between the mappings of certain metaphors can be noticed but cannot be explained, nor predicted by the approach of conceptualism. In the following section we identify a few key points against Lakoff's and Johnson's conceptualism, however, only the type of criticism that has not been raised before. As well as criticism of Black's theory, there is the problem of the extent to which such metaphorical expressions as Lakoff (1994: 381 ff.) cited actually allow qualitative, content-related statements about the idealised cognitive models of the concepts uttered. Some of Lakoff's expressions allow such statements, some do not, and some remain very general. For instance, from the example 'When he saw her smile, his anger disappeared' (op.cit.: 397) Lakoff concluded that the appearance of anger is metaphorically expressed as presence (otherwise one would not be able to say that anger disappears). This goes without saying, as with hundreds of other emotions, such as frustration, for example. If such an emotional state was present, would one express this fact as if the frustration would be absent? Above all, the conceptual metaphors proposed by Lakoff (1994)⁷ were often constructed in the sense that these phrases would not be used as such. But, since, according to

6 Our translation; orig. in German: 'Hierbei handelt es sich um gestalthafte Wissensstrukturen, welche den kognitiven Hintergrund für unser Agieren in der Lebenswelt einschließlich unseres Sprachverstehens bilden.' Jäkel (2003: 138–141) makes further discussions of the idealised cognitive models, including critical.

7 In his book, he always writes conceptual metaphors in small caps. His followers copy this attitude and set great store by small caps.

Lakoff, a conceptual metaphor represented by several utterances reflects an idealised cognitive model (category, concept) prototypically, the conceptual metaphor itself should really exist in the language. For if we are talking about the similarities of objects, then one object (as the best example) always covers the variant to which all other examples have a similarity.

If we consider Lakoff's and Johnson's research background based on psychology, the authors hardly present any special studies or empirical research on their topics. However, they only briefly touch upon the history of research on predication regarding philosophy of language and epistemology, too. Lakoff's (1994) and Lakoff and Johnson's (1994) outlines seem to have as their sole purpose of distinguishing the own new theory from (supposedly!) outdated and traditional misconceptions. For the details of this criticism see Jäkel (2003: 134–138). Jäkel's study is additionally one of the few works that examines details of mapping on the basis of conceptualism. He investigates the alleged unidirectionality empirically. 'Unidirectionality' says that conceptualism only starts out from one direction of mapping, namely, 'known concrete → unknown abstract'. Jäkel classifies this kind of mapping as type I, but he classifies as types II and III two different directions of mapping that he can detect as well: 'abstract → concrete' and 'concrete → concrete'. Here Jäkel (2003: 83) observes that 'metaphors of the type I are interpreted consensually to a great extent [i.e. by most of the respondents] and, therefore, these metaphors allow intersubjective understanding. The heterogeneous attempts to interpret metaphors of the types II and III show a high possibility of mutual understanding'.⁸ Jäkel's study also shows that the discrimination between the types is tricky. In the end, one can just say that something familiar represented by a concept is mapped onto something unknown (or onto something less well-known or, at last, onto something you want to re-define) — but this is just what philosophers have called 'predication' long since: 'true' predication, elementary predication, quasi definitions *et cetera* used for the purpose of conceptualising (categorising) objects and facts! Therefore, one must diagnose again that the matter of conceptualism is predication and it is not metaphor, and predication is rather outdated.

The works of Lakoff and Lakoff and Johnson that we look at analyse their examples regardless of the question of context or utterance situation: either the reference of the statements is simply not considered (but parts of a sentence are allegedly related to each other), or the reference situation is given by definition (but without any detailed specifics). It is said, for instance, that in example 86 (see page 123) there are statements about love — but love has many facets! Obviously, in the two sets of № 86 it is not about love in its finest form, but about the description of crises. Does this fact play any part in Lakoff's and Johnson's analysis? (No, it doesn't.) And not only in this detail the method of conceptualism is imprecise. Its 'fuzzy' procedure should be summarised as follows:

- i The example of an utterance is given which is figurative in any way; for instance, 'I attacked his major thesis.' If necessary, there are other statements that include the same iconicity. They are also listed. (My statement: it's all about sentences and sentence mean-

8 Our translation; orig. in German: 'Metaphern vom Typ I werden weitgehend konsensuell interpretiert und ermöglichen daher auch intersubjektive Verständigung. Die heterogenen Deutungs-versuche der Metaphern vom Typ II/III lassen ein gemeinsames Verständnis als extrem gefährdet (...) erscheinen.'

- ing. Moreover, the prototype theory legitimises every selection of examples regardless to any *ratio philosophiae et ikonographiae traditio*.)
- ii From all figurative expressions that are detected a 'basic sentence' is somehow deduced. This basic sentence implies a quasi definition. (For some authors the basic sentence simply reflects the so-called proposition of the figurative expressions; see, for instance, Sperber and Wilson 1996.) For example, a basic sentence that could be deduced from 'I attacked his major thesis' may be 'Argument is war.' The basic sentence is known as well as the conceptual metaphor. In this case, it is very important thus to print the sentence in small caps: ARGUMENT IS WAR. (The truth is that the finding of the conceptual metaphor or, respectively, of the idea of the metaphor is already done by the selection and compilation of the examples.)
 - iii The quasi definition (basic sentence) is then treated as a 'mathematical' equation. In this case, it is then read as a connection of analogy regarding to the equation's operands: 'all you can say about the war, can be said about exchanging words.' (Thereby, it is said of the equation-basic sentence that it is an implication. For instance, 'to kiss' implicates 'to touch by the lips,' so that one can say that 'kissing is touching by the lips,' and *vice versa*. Accordingly, one should deduce from 'argument is war' that argument implicates war, and *vice versa*. However, this is obviously not true. The basic sentence is no implication and whatever is said about exchanging words and views, there are more manners of arguing than war. In addition, 'war' does not implicate 'argument' at all).
 - iv By means of the analogy, further statements about the figurative expressions detected in the beginning, are made; see, for instance, Lakoff and Johnson (1994: 139–140). (This is due to the utterance potential that lies within each act of reference, whenever possible.)

The conceptualist themselves describe their strategy, of course, quite differently — namely, as Jäkel (2003: 142) does.

More Questions for Conceptualism. Blending Theory (Fauconnier, Turner)

To sum up our criticism of Lakoff and Johnson the final question is the extent to which a classical metaphor can be explained by the conceptualist theory of predication. Lakoff, Johnson and Weinrich, for instance, list many linguistic versions for the conceptual metaphor 'Time is money':

- (87) Du **verschwendest** meine Zeit. Dies wird Ihnen viel Zeit **ersparen**. Dieser platte Reifen **kostete** mich eine Stunde. **Lohnt sich** das zeitlich für dich? Der Zeit**gewinn** ist enorm. Ich habe keine Zeit zu **verlieren**. *And:* Danke, dass Sie sich für uns Zeit **genommen** haben!

Transl. of sense: You're wasting my time. This will save you a lot of time. This flat tire costs me an hour. Is it worth to you in terms of time? The time saved is enormous. I have no time to lose. *And:* Thank you for taking time for us!

In fact, all figurative utterances in example 87 have something in common, namely the belief (idea) that time is a valuable property. However, in the German question *Lohnt sich das zeit-*

lich für dich? ‘Is it worth to you in terms of time?’ the adverb *zeitlich* which even says that time is at stake (‘in terms of time’) is the context marker, and the metaphor is the verb *sich lohnen* ‘to be worth’. That means if there is a conceptual metaphor, it should not be named ‘Time is money’ but rather ‘What is worth time, is benefit.’ Of course, this seems to be true although the statement could entail a dogma of effectiveness which not everyone may agree with.

The last deliberation is also valid for the other statements of № 87: the context markers are all the invariant lexical element *zeit* ‘time’, but the metaphors consist of different actions, and have different sentence meanings. To claim that there is a conceptual metaphor ‘Time is money’ suggests a similarity and unity of the parts of the statements that does not exist — and, moreover, suggests it pointing at the wrong lexical elements. If there would be only one conceptual metaphor in the statements of № 87 and the statements would be only variations of it, then it is strange why this principle of variance cannot so easily be exploited creatively. Nevertheless there are some possible variants in German, for instance, *Lohnt es sich finanziell?* ‘Is it worth in terms of money?’ or *Lohnt sich der Aufwand?* ‘Is it worth in terms of bother?’ However, these variants (and the English equivalents as well) turn out to sound trivial, and here *sich lohnen* (and ‘to be worth’ as well) isn’t a metaphor (anymore). Let us look at a better example. For instance, from the metaphor:

(88) etwas auf eigene **Faust** tun — *transl. by sense*: to do something on your own,

a willingness to take risks as well as to be responsible speaks even here, where the context is not about war and combat. On the other hand, observe that it is not possible to say in German:

(89) etwas auf fremde **Faust** tun — *transl. by sense*: to do something on somebody else’s ‘expenses’.

However, if a conceptual metaphor ‘Responsibility is a fist’ would be existent and if any mapping would work on the same principles of thinking, then example 89 should be possible.

Moreover, example 88 also shows a void of epistemology. As with Weinrich, so with Lakoff and Johnson detecting, determining or at least getting the metaphor is problematic. Is the conceptual metaphor that speaks of example 88 actually called ‘Responsibility is a fist’ as we got you to believe above? Assuming that this is true: what idealised cognitive model can be derived from ‘fist’? What can we map by it? Onto what? What conclusions that structure our actions do arise out of this? We would also like to raise question with regard to the examples 87 and 88: is it really important that certain lexical elements always remain the same, since the meaning of the expressions is always something else? One would not think so. If investigated further evidence for the concept ‘fist’ is metaphorised. In German, one would find, for instance:

(90) jemandem eine **Faust** zeigen; sich ins **Fäustchen** lachen; von der **Faust** weg schreiben; es **faustdick** hinter den Ohren haben; das passt wie die **Faust** aufs Auge;

transl. of sense only: to show someone a fist; someone is laughing up his sleeve; to write off of the thumb; there are sly ears; it fits like chalk and cheese.

The *Faust* ‘fist’ is common to all examples, but neither do these statements mean anything the

same, nor do they mean anything comparable, nor are they mapped models that could be named in each 'fist'-phrase to explain the image, that is, what is common to all statements regarding *Faust* 'fist': on one occasion, the fist is something evil, or a weapon; on another occasion, it is a place of secrecy in case of glee, or something relatively big and solid, *et cetera*. Looking at it from another angle is also instructive. The quality 'as a valuable property' has other expressions as well; for instance, in comparison with 'I have no time to lose' of example 87:

(91) to **lose** one's life *and*

(91') to **lose** one's wallet.

Only the first phrase, № 91, can be seen as a metaphor. However, the second phrase, № 91', is also about the loss of something valuable. It is the semantics of 'lose' that allows us to use a 'cognitive model' by which the quality 'as a valuable property' can be attributed to a target. If this target would not be valuable to us, we would have used 'leave behind' or 'forget'. It therefore comes to light that the semantics of 'lose' are the point here. With regards to what we have explained in the previous chapters, we can conclude that the 'cognitive model' that gets mapped is the ideal reference of 'lose'. Lakoff therefore did not touch upon ideal reference badly, as he introduced his 'idealised cognitive models'. However, these 'models', as well as any ideal references, are not suitable as a defining or structuring criterion for (classical) metaphors as both are general characteristics of concepts.

The question is the exact point at which linguistic knowledge fulfils the principles of gestalt-giving work. This is a problematic issue in Lakoff's and Johnson's theory. The gestalt principles work, but nonetheless, only where perception plays a role. Conceptualism, however, mixes the difference between the effects of the gestalt principles and the arbitrariness of the sign-sense-object-connection. If sense is a gestalt, then thought, action, objects and language are connected in an experience by this gestalt. Thus, sense (gestalt) is not one-sided in words, and may these words also be idealised concepts or conceptual domains. Rather, there is one meaning-laden situation and, respectively, a situation of performance is of gestalt: performance lets the perceiving person connect what is perceived by one's own and other involved persons 'in one sense', i.e. thinking, acting and speaking are all rolled into one gestalt. And, of course, the perceiving person has to map known gestalts (sense) onto actual experiences which reveal a certain situation in this way. Otherwise, the perceiver would be confused by the variety and the constant flow of experiences or, at least, he/she would lose all sense.

But language and speech do not reflect this proceeding one-to-one. Imagery and iconicity are not an evident linguistic mirror of these essential tasks. Without doubt, the iconicity used by a speaker reveals something of his/her basic attitudes (and it often does against his/her will). We have touched on the question of perspective already. If we, for instance, compare the German metaphor *Kindergarten* 'kindergarten' (see example 16 on page 42) with its Polish equivalent *przedszkole* 'pre-school', then it seems obvious that several regulatory and moral values are expressed by *przedszkole* than by *Kindergarten*. We say 'it seems' because interpreting both concepts in view of the values that they express is just a problem of individual visualisation, and insofar an issue of intercultural competence. In comparison with the Ger-

man iconicity of *Kindergarten, przedszkole* conveys a difference of the value of pre-school education. However, the ‘true’ meaning of *przedszkole* in Poland can be understood only by someone who is familiar with Polish culture — and perhaps one discovers that both conceptions of pre-school education, the German and the Polish, are similar regardless of their different names.¹ The collection of Zybatow (2006), for instance, takes such a cross-cultural approach into account. Or, after collecting metaphorical expressions that describe the global economic crisis 2007–2011 Jurgaitis (2015) has interculturally evaluated the notions that emerge from Lithuanian and German public discourses regarding the concept ‘crisis’. Jurgaitis can focus solely on the metaphors because the reference of the expressions he collected is clear.

Language and speech are involved in performance in many different ways. The analysis of language and speech is part of the problem, not part of the solution. Images and concepts make the world conceivable and utterable, but they are not the experience of the world (cf. Urban 1971). While recognising this helps to close gaps by systematic connection, they also convey ideas of order and moral from which, in turn, can open up possibilities for new actions. But images and concepts are neither a thinking of gestalts, nor a recognising of the sense itself. Let’s take a final example. Imagine a family on a long hike through the mountains. The family looks for a place to rest at a place that is marked on their map as a ‘picnic point’. They encounter a large, flat, and strange looking stone that could be either natural or artificial. Strangely, six blocks of wood stand around the stone. When the kids ask: ‘What’s that?’ — who would not answer: ‘This is a table with chairs! We have found the picnic point!’ Without doubt this is an act of ‘mapping’ (elementary predication). It was made possible because the concept of the table being a semantic form is functionally open: ‘a flat, semi-high object for sitting by and, for instance, eating.’ That means that language sets categories in advance while recognising what on the stone itself. This happens, on the one hand, for the sake of a specific interest the family has (they want to rest and examine the promised picnic place), and on the other hand it happens ‘open-ended’ and ‘open-minded’: all linguistic concepts are at the perceivers’ disposal. The children of the family, for instance, could see in the stone-wood-ensemble a playing ground as well. After the stone has been identified as a table or a toy, this new sense takes place in the subjective order of the hikers and the revealed gestalt resulting in new possibilities for action (the parents: pausing, eating, *et cetera*; the children: up and down climbing, jumping, *et cetera*).

We have deliberately written the stone-story from a psychological point of view. But we can also tell this story from the perspective of concepts. We do not need, however, conceptual metaphors and hedges then. Instead we are dealing with references, with elementary predication and with other kinds of predication. We can also simply say this: a concept has undergone a generalisation of meaning by its further application that expands the rules of its use. However, instead of sharing the linguistic and philosophical state of the art conceptualism

1 Because the concepts do not make any statement about their reference objects ‘in themselves’, i.e. about the reality of what is signified. If it would be otherwise, language would be a denotation of objects only, concepts would be of the indexical type of signs only and there would be ‘true naming’ (see also what we have touched on *verba univoca*, on pages 35 and 58).

has had 'had' to re-evaluate the theoretical place occupied by assertions, concepts and examples. Here, even Lakoff (1993: 203) was compelled to note:

The word 'metaphor' has come to be used differently in contemporary² metaphor research. It has come to mean 'a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system.' The term 'metaphorical expression' refers to a linguistic expression (...) that is the surface realization of such a cross-domain mapping (this is what the word 'metaphor' referred to in the old³ theory).

Therefore, one can easily find fault with the perception of literary critics who apply the theory of conceptual metaphor in the classical form. It is obvious that conceptualism tries to explain something very different from iconicity. Conceptualism is concerned with the cognitive side of predication as well as with the subjective part of our interpretants; at last, it is concerned with the mental categorisation of our world. And this is, of course, a research intention as advanced and difficult as admirable.

In another sense conceptualism is about a 'philosophy of symbolic forms', as Cassirer (2001) termed it (see my remarks in chapter 5.1). Conceptual thinking must be deciphered in terms of how it structures our actions and condition. From this 'philosophical' issue of conceptualism a whole series of individual studies have arisen, some of them carried out by Lakoff himself. A research summary can be found at Jäkel (2003: 131–134). As a result, the approach works in Cassirer's view, and even confirms his philosophy to certain extent. An example is Jäkel's (2003: 252–259) analysis of whether iconicity uses known philosophers of science (from Aristotle to Kuhn) in order to clarify the nature of science. Here it would be nice if we could learn even more of Jäkel, for example, does the iconicity used by philosophers unconsciously thwart their philosophy, or clearly illustrates them? Do we have to see this iconicity as a threat towards understanding the philosophers' works? What social relevance had the iconicity analysed by Jäkel have? Were only philosophers thinking about science in this iconic way, or did all contemporaries or groups within them? For initial 'answers' one could refer to Hänslér (2009) who in her investigation takes the social and discourse bondage of Robert Koch's (1843–1910) iconicity into account. She gives evidence, too, that the metaphors which the famous microbiologist used have not been illustrative linguistic accessories but an integral component of Koch's explanations and reasoning.

Although such new 'questions' for and about the new 'trends' of conceptualism, or in other words, its transformations into philosophy of knowledge as well as its practical application on, for instance, history or politics, involve a great potential for further research (if not to explain the classical metaphor), one has to state that conceptualism is already out — it is the blending theory that is *en vogue* now. However, the blending theory appears to be a 'second edition' of conceptualism (to be precise: of Black's model of thinking). At least the representation of the blending theory which the scholar duo Gilles Fauconnier (b. 1944) and Mark Turner (b. 1954) have elaborated after 2000 is grounded on attitudes comparable to Lakoff: that there was one common principle on how our mind works and that Fauconnier and Turner finally understood it. It can also be added that this monadological principle was

2 i.e. cognitive.

3 i.e. rhetorical.

merely of interest and all other matters — ‘the painting, the poem, the dream, the scientific insight — they did not look for what all these bits and pieces have in common’ (Fauconnier and Turner 2003: v). The two also say that at last conceptual blending was ‘responsible for the origins of language, art, religion, science, and other singular human feats,’ or, in other words, ‘for the explosion of creativity in tool-making, painting, and religious practice, dated by archaeologists to roughly 50,000 years ago’ (op. cit.: vi). And, consequently, the authors think that there was no need for systematically noticing previous insights of research (not even of cognitive scientists).

If we would go into more detail, then we would have to draw more astonishing parallels between the model of thinking represented by Fauconnier and Turner (2003) and the conceptualists’ model.⁴ However, Fauconnier and Turner have renamed the items: two ‘input spaces’ (of brain), that is, two ‘mental objects’ or cognitive domains based on several ‘mental frames’ get connected. Thus they give birth to a ‘blended space’ that can optimally be expressed by the ‘blend,’ this is to say, a ‘new’ concept or idea. The blend or the blended space consists of particular, selected elements and structures of the former input spaces, but it is not the input spaces itself. Since the selected elements and structures have initially been ‘mapped’ to each other but then they have been projected into a new or ‘discrete’ space (of brain). This is why we can speak of thinking as of blending because to get a new idea man has to blend just two elder thoughts. There is probably no one who would condemn this model of human thought, nor that it is such an innovative approach.

4 On the practical side, one of those parallels is that scholars have also used the blending theory for analysing political slogans and their world view (for instance, Thielemann 2014).

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Research that deals with metaphors and linguistic imagery has increased in the last thirty years. However, studies that question existing theories of metaphor from a comparative perspective are less common.

The reason for the present theoretical sketch was the metaphorical model of conceptualism, alias the cognitive theory of metaphor: at least with this theory, metaphor itself has become a metaphor, and the classical, rhetorical metaphor has been sidelined. Kessler's book not only criticises existing theories of metaphor, but also develops from them a discursive synthesis that seeks to rehabilitate the classical metaphor as an everyday pragmalinguistic phenomenon. For this purpose, the nature of thought, the mental lexicon, predication and word semantics are also covered.

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Logos Verlag Berlin

ISBN 978-3-8325-4701-1